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Abstracts

- **Concurrent Session Abstracts** (arranged alphabetically by author surname)
- **Panel Session Abstracts** (follow at the end here)

Concurrent Sessions

Aberdein, Andrew (Florida Institute of Technology)

Anonymous Arguments

[***Keywords***: *anonymous argument; ethics of argument; vices of argument; virtues of argument*]

Anonymous argumentation has recently been the focus of public controversy: flash points include the outing of pseudonymous bloggers by newspapers and the launch of an academic journal that expressly permits pseudonymous authorship. Similar debates took place in the nineteenth century over the then common practice of anonymous journalism. Advocates of anonymous argumentation in either era contend that it is essential if the widest range of voices are to be heard; its critics hold that it weakens the credibility of individual arguments and irresponsibly cheapens public discourse. This paper explores the implications of the controversy for the ethics of argument. Not all forms of anonymity give rise to the same problems. In particular, enduring pseudonyms can build up their own ethos. But accounts of argument appraisal that divorce arguments from arguers inherit any problems facing anonymous argumentation, because they effectively treat all arguments as if they were anonymous. Virtue theories of argument solve that problem, but they face a different problem of how to evaluate genuinely anonymous arguments. I suggest that this is a challenge which can be met: even the most austere forms of anonymity provide minimal indications of argumentative character. Virtue theories of argument also show us that we can distinguish good from bad uses of anonymous arguing, and thereby counter the charge of irresponsibility against such arguments.

Albersmeier, Frauke (Heinrich Heine University, Dusseldorf / Centre de recherche en éthique, Montreal)

Animal ethics education – a children's right

[***Keywords***: *children's rights; animal ethics; conscience; freedom of thought; moral education*]

In this talk, I argue that animal ethics education is a children's right that is disseminated over various already established rights. Navigating the moral dimensions of the multitude of (chosen and unwittingly adopted) relations humans typically have with nonhuman animals is such an important, inevitable and demanding task that it morally requires giving maturing moral agents access to information about these relations and providing them with environments in which moral deliberation pertaining specifically to these relations can be practiced. In order not to hinder human children in developing a significant aspect of their moral agency, the relevance of animal ethics education for realizing already established children's rights must be acknowledged.

I start (1) by clarifying some presuppositions about the nature of rights and concepts such as "moral education" and then (2) address the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, outlining the rights that are most pertinent to the matter of moral agency in relation to other animals. I go on (3) to discuss some of the possible starting points in ethical debates that an argument for a moral right to animal ethics education could depart from, such as Nussbaum's inclusion of the ability "to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature" in her list of capabilities (Nussbaum 2006, 77) and the view that humans have a right not to be made complicit in harms done

to animals (Boyer, Scotton & Wayne 2016). I show how both proposals should be interpreted as underlying an entitlement to a moral education that covers human-animal relations. Finally (4), I point out how failing children in this regard subjects them to bad constitutive moral luck and (5) indicate some challenges for implementing the results in practice.

Barn, Gulzaar (University of Amsterdam)

Genetic Justice

[***Keywords***: *genetic engineering, race science, technology*]

The longstanding bioethical debate surrounding creating 'better people' through developments in reproductive technologies and genetic engineering has taken on a renewed relevance. Artificial intelligence tools are being deployed in assisted reproductive technology services. Such tools make it possible to predict the height, IQ, eye colour, and even facial appearance of an embryo. Thought experiments that philosophers have long puzzled over, relating to the morality of selecting embryos according to such non-disease traits, are no longer situated in the hypothetical. The New Jersey start-up company, Genomic Prediction, claims to already offer predictions relating to these non-disease traits, and genomic prediction of facial features and skin tone is an active area of research. In this paper I suggest the widespread deployment of such technologies is incompatible with liberal principles. First, I argue that democratic procedure is undermined when society-altering technologies are developed, driven, and shaped primarily by investment from high-net worth individuals and scientists, rather than through public deliberation. Second, the non-disease traits deemed desirable in this context are poised to reinforce social hierarchies in a way that is incompatible with considerations of justice and relational equality.

Bazargan-Forward, Saba (UC San Diego)

Individual Accountability for Cooperatively Committed Wrongs

[***Keywords***: *collective action, group action, cooperation, complicity*]

How do we determine accountability in cooperative action? When a group of individuals in a hierarchical command structure work together to achieve some illicit goal, the individual in charge will typically bear more accountability that anyone else if only because of the causal influence she has. I argue, though, that the boss is also accountable in virtue of the normative authority she has over her underlings. This argument generalizes in a way that helps explain how each underling, in turn, can be accountable for more than the difference he makes to the wrong they together commit. When we evaluate a wrong by invoking the motivating reasons behind it, the wrongdoer's motivating reasons won't be enough if the wrongdoer is an underling acting on a boss's orders. To evaluate the underling's conduct in such a case, we need the reasons that the boss took there to be in favor of that conduct. In such cases, the boss has the function of constitutively determining a purpose for which the underling acts. I analyze such a purpose by invoking Joseph Raz's conception of a 'protected reason'. Where the purpose that the boss furnishes for the underling is morally bad, the boss can be accountable for that wrong-making feature of what the underling does. I call this 'authority-based accountability'. If the underlings agree with one another to work together in furtherance of achieving the boss's wrongful goal, each underling thereby enjoys authority over every other underling, in that each confers upon every other a protected reason to do his part. In such cases, the underlings act not only at the boss's behest, but at one another's behest. So, authority-based accountability not only inculpates the boss in what her underlings do, but inculpates the underlings as well with respect to what they do.

Bennett, Christopher (University of Sheffield)

Criminal Appeals and the 'Sovereignty of the Jury'

[***Keywords***: *Criminal Appeals; Authority; Innocence; Miscarriages Of Justice*]

This paper offers a partial defence of the reluctance of the Court of Appeal to overturn jury verdicts when there is evidence of factual innocence. Critics of the Court note that the reluctance seems to stem from a wish to respect the 'sovereignty of the jury.' However, a sympathetic articulation of the evaluative perspective underpinning this reluctance has not often been given in the academic literature. In this paper I articulate the Authority Argument, which claims that, in cases of factual innocence where the available evidence has been conscientiously reviewed by the original trial, quashing the conviction or ordering a retrial would be unnecessary (given that the responsibility to give the defendant a fair trial has already been met) and undesirable (because there are good reasons to give authority to the jury at the original trial and to uphold that authority). I argue that the Authority Argument is partially correct. There are important reasons to uphold the authority of the jury. These include reasons deriving from the need for finality in adjudication; and reasons to do with the value of public participation in public institutions such as the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, the Authority Argument does not provide the whole picture because the criminal justice system cannot disavow the importance of evidence of substantive innocence. The conclusion that we should draw is that the appeals process inevitably involves a conflict of values between respecting substantive innocence and respecting the authority of the jury.

Birks, David (University of Hong Kong)**,** and **Carroll, Ian** (University of Oxford)

Sin, Tyranny, and the Metaphysics Of Money

[***Keywords***: *Neutrality; Perfectionism; Political Liberalism; Taxation; Money*]

It is commonly assumed that states pay for goods and services with money collected through taxation. Taxation is coercive, and according to political liberals, the use of funds acquired through taxation has to be publicly justifiable to (at least some) citizens. In this paper, we propose that according to an alternative theory of money, states do not need to use money collected through taxation to pay for goods and services. Rather, states can simply create any amount of money. Money collected through taxes does not fund anything – it is simply destroyed. As a result, we show that certain influential objections offered by political liberals to the state funding of art galleries, abortion services, and churches are unsuccessful.

Bou-Habib, Paul (University of Essex)

Care for the Elderly: The Division of Responsibility between the Family and the Welfare State

[***Keywords***: *The elderly; care; filial duty; liberal equality*]

How should the responsibility to care for elderly citizens be divided between the welfare state and the family? Normative political theorists have had remarkably little to say in response to this question. This paper aims to move the literature forward by defending a view of "filial duty" – i.e. the duty that family members have to provide material and affective support for their elderly relatives - and by drawing its implications for welfare state policy. According to what I call the Guarantor View, family members do not have primary responsibility to offer material support for their elderly relatives but must guarantee such support in the event that the welfare state does not provide it to a sufficient extent. I argue that once we incorporate the Guarantor View into a liberal-egalitarian theory of social justice, a surprising implication follows about the extent to which the welfare state must provide support for the elderly. In order to ensure that the adult children of some elderly citizens are not unequally burdened relative to the adult children of other elderly citizens, the welfare state must support the elderly up to the point at which filial duties would no longer arise. In short, filial duty augments the responsibilities of the welfare state to care for elderly citizens (relative to the responsibilities it would have in the absence of filial duty).

Braun, Esther (University of Oxford)**,** and **Jennings, Katerina** (University of Oxford)

Beyond suppressing testosterone: a categorical system to achieve a "level playing field" in sport

[***Keywords***: *fairness; intersex; gender; sports ethics; categories in sport*]

Female athletes with differences of sexual development (DSD) that lead to elevated testosterone levels presumably have an athletic advantage over other women. Regulations implemented by World Athletics (WA) require persons with DSD to suppress their blood testosterone levels to those of average cis women in order to participate in women's sporting competitions. WA has justified this requirement by reference to the principle of fairness. In this paper, we reconstruct the notion of fairness put forward by WA. According to this notion, fairness requires a "level playing field" where no athlete may have a significant performance advantage based on factors other than talent, dedication, and hard work over an average athlete in their category.

We demonstrate that by placing regulations only on testosterone levels which presumably lead to an athletic advantage, while ignoring relevant physical as well as socioeconomic advantages, WA consistently fails to meet its own definition of fairness. We then discuss several ways in which this definition could be met: suppression of athletic advantages, enhancement of disadvantaged athletes, establishing a third "open" category, a handicap system, the abandonment of all categories, and a categorical system.

We argue that the categorical system, in which athletes compete in different categories based on individual properties that lead to significant performance advantages, is best suited for meeting WA's definition of fairness. To be logically consistent, WA should either adopt such a categorical system in lieu of the current binary gender-based system, or abandon its definition of fairness.

Brown, Jenny (University of Warwick)

Nursing, the biological penalty, and gender equality in the workplace

[***Keywords***: *autonomy; feminism; LGBTQI+; gender equality; children's interests*]

Recent work on gender and the workplace by economists has found that the persistence of a disparity in pay between men and women can overwhelming be accounted for by the disproportionate adoption of the primary caregiving role by women. Kleven et. al. (2018) describe the difference in pay between men and women as consisting mainly of a 'child penalty' wherein for many women performing work roles in a manner identical to their male counterparts, and identical to their pre-parenting performance, is often not an option.

Kleven et. al. suggest that environmental influences, such as gender socialisation and its effect of the formation of preferences in girls and women, can explain the difference in the career decisions made by men and women on becoming parents. I do not dispute the likelihood of these factors, but in this paper I focus on a biological aspect of parenting, namely breastfeeding (hereafter referred to by gender-neutral term, nursing), which has the potential to influence who takes on the role of primary caregiver, or how the share of parenting tasks is divided up.

I take one assumption – that governments should support parents and/or carers to do what is in the best interests of a child – as a reason to take seriously the World Health Organisation's recommendation that children be fed human milk exclusively for 6 months. If parents are to be able to meet this evidence-based recommendation, it is clear that significant accommodations need to be made in many if not all workplaces. Not only that, but the task of meeting this recommendation will fall on those humans who lactate, that is, in the main, women. If accommodations are not made, this biological fact can function as a 'biological penalty' for women, where equal performance with men in the workplace is less achievable.

The issue of nursing and its place in parenting reveals significant tensions within feminism between pursuing gender equality in a manner that erases biological difference as much as possible - treating men and women as equally fungible as parents - and embracing and celebrating the specialised abilities of women's bodies and centring the mother-child dyad in family narratives. I make two main recommendations in the paper, which negotiate this tension. The first is to re-value the biological role

of nursing: if exclusive nursing is to become a norm that does not carry with it a biological penalty, not only should nursing at or around work become as costless as possible, but also that role should be shared amongst mothers, parents, partners, family, friends, and altruistic strangers in human milk banks. The second is to de-gender the biological role of nursing as far as possible: by, for example, highlighting and normalising nursing by non-gestational partners, and 'chestfeeding' by trans men and gender non-binary persons. I argue that the pursuit of both of these strategies could support the best interests of children, and workplace gender equality, in roughly equal measure, thereby pursuing a legitimate public health target in a manner that does not further entrench women's inequality.

Cassinadri, Guido (Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies)**,** and **Fasoli, Marco** (University of Rome La Sapienza")

The assessment of capacities of cognitive tool-users: from extended to integrated cognitive systems

[***Keywords***: *extended cognition; integrated cognition; assessment of capacities, cognitive enhancement; cogntive diminishment*]

Given the explanatory stalemate between 'embedded' (EMB) and 'extended' (EXT) cognition, various authors have proposed normative arguments to overcome such a deadlock in favour of EXT. In this article, we criticise King (2016) and Vold's (2018) 'argument from assessment of capacities' (AAC), as well as Clowes (2013) and Farina and Lavazza's (2022) 'cognitive diminishment argument' (CDA). AAC states that EXT is better at attributing cognitive credit to individuals with learning disabilities who use assistive tools to complete their learning tasks. According to CDA, EXT is better than EMB since the latter implies the cognitive diminishment of the agent, while the former implies the agent's cognitive enhancement. Our thesis is that AAC and CDA present a flawed dichotomy between EXT and EMB and that there are alternative and more informative approaches when compared to EXT. We argue that AAC and CDA suffer from the agential bias, by failing to acknowledge that human agency and cognition are characterised by a relational dependence on external resources. Moreover, AAC and CDA assume a flawed characterisation of EMB in terms of a 'principle of intracranialism', which ignores the complex skills involved in cognitive integration. We argue that Heersmink's (2015) account of cognitive integration (INT) and Malafouris's (2013) material engagement theory (MET) do not suffer from these flaws. Moreover, by combining INT with Fasoli's (2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts, we obtain the framework 'INT+', which is more informative in attributing cognitive credit to tool-users when compared to EXT. Moreover, INT+ distinguishes between cognitive enhancement and cognitive diminishment, allowing us to normatively assess the trade-offs of the cognitive capacities we enhance and diminish by relying on cognitive artifacts. To conclude, we reply to King's counterargument arguing that INT+ is better at assessing the capacities of tool-users by using a contextual, fine-grained, and multilevel analysis of cognitive delegation.

Cutas, Daniela (Lund University)

Bodily integrity versus family interests

[***Keywords***: *family interests, posthumous reproduction, uterus transplants, fertility preservation for children, bodily integrity*]

In this talk, I look at tensions that may arise between respecting individuals' bodily integrity and respecting familial requests. I will start by listing three different kinds of cases: reproduction with a dying/deceased spouse, fertility preservation for children, and uterus transplants from mother to daughter. I use these cases to tease out the interests that may be at play in the request – and success – of such endeavours. I show how cases such as these can help bring to light the – still – fragile boundaries between individuals in a family. To date, much the ethics literature on posthumous reproduction and fertility preservation for children has sought to justify intervention in the name of the interests of the person being harvested, or in the name of familial interests (which are assumed to include and express the interests of the person to be intervened on). In my talk, I will problematise these claims and contrast them with the demands of bodily integrity – which are only compounded by the fact that an individual may be unable to or very much expected to consent.

De Marco, Gabriel (University of Oxford)

Resistible Nudges

[***Keywords***: *Nudges; Behavioral Influence; Resistibility*]

In the literature on the ethics of nudging, it is often claimed that an important moral consideration is whether a nudge is easy to resist; if it is not easy to resist, then we have a strong reason not to implement it. However, authors tend to rely on an intuitive understanding of what it is for a nudge to be easy to resist, without offering an explicit account. The two exceptions to this are Saghai's influential account (2013), and Kipper's recent alternative (2021). In other work I have, with a co-author, argued against both of these accounts. In this paper, I begin to provide a foundation for a new account of what it is for a nudge to be resistible.

The paper has two main parts. First, I consider what it is to resist a nudge, or a nudge-like influence. It is commonly thought that to resist a nudge is just to behave in a way that is contrary to the intention behind the nudge; if a nudge is intended to get people to A, then resisting the nudge involves not A-ing. I argue that this conception will not capture everything of interest to us, and offer an alternative conception.

Second, having these two conceptions of what it is to resist a nudge, I move to what it takes to have the ability to resist a nudge. Making use of the extensive literature on agential abilities, I draw some lessons concerning this ability.

Douglas, Tom (University of Oxford)

What Does It Take to Trespass on a Person's Body?

[***Keywords***: *bodily interference; bodily integrity; self-ownership; trespass*]

It is standardly thought, in medical and sexual ethics, that each person enjoys a moral right against interference with her body. However, the scope of the right remains very unclear. Against which interventions, exactly, does the right protect us? Or, as I will sometimes put it, which interventions constitute bodily trespass? In this paper, I begin to answer this question.

I first develop a narrow–and I hope broadly acceptable–account of bodily trespass. On this account, A trespasses on B's body if, without B's valid consent, A either (i) intentionally touches B's body with A's own body or with an object that A controls, or (ii) A intentionally, significantly and via purely physical (not psychological) means alters B's bodily states.

I then show that there is a case for broadening this account in two ways: by weakening the requirement that touchings and alterations must be intended in order to qualify as bodily trespass, and by weakening the requirement that they must be produced via purely physical means.

These arguments lead me to propose a broader, revised account of bodily trespass–one that, I claim, sets the boundaries of bodily trespass in a less morally arbitrary way. However this account does, I concede, have some surprising (and some may think implausible) implications. For example, it implies that some rather mundane types of psychological influence, such as wearing perfume on a date, can constitute bodily trespass.

I thus end by posing a dilemma: either accept a narrower account of bodily trespass, in which the boundaries of bodily trespass are morally arbitrary, or accept a broader account of bodily trespass, on which many more interventions count as bodily trespass than is typically assumed, and than some would find plausible.

Düvel, Eike (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)**,** and **García Portela, Laura** (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)

Normative emissions accounting and the relevance of contributing to climate change

[***Keywords***: *emissions accounting,*]

Normative emissions accounting concerns “on whose books” emissions should be from the perspective of justice. The standard approach, also used by the IPCC report, is production-based emissions accounting (PBEA) which assigns emissions to producers of goods. The alternative is consumption-based emissions accounting (CBEA) which assigns emissions to consumers of those goods. Almost all philosophers participating in the debate on normative emissions accounting have adopted what we call the instrumental approach to emissions accounting. According to this approach, our choice of emissions accounting mechanism should be guided by broader justice considerations, such as who has the capacity to bear climate policy-related burdens that would follow the allocation of emissions. In this way, the question of ‘on whose books emissions should go’ is instrumental to the question of ‘who should bear climate policy-related burdens’. Or, in other words, that the emissions accounting question is instrumental to the principle of burden-sharing question. In this paper, we argue that this approach is mistaken. We argue that the choice of emissions accounting only has relevance if one’s theory of climate justice is based on a principle of contribution to the problem, such as the Polluter Pays Principle. That is, one only needs to address the question of on whose books emissions should go if one believes that emitting is the relevant factor to then distribute climate policy burdens. In that sense, when one decides to engage in the emissions accounting question, one has already decided on the relevant principle of climate justice: the Polluter Pays Principle. Then, the question is who the normatively relevant polluter is. In this paper, we provide some criteria to decide on that question, which we believe should be the core question of normative emissions accounting.

Eskens, Romy (Utrecht University)

Mental Wronging

[***Keywords***: *Normative ethics; ethics of attitudes; degrading wrongs*]

Can one person wrong another through purely mental activity? It seems so. Suppose A intentionally and non-compulsively fantasizes about raping B. Even if A keeps their mental activity secret from everyone, it seems fitting for A to feel guilty over it with respect to B. Moreover, if B were to find out about the fantasizing, it seems they could fittingly resent A for it and demand an apology. These are all signs that a wronging has occurred. But, despite these signs, the possibility of such ‘mental wronging’ seems ruled out by a basic and widely shared assumption underpinning theorizing about wronging – that one person wrongs another only if they treat them in some way, and that treating another in some way requires (at least) affecting them. If it’s true that purely mental activity doesn’t affect anyone, then it’s true that it can’t wrong anyone.

This paper has two complementary aims. The first is to show that the basic assumption doesn’t in fact rule out the possibility of mental wronging. Accounts of the affecting required for treatment that would exclude purely mental activity are implausibly narrow, and there are ways of affecting others that even purely mental activity can realise. The second is to identify degradation as a sufficient ground for mental wronging. I argue that purely mental activity can degrade others through the same mechanisms that physical activity can, and that when it does, the subject of degradation is wronged. What results is an improved account of mental wronging, supported not only by the normative evidence offered by particular cases, but also by an answer to the treatment-based objection to its possibility and a deeper story about what it is in virtue of which one person’s purely mental activity might wrong another.

Faissner, Mirjam (Ruhr University Bochum)

Structural Racism and the Ethics of Coercion in Mental Healthcare

[***Keywords***: *Coercion, Psychiatry, Discrimination, Intersectionality, Oppression, Implicit bias*]

In mental health ethics, it is generally assumed that coercive measures are sometimes justified when a person with mental illness endangers themselves or others. Coercive measures are regarded as ethically justified only when certain criteria are fulfilled: for example, the intervention must be proportional in relation to the potential harm. In this paper, we demonstrate shortcomings of this established ethical framework in cases where people with mental illness experience structural racism.

By drawing on a case example from mental healthcare, we first demonstrate that biases in assessing whether the coercive intervention is proportional are likely, for example due to an overestimation of dangerousness and an underestimation of the impact of coercion on the service user. We then show that even if proportionality is assessed correctly, and the specific coercive intervention would thus be regarded as ethically justified according to the standard framework, coercion may still be unjust. This is because the standard framework does not consider how situations in which coercive measures are applied arise. If structural racism causally contributes to such situations, the use of coercion can compound the prior injustice of racist discrimination. We conclude that the ethical analysis of coercion in mental healthcare should consider the possibility of discriminatory biases and practices and systematically take the influence of structural discrimination into account.

Fisher, Sarah (University College London)

"Death to Khamenei". A case for applying the illocution-perlocution distinction in online content moderation

[***Keywords***: *Online content moderation; Free Speech; Harm; Illocutionary act; Perlocutionary effect*]

The paper explores a series of recent content moderation decisions made by the tech company Meta and its Oversight Board, concerning a Facebook post of "death to Khamenei" (or, in the original Farsi, "marg barâ€¦Khamenei"). While the post was initially removed, as a violation of Facebook's Violence and Incitement Community Standard, Meta later granted it a "newsworthiness allowance" on the basis that the risk of harm to the Iranian leader was negligible and outweighed by the significant public interest in the anti-regime perspective being voiced. The subsequent ruling of the Oversight Board similarly concluded that the post should be allowed to stand – but that conclusion was reached for quite different reasons. The Board ruled that "death to Khamenei" here was a rhetorical expression of criticism, disdain or disgust for Khamenei (better translated as "down with Khamenei") rather than literally calling for his death. As such, the post did not violate the Violence and Incitement Community Standard and did not require any special allowance to appear on the platform.

I argue that this landmark case calls for a thoughtful application of the philosophical distinction between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary effects, which was originally drawn by J.L. Austin in the mid-20th Century. While Meta focused on weighing up the (harmful or beneficial) perlocutionary effects of the post, the Oversight Board reinterpreted its direct illocutionary force. Nevertheless, the reasoning of both parties frequently conflates these two aspects of speech in a way that I argue is ultimately unhelpful. I show how disentangling them is crucial for clarifying the underlying principles of online content moderation and ensuring the coherence of future moderation decisions. In a world where social media plays an increasingly important role in public discourse, this is essential if we are to protect free speech while managing its risks.

Forsberg, Lisa (University of Oxford)

Consent-sensitive duties and children

[***Keywords***: *consent; children; autonomy; well-being; duties*]

The philosophical literature on consent has so far mainly focused on standard agents–autonomous adults–with relatively little attention paid to children's consent. In the little literature there is on children's consent, the focus has typically been on children's capacities, and whether they have the capacities necessary to give valid consent. This paper focuses instead on what justifies consent requirements and how this justification applies to children. I begin by attempting to apply standard accounts of when and why consent is morally required in respect of certain forms of conduct, including both the standard cases of medical treatment and sex, and less standard cases, to children. I argue that, when applied to children, standard accounts of when and why consent is morally required face a number of difficulties. I then consider a possible explanation for why standard accounts struggle to provide a plausible view about the value of children's consent, according to which they do not pay sufficient attention to how we relate normatively to children and in particular the central role that concern for their well-being plays in how we relate to them and structures our duties

to them. I argue that our duties towards children are not consent-sensitive in the same way as our duties towards adults, but that the difference is not explained primarily by limitations in children's autonomy. I then consider two objections, including that children's consent is not really special in that we place limitations on it, for we place limitations on adult consent too, and that in many cases in which we talk about children's consent, what we are talking about is not actually consent proper. Finally, I consider some implications of my arguments, including what thinking about children and thinking beyond the standard cases can tell us about consent more generally.

Frowe, Helen (Stockholm University)

The Comparative Claims of Victims

[***Keywords***: *duties to rescue; culpable victims; negligence; recklessness*]

There is something intuitively appealing about the idea that someone who is imperilled as a result of her own wrongdoing has a weaker claim to assistance compared to an innocently imperilled victim. This intuition is strongest when the victim is imperilled as a result of some intrinsically wrongful act. But it is not only obviously culpable victims who plausibly have weaker claims to assistance. Those who recklessly or negligently endanger themselves might also have weaker claims, even if their reckless or negligent act is not intrinsically wrong but rather, as I will suggest, wrong only in virtue of the fact that it has rendered them in need of rescue, or risks doing so. Specifically, it can affect the chance of rescue that they ought to be given in conflict cases – that is, cases in which a rescuer cannot save all those in peril. As I argue, subject to proportionality constraints, rescuers are sometimes required to simply save innocent victims in conflict cases, giving wrongdoers, including the reckless and the negligent, no chance of rescue at all.

Section 2 considers cases in which a victim is imperilled as a result of performing an intrinsically wrongful action. I argue that when her wrongdoing causes, or will cause, other victims to be worse off, she lacks a claim to be rescued. Section 3 argues that those who permissibly impose risks of harm on others can lack claims to be rescued in conflict cases. Section 4 argues that those who recklessly or negligently endanger themselves can act wrongly if they thereby decrease the chances that innocent people will be saved or increase the chances that innocent people will incur costs for their sake. Like those whose imperilling actions are intrinsically wrong, reckless and negligent victims lack claims to be saved in conflict cases.

Giannopoulou, Areti (Keele University)

Political Friendship and Ecological Sustainability

[***Keywords***: *Polititical Friendship; Aristotle; Degrowth; Economy; Sustainability*]

The objective of my paper is to show how a contemporary account of political friendship could provide the ethical grounding and contribute to the realization of an economy in the service of human flourishing. I start from the fact of the lack of friendship in the public sphere as this is reflected in the huge economic inequalities in contemporary capitalist societies, and I argue for the need for conceiving an alternative economy that would enable citizens to see and treat one another as friends and develop a harmonious relation with nature. The Aristotelian political friendship, I claim, incorporating genuine concern for the others' well-being could allow us to identify the pathology of the capitalist market economy and envision a socially and ecologically sustainable future. Hence, I explore Aristotle's conception of friendship and political friendship by drawing on his Rhetoric, Nicomachean Ethics, and Eudemian Ethics and then I update the Aristotelian idea by developing a primordial conception of the good life that consists in living within a political community and benefiting fellow citizens namely contributing to their self-preservation and self-realization by joining genuine political praxis. Next, I investigate economic proposals, such as market socialism, Otto Neurath's associational socialism, and the solidarity economy, which are compatible with the content of my account of political friendship. Then, I am deepening on the meaning of political friendship by foregrounding its organic root, that is, human sociability and I focus on the degrowth environmental movement which by proposing the downscaling of economic production and the abandonment of

empty materialism, in effect, fosters this instinctual substratum of political friendship. Finally, I maintain that the call for genuine political – economic praxis that political friendship encapsulates could enable the degrowth movement to retain its radical character and establish an economy that affirms life.

Glorieux, Dries (King's College London)

Benefiting from enduring injustice: the case of zoning

[***Keywords***: *Enduring injustice; benefiting; zoning; remedial duties; historical common-source problem*]

In his book Should Race Matter? David Boonin takes aim at benefiting-based accounts of reparations for historical injustice. He raises a powerful objection which I shall refer to as the historical common-source problem. This objection holds that there is no normative significance to a common historical injustice between benefits and harm in the present. I argue that despite its intuitive appeal the problem does not present an insurmountable barrier to such accounts. I do this by developing a novel conception of benefiting which is capable of addressing the problem. I call this conception benefiting from enduring injustice. A historical injustice becomes enduring when laws adopted in the past to discriminate against minorities endure into the present, sustaining a state of affairs in which their interests are wrongfully set back as well. I contend that enduring injustice benefits beneficiaries in the present by continuing a distribution of economic rents rooted in discriminatory legislation. I argue that their receipt and subsequent retention of this benefit sustains wrongful harm in the present. As a result of this they incur remedial duties towards victims in the present, thus escaping the historical common-source problem. In the second half of the paper I apply this account of benefiting to the topic of zoning. I show that zoning had explicit discriminatory intentions from its inception during the Jim Crow era and that its well documented exclusionary effects in the present sustain a distribution of economic rents that advantages some whilst harming others. I conclude by outlining what the beneficiaries' remedial duties might consist of.

Izatt, Alyssa (University of British Columbia, Department of Philosophy)

The Metaphysics of Pregnancy and Moral Interpretation

[***Keywords***: *Metaphysics; Ethics; Philosophy of pregnancy; reproductive ethics;*]

The philosophy of pregnancy is well represented in the moral literature. There, the conversation primarily centres on questions relating to the moral status of the fetus, the rights of the pregnant person and the fetus, or the permissibility of emerging Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs). However, literature is emerging on the less examined topic of the metaphysics of pregnancy. Metaphysical assumptions about pregnancy are prevalent in moral philosophy, and in the popular debates on abortion. However, these metaphysical commitments are not often articulated explicitly. Drawing out and challenging these foundational elements is helpful in clarifying the arguments in the moral domain. Indeed, as some scholars have argued, certain misguided metaphysical accounts of pregnancy tend to go along with or give support to equally problematic moral accounts.

In this paper, I draw on Anne Sophie Meincke's process account of pregnancy, where she argues that the foster and gravida are best understood as a bifurcating process: one process that is becoming two. I will argue that her view is compatible with organismal proper overlap, which occurs when two individuals share a part but are also distinct. This applies to the foster and gravida insofar as pregnancy is understood as a process of emerging individuality for the foster. I then elaborate on the importance of these metaphysical underpinnings in formulating our moral understanding of pregnancy. I will apply this metaphysical account of pregnancy to three questions of moral and metaphysical interest. Firstly, what is the fetus? Secondly, what is the relationship between the gestator and the fetus? Thirdly, what is our connection to our past embryo or fetus? Ultimately, I aim to provide a better understanding of the metaphysical and moral issues at stake in pregnancy, as well as the interconnectedness of the moral and metaphysical scholarship in this domain.

Jefferson, Anneli (Cardiff University)

(Moral) Ignorance, culpability and proleptic blame

[***Keywords***: *moral responsibility, ignorance, proleptic blame*]

Everyday moral intuitions and the moral responsibility literature broadly agree that ignorance excuses if a person couldn't reasonably be expected to know that what they were doing was wrong. However, philosophers have argued that in certain situations, we should reproach or even punish those who couldn't have known better in order to affect positive change. Cheshire Calhoun proposes this in the context of sexist behaviour, claiming that these cases often involve moral ignorance. Elinor Mason has suggested in some cases of non-consensual sex, offenders should be punished in order to affect societal change, even if they believed that their partner was consenting and this belief was subjectively reasonable given their (sexist) socialisation. An obvious worry concerning these proposals is whether we are justified to blame in order to affect societal change. One possible way of justifying blame in these cases is to deny that ignorance excuses and say that the ignorance itself it expressive of some kind of moral shortcoming. I pursue a different approach by shifting the question to what blame is trying to achieve. I argue that blame in these cases is proleptic, and that it is particularly apt when we have cases that involve some level of moral ignorance. Proleptic blame primarily aims at a change in the person blamed and is a social device for negotiating moral wrongs. This moves the question away from classic questions of culpability. In many cases, especially those involving criminal punishment, there is still an extent to which agents who are blamed and punished for these kinds of moral errors are used as an example for society more broadly. But this form of use is not one that bypasses engagement with the agent or is indifferent to their moral development.

Karhu, Todd (King's College London)

Why Active Euthanasia Should be Legal, Even If It's Immoral

[***Keywords***: *Active euthanasia; suicide; killing; non-interference*]

Arguments for legalizing active euthanasia often rely on the premise that most individual instances of the practice are morally permissible. In this talk, I give an argument for its legalization which is entirely compatible with the claim that every instance of active euthanasia is morally impermissible when performed. The argument is simple but to my knowledge novel. It begins by establishing that people have a right against others that they not be prevented from killing themselves when their decision to do so is informed, autonomous, and expectably in their best interest. I next argue that this right extends to a right that informed and rational patients have against third parties that those parties not deter other people from killing the patients upon their request. Since at the legal prohibition of active euthanasia will predictably deter medical practitioners from performing it, legislators infringe patients' rights by prohibiting the practice, even if by doing so they would only prevent impermissible acts. I next aim to show that such a prohibition not only constitutes a rights-infringement, but one which is all-things-considered impermissible. While we are sometimes justified in infringing even stringent rights, since active euthanasia is not harmful, any justification for the rights-infringement–if such justification exists–would likely derive from the putative impermissibility of active euthanasia itself. So, I offer reasons for thinking that the mere fact that someone's act would be impermissible does not in and of itself justify taking steps to prevent it. Accordingly, legislators appear to lack a justification for infringing the rights they do by illegalizing active euthanasia, even if the practice is morally impermissible. It is therefore morally incumbent on legislators to legalize the practice, regardless of its deontic status.

Khorasanee, Kasim (University of Nottingham)

The Market, The Forum, and Honest Speech

[***Keywords***: *Free Speech; Economic Regulation; Information Asymmetry; Fraud*]

The marketplace of ideas is a colourful metaphor with a long history of being used to argue for freedom of speech. It does so through three steps:

1. Economic markets are – or should be – unregulated.

2. The absence of regulation is conductive to market success.

3. The public forum is, in a relevant sense, analogous to the market and therefore will likewise benefit from the absence of regulation.

Much criticism of the metaphor has focused on the third step and the disanalogy between market dynamics and how ideas are supplied and consumed. This paper adopts a different approach by focusing on the honesty-regulated nature of market speech and in so doing inverting the orthodox reading of the metaphor by exploring how speech in the market is itself regulated for honesty. This analysis is illustrated with a set of contemporary legal fraud and misrepresentation cases. Drawing on the economics literature on information asymmetry this paper finds that the best justification for these honesty regulations is enabling market participants to rely upon one another's statements. A parallel literature within philosophy identifies honesty and reliable channels of communication as fundamental to carrying out our moral duties. Drawing these two strands together – the revised understanding of the marketplace of ideas metaphor lends support to the idea of regulating public speech for honesty, to preserve the reliability of the communicative practices which we rely upon for social coordination.

Kowalczyk, Kacper (University College London)

A New Puzzle for Limited Aggregation

[***Keywords***: *aggregation; risk*]

This paper presents a new puzzle for limited aggregation. The puzzle shows incompatibility between limited aggregation and plausible principles about risk. The puzzle is different in type from other familiar puzzles that face aggregation sceptics in cases of risk. Some possible responses are laid out and explored.

Kwan, Jonathan (New York University Abu Dhabi)

Transitional Legitimacy: Non-Ideal Theory in Circumstances of Structural Racism

[***Keywords***: *legitimacy; non-ideal theory; structural racism; transitional justice; oppression*]

Structural racism is often denounced, and rightly so, as unjust. Less often noted is that structural racism also undermines a political entity's very legitimacy, or its right to rule–a weaker but prior demand to justice. I argue that there is reason internally connected to the value of legitimacy itself as to why theories of legitimacy should be non-ideal theories. That is, they ought to consider how to realize legitimacy in circumstances of oppression, domination, and historical injustices. I criticize existing theories of legitimacy, based on consent, public reason, human rights, and democracy, for merely seeking to specify what conditions constitute legitimacy but failing to interrogate how to realize legitimacy under non-ideal conditions. To develop what a non-ideal theory of legitimacy should look like, I advance a concept of transitional legitimacy by analogy to transitional justice, which considers what justice requires in the aftermath of war, conflict, or large-scale human rights abuses. I compare the "problems" and "circumstances" of transitional legitimacy versus transitional justice and evaluate the descriptive and normative roles that the notion of "transition" is meant to play. Finally, I substantiate the content of transitional legitimacy by applying it to the case of U.S. anti-Black racism. I argue that transitional legitimacy will require the public acknowledgment of past injustices and the reaffirmation of political equality, the rule of law to guard against racial discrimination, the dismantling of racialized mass incarceration, effective de facto protection of democratic rights, and reparations for past and enduring injustices.

Lang, Gerald (University of Leeds)

Slacking Off

[***Keywords***: *Taking up the slack; remedial duties; fairness; ownership of duties*]

If some agents refuse to do their fair share in remedying suffering and deprivation, should conscientious agents take up the slack? Many have supported the existence of enforceable slack-taking: for these thinkers, beneficence trumps the unfairness of slack-taking, and slacking, after all, is just one more source of wrongness that has to be factored into the mix of factors that generates remedial duties in the first place. Why should this specific form of wrongdoing arrest the creation of additional remedial duties, while other forms of wrongdoing are readily generative of remedial duties?

An unadulterated enthusiasm for slack-taking, and more particularly enforceable slack-taking, has its drawbacks. We must avoid embracing a picture of remedial duty generation whereby the duty breached by agent P's slacking is then freely transferred as a slack-taking duty to agent Q, appealing only to the same patient-centred concern for those individuals in dire need that generated P's original duty. This 'free transfer' picture of remedial duty creation makes it difficult to recognize the wrongdoing in P's slacking. If the duty P has breached is now squarely Q's business, then what is there left to complain about to P? Even if we wish to say that P should compensate Q for these extra burdens, what can ground this conviction?

To redeem the thought that P is seriously at fault for slacking, I will argue that we should appeal to the claim that we own our duties. These duties cannot be freely transferred, at least by appeal solely to patient-centred concerns. Even if Q has strong reasons to take up the slack, these ideas about ownership do not leave everything in their place. As a result, and just as David Miller suggests, reasons to take up the slack may exist but remain non-enforceable.

Lin, Kida (University of Oxford)

Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible: Lesser-Evil Options, Agent-Favouring Options, and Rights Infringements

[***Keywords***: *Lesser-Evil Options; Agent-Favouring Options; Rights Infringement; Trolley Problem*]

Is it ordinarily required to act on lesser-evil justifications? I clarify this question in Â§1, and summarise my argument for answering "no". We have "lesser-evil options" – acting on lesser-evil justifications is ordinarily morally optional (merely permissible). In Â§2, I present the flagship argument for rejecting lesser-evil options, inspired by Helen Frowe, and I examine and reject four different defences of these options. Lesser-evil options arise not because we have general moral options not to act on justifications, nor can they be easily defended in a way that relies on an asymmetry between intrapersonal and interpersonal harming (Â§2.1). Appealing to the agent's interest in not acting on lesser-evil justifications (Â§2.2), or that the reason to act on these justifications roughly balances the reason not to do so (Â§2.3), is also unsatisfactory. Â§3 develops a new account of lesser-evil options, the "Derivation Account", according to which these options arise because they can be derived from "agent-favouring options". In ordinary lesser-evil cases, we are not required to harm those whose rights we may infringe, because those people would not be required to inflict the harms on themselves. Â§4 discusses the implications of the new account: it does not under-generate or over-generate moral options, and it implies that, in lesser-evil cases, those whose rights we may infringe can affect whether we have lesser-evil options.

Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper (University of Aarhus)

Is lack of commitment what undermines the hypocrite's standing to blame?

[***Keywords***: *Blame; commitment account of standing to blame; ethics of blame; hypocrisy; standing to blame*]

We are dining together, and you order steak. I blame you for your choice appealing to the norm that one ought not to do things that are bad climate-change-wise. I regularly fly to the Maldives to vacate. Intuitively, you can dismiss my blame as hypocritical and for that reason one for which I lack standing.

Assume that the underlying common and general view informing this concrete judgment - that a hypocritical blamer who blames a blamee for violating a norm, which the blamers violate themselves to an equal or even greater extent lacks standing to blame - is correct. What fact about the hypocritical blamer explains why they lack standing to blame? One central view is:

The commitment account of lack of standing to blame: What deprives the hypocrite of her standing to blame is the fact that in virtue of their relevantly similar flaws which render their blame hypocritical, they show themselves to lack commitment to the norm they appeal to.

My paper presents two problems for this account. First, it is underspecified in the literature what exactly "commitment" means in the present context. I propose several specifications arguing that, on all of them, a hypocritical blamer can be committed to the norms to which they appeal, while intuitively lacking standing to blame. Second, hypocritical blame is essentially a comparative issue, i.e., it is a matter of how the blamer's faults compare to the blamee's (are the the former's faults at least as great as the latter's?) However, how the blamer and the blamee's levels of commitment compare is irrelevant to whether the blamer lacks standing for hypocrisy-related reasons. Even if I am less committed to a certain norm than you are, I can non-hypocritically blame you for violating that norm if I have not violated the norm myself.

Löschke, Jörg (University of Zurich)

The Unique Value of Human-Robot-Relationships

[***Keywords***: *Social Robots; Human-Robot-Relationships; Associative Duties; Relationship Goods; Persoal Relationships*]

In recent years, there has been a growing debate on whether human-robot-relationships can be valuable, that is: good for humans. Most authors discuss this question by asking whether a social robot can be a friend or a lover, and they are usually pessimistic in this regard. I argue that rather than analyzing human-robot-relationships in terms of established relationship concepts, we should understand them as novel kinds of relationships with a unique contribution to human well-being.

I will work with the so-called relationship goods account that has been developed in the literature on personal relationships. The idea is to analyze relationships in terms of goods that we can only realize within these relationships and that we have a weighty interest in. Such relationship goods form the substance of relationships and explain what kind of relationship two parties have, as well as the value of relationships, as relationship goods are (partly) constitutive human well-being. I will apply this relationship goods framework to the case of human-robot-relationships and argue that the interesting question is not whether such relationship qualify as love of friendship, but whether we can realize distinct relationship goods with a robot. I will then argue in favor of this view by discussing two examples, namely a specific algorithm-based kind of self-understanding, and a uniquely stable emotional attachment. The upshot is that human-robot-relationships are novel kinds of relationships that cannot be reduced to any kind of relationship that we can form with other humans.

This has interesting implications for theories of human well-being, the further development of social robots, and the normativity of human-robot-relationships. In particular, it makes it possible to explain duties towards robots as associative duties that are fully grounded in the value of the relationship, without the robot having moral status

Luptakova, Veronika (LSE)**, and Voorhoeve, Alex** (LSE)

Beholding the Speck In Other's Eyes, Not In One's Own: Moral Inconsistency Is More Readily Noticed in Others' Reasoning.

[***Keywords***: *motivated moral reasoning; moral inconsistency; cognitive dissonance*]

Coherence, as one of the key elements of rationality (Sunstein et al., 2001), is considered a value from a societal as well as personal perspective. We expect that decisions are made in a consistent manner and that 'like cases are treated alike'. This holds for our system of justice, for our public policies but also for our social interactions and personal decisions. Yet, we find that people often are inconsistent in a sense that they hold mutually inconsistent moral beliefs, which creates a dilemma for policymakers "between the demands of coherence and the need not to impose on people principles that violate their judgments." (Kahneman in Voorhoeve, 2009, p. 78).

In this paper, we explore a particular aspect of such inconsistency – failures to recognise one's own moral judgments as inconsistent. We assumed that such failures are not fully attributable to a lack of cognitive capacity but instead they are at least partly driven by motivational factors. We tested our assumption empirically via two empirical studies (n=814 and n=1623).

In Study 1, we hypothesised that people are less likely to recognise inconsistency in their own moral judgments than in the moral judgments of other people. We confirmed our hypothesis, and we attributed the observed difference in the likelihood to recognize other people's versus one's own inconsistency (OTHER-OWN difference) to motivational factors. This indicates that people are to a large extent cognitively capable of recognising moral inconsistencies, but they might be less motivated to do so, when it comes to their own judgments.

In Study 2, we investigated the cause(s) of the observed OTHER-OWN difference. We identified three most plausible alternatives, such as motivated reasoning, lack of insight into other people's judgment or different levels of cognitive effort that people exert. We did not find a clear support for any of the explored alternatives.

We discuss potential explanations for our findings and their implications for the psychological and philosophical literature.

Malbois, Elodie (Institute for Ethics, History and the Humanities, University of Geneva)

Social Robots for People with Dementia: What is the Problem with Dignity?â€¯

[***Keywords***: *social robots, elderly, dignity, dementia, deception*]

Social robots designed for people with dementia have been accused of deceiving them and infantilizing them and, therefore, of threatening their dignity. It remains to be determined, however, how serious this issue is, especially when the user is happy to interact with the robot. Can we still use the robot for their benefits? This problem is difficult to address because it is not clear what concept of dignity is at stake. In this paper, I provide a more comprehensive answer to that question by exploring the different ways in which social robots can be said to threaten the dignity of their users with dementia and show that none of them constitute a definite objection against using such robots.

Marchiori, Samuela (Delft University of Technology)

Mind the gap. Enhancing the ethical regulation of low-code/no-code AI platforms

[***Keywords***: *AI ethics; applied ethics; ethical regulation of technology; socially disruptive technologies; digital technologies*]

Low-code/no-code AI platforms allow virtually anyone with a computer and an internet connection to develop AI systems autonomously in a fast, easy, and inexpensive way, without the need for expert human supervision or training. This results in AI systems that are likely to give rise to a wide range of ethical issues, but are not routinely checked for ethical shortcomings before being implemented. This is concerning in that it effectively delegates ethically charged development choices to individuals who may not have the necessary skill set to grasp their significance.

My aim in this paper is twofold. On the one hand, I examine the extent to which the current EU regulatory landscape provides adequate tools to mitigate the ethical concerns raised by low-code/no-code AI platforms and their applications. On the other hand, I aim to propose adjustments to enhance such a framework to the extent that it fails to do so. Specifically, I focus my attention on three

categories of ethical concerns: the lack of transparency, the presence of bias and discrimination, and the lack of responsibility.

I ultimately argue that the regulatory framework currently in place in the European Union is overall inadequately equipped to mitigate the ethical issues arising from the design, development, and deployment of low-code/no-code AI platforms and their applications. Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the current EU regulatory framework can still provide a good starting point for the ethical regulation of low-code/no-code AI platforms. I conclude the paper by proposing two adjustments to the AI Act that would enhance the ethical regulation of low-code/no-code AI platforms in the EU.

May, Simon (Florida State University)

The Right to Do Wrong as a Normative Disability

[***Keywords***: *Rights, Duties, Liberalism, Toleration*]

Jeremy Waldron (1981) presents an analysis of the moral right to do wrong as the claim-right an individual holds against others that they not interfere with her wrongdoing. I argue that a claim-right to non-interference is neither necessary nor sufficient for a right to do wrong. On the alternative analysis I defend, the key element of the right to do wrong is the possession of a certain kind of normative disability. In ordinary cases of wrongdoing (i.e., ones not encompassed by the right), the agent does not merely violate a moral duty. She also thereby exercises a normative power to change her own moral position and that of other agents around her: they become morally permitted, ceteris paribus, to sanction her in some way for her wrongdoing. But when the individual has a right to do wrong, her wrongdoing fails to have this consequence. This means she has no normative power to effect the ordinary moral change simply by violating her moral duty (in the manner encompassed by the right). What matters, then, is not the extent to which other agents may or may not interfere with an individual's choice, but whether her wrongdoing would trigger a certain kind of change in her moral position and theirs. I explain why this account better explains why individuals have no right to violate rights and provides a broader justificatory basis for the right to do wrong as an element in liberal practices of toleration.

McKeever, and Goddard, Natasha, and Sophie (University of Leeds)

Examining Relationship Anarchy

[***Keywords***: *relationship anarchy; philosophy of love; monogamy; polyamory; relationships*]

In this paper, we examine a relatively new, and philosophically under-explored, relationship configuration: relationship anarchy (RA). In Part 1, we explain what RA is: a form of non-monogamy which differs from polyamory in that it eschews relationship hierarchies and the prioritisation of sexual and romantic relationships over friendships.

In Part 2, we consider the benefits of RA. RA is a way of doing away with problematic norms surrounding our relationships: (i) amatonormativity (Brake 2012), the assumption that romantic relationships should be prioritised over non-romantic relationships; (ii) mononormativity: the assumption that monogamous romantic relationships are the only valid, or the most valuable type of romantic relationship; and (iii) heteronormativity: the assumption that heterosexual relationships are the only valid, or the most valuable type of romantic relationship.

In Part 3, we examine two potential pitfalls of RA: first, doing away with norms and hierarchies can create uncertainty and anxiety in relationships. Although relationship anarchists do make commitments to each other, in the absence of norms and relationship hierarchies, they may feel unsure what it is reasonable to ask of each other. Second, without norms to fall back on, certain sorts of power imbalances may be exacerbated. Thus, the less confident might find it even harder to articulate their needs, and people who suffer structural disadvantages might also struggle to get their needs met.

We conclude that RA is, in some ways, a more ethical approach to structuring relationships, but that relationship anarchists need to be cautious over the way that doing away with relationship categories and norms could lead to anxiety and uncertainty around our relationships, as well as exacerbating certain sorts of problematic power imbalance. Thus, living outside of relationship norms means that even more care must be taken by relationship anarchists to support each other's capacities for articulating their needs.

Millum, Joseph (University of St Andrews)

Valuing interventions that affect procreation

[***Keywords***: *Priority-setting; cost-effectiveness; family planning; procreation*]

Within health care systems, limited resources mean that not all interventions can be provided to those who could benefit from them. The decisions about how to allocate these limited resources should ideally be made in a systematic and data driven way, including assessment of the costs and the expected effects of alternative health care interventions. Some medical interventions are not just intended to improve health but also to enable or prevent procreation. The provision of condoms, for example, has multiple desired effects: condoms protect the user and their sexual partners against sexually transmitted infections, they allow couples greater control over whether and when they reproduce, and greater condom use can reduce birth rates and thereby affect the size of the population. However, current methods for evaluating medical interventions–such as cost-effectiveness analysis–typically take into account only the first of these. They ignore the value of giving people control and they do not dictate how changes in population size or membership should be taken into account.

In this paper, we assess the methods used to evaluate the effects of health interventions that affect procreation. There are two current approaches that are internally consistent: the intermediate outcomes approach and the complete accounting approach. We outline these two approaches and explain some key pros and cons. We argue that neither captures the value of reproductive autonomy–that is, the value to individuals of being able to control whether and when they procreate. In response, we sketch a reproductive rights approach to valuing interventions that affect procreation. This approach would place a positive value on increasing reproductive autonomy, but treat the effects on the population of someone exercising their reproductive autonomy as neutral. We close by noting some challenges for a proponent of this third approach.

Mitchell, Thomas (University of Oxford)

Problematic Rational Persuasion in Digital Technology

[***Keywords***: *Technology; Persuasion; Influence; Manipulation*]

This paper considers the act of rational persuasion in the context of modern digital technology. It is often taken for granted that, although there may be myriad ways of influencing others in a morally dubious manner, being rationally persuasive is unproblematic. This paper challenges that idea, showing that some kinds of rational persuasion can be wrong, and that these kinds lend themselves to being abused online.

It begins by developing a working account of rational persuasion, according to which the persuader both aims to make the audience consider the given position rational, and uses reasons rather than rhetoric to achieve this. We then consider a set of ideas about what makes problematic influence, such as manipulation or paternalism, wrongful. It is argued that, whatever the correct explanation for why some influence is wrongful, at least some kinds of rational persuasion fit into the category of wrongful influence. In particular, the issues of being too quick to offer unsolicited advice and carefully selecting one's audience to produce a desired result are found to be morally problematic cases of rational persuasion.

Both of these are commonplace in the online world. We can get not only information, but opinions and the reasons behind them almost immediately through our smartphones on social media sites and

on blogs, often without deliberately seeking them out. Audiences can also be precisely targeted with sophisticated data gathering and algorithms, to ensure that the persuader can optimise the chances of getting their audience to believe or do what they want. Although the dangers of online activity and the prevalence of smart technology are well known, it is of particular interest and concern that these dangers persist even when we restrict our considerations to what is often thought to be an innocuous mode of influence.

Neves, Catarina (CEPS, Centre for Ethics, Politics and Society from University of Minho)

Between Charity and Entitlement: Unconditional Basic Income as a Gift

[***Keywords***: *Political Philosophy; Unconditional Basic Income; Reciprocity; Gift.*]

The paper offers two distinct contributions. Firstly, it focused on theorizing the framing of a UBI within existing payment systems. Most proposals for a UBI either dismiss its framing or take for granted a certain reading. Doing so might obscure how different framings of a UBI yield different moral and political justifications. Secondly, there is no existing literature on how a UBI could be framed within the Gift paradigm, with the small exception of CaillÃ©'s presentation on "conditional unconditionality". Looking at how a UBI can function as a non-contractual payment system, which could be framed as a gift from everyone to everyone, opens new opportunities for thinking on the implications of a UBI as a policy.

Catarina Neves is a PhD candidate at Centre for Ethics, Politics and Society, University of Minho, Braga Portugal, with a thesis on Reciprocity and Unconditional Basic Income. Her PhD project is funded by FCT – FundaÃ§Ã£o para a CiÃªncia e Tecnologia, reference SFRH/BD/144495/2019.

She is also the co-authored of a book on UBI pilots and experiments entitled "Basic Income Experiments. A Critical Examination of Their Goals, Contexts, and Methods", published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2022.

Catarina is also a teaching assistant at Nova School of Business and Economics in Lisbon, Portugal.

Nguyen, Quan (University of Edinburgh)

What is to be done with Asian men?

[***Keywords***: *philosophy of race; feminist philosophy; gender and sex; race; racism*]

This paper argues that Asian men occupy a racial and sexual middle-class position generating a special responsibility to resist pressure to "become white". Using an Afropessimist framework, I examine how (1) Asians experience a continous pressure to "become white", orienting themselves towards white standards, and distancing themselves from Black people as the fundamental Other, (2) how the "model minority myth" - a narrative that holds up Asians as a well-integrated, hardworking community that does not complain about racial injustice - is not a myth, but a mechanism designed up uphold racial hierarchies, help Asians becoming more white, and suppress Black people's agency, and (3) how this pressure plays out along gendered dimensions, with Asian men both positioned in a sexually dominant position as well as experiencing sexual alienation that can unload in misogynist rage. This positioning generates a special responsibility for Asian men to resist racist and sexist oppression and less immediately take the side of the oppressor, which, if we take lessons from Afropessimism and the model minority narrative seriously, ultimately means resisting becoming white.

Oberman, Kieran (London School of Economics and Political Science)

By Taxation or Donation: How Should Justice be Funded?

[***Keywords***: *Donation; taxation; distributive justice*]

If justice requires that certain goods, such as education and healthcare, be provided, how should they be funded: by taxation or donation? This is a crucial question. Currently, donation plays a surprisingly important role in funding basic goods and is often championed by politicians. Yet the "collection question", as I shall term it, has received insufficient attention. This article defines the collection

question and considers a powerful argument for donation: that donation, being voluntary, ensures a just distribution of costs. The article explains why this argument fails and explains why taxation is typically preferable.

Preda, Adina (Trinity College Dublin)

Interest-based rights, peremptoriness, and exclusionary reasons

[***Keywords***: *rights, interests, exclusionary reasons, peremptory force*]

Interest-based rights, peremptoriness, and exclusionary reasons

Many theorists argue for certain moral or human rights on the basis that they protect a (weighty) interest. To support this general strategy for justifying a right, they often reference the well-known Razian definition of a right:

'X has a right if and only if X can have rights and, other things being equal, an aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty'

The motivation for appealing to rights – in addition to interests – seems to be that rights are invested with a special, or peremptory, force, which in turn is often cashed out in terms of their providing exclusionary reasons for action.

This paper will argue that this justificatory strategy has very significant costs, the highest of which is that it deprives rights of their peremptory force. The first cost is that it can only justify what we might call 'circumstantial' rights, which are quite different from human rights, for example. The second cost is that rights lose the special strength or role that makes them appealing in the first place. Supporters of the strategy claim that, on this view, rights provide 'exclusionary' albeit not 'conclusive' reasons to comply with the corresponding duties. Rights can thus rule out certain conflicting actions but are not implausibly seen as absolute deontological constraints; they are rather 'intermediate conclusions (in an argument from values to duties)', which is considered a virtue of the view.

I argue that this view supports neither the idea that rights are 'intermediate conclusions', given that duties are logically prior to rights, nor that they can rule out conflicting actions. Moreover, solving the conflicts of rights that will inevitably arise on this view, will reduce rights to mere instruments for protecting welfare.

Rinner, Stefan (University of Hamburg)**,** and **Hieke, Alexander** (University of Salzburg)

Slurs and Their False Friends

[***Keywords***: *Slurs, False Friends, Derogation, Offensiveness*]

It has been argued that uses of slurs are derogatory even if the speaker lacks any kind of derogatory attitude or intention towards the target group of the slur.

This is also known as expressive autonomy. Similarly, it has been argued that uses of quoted slurs can cause offense and alarm, even though quoted slurs are usually not used to derogate the target group of the respective slur. In addition to the offensiveness of standard uses of slurs, a theory of the semantics and pragmatics of slurs should account for the offensiveness of these divergent uses. In this talk, we will present a further phenomenon where a use of an expression offends and/or derogates a given group without the speaker having the intention to derogate, i.e., uses of a slurs' false friends, in particular uses of a slurs' co-designational false friends. In linguistics, a false friend is an expression that looks or sounds similar to an expression of another language while differing in meaning is called a `false friend'. We will argue that the use of a slurs' co-designational false friend has to be clearly distinguished from both expressive autonomy and the use of quoted slurs. Concluding, we will briefly address the question of how the main theories of slurs on the market could account for the phenomena of co-designational false friends. We will see that the use of co-designational false friends is particularly problematic for content theories of slurs, according to which slurs have some kind of (conventional) derogatory content.

Sharma, Ritu (University of British Columbia)

Rethinking Linguistic Agency in Speech Act Perspective

[***Keywords***: *Linguistic Agency; Social Power; Power With; Speech Act; Authority;*]

The paper attempts to provide a roadmap for a non-binary model of linguistic agency that is capable of capturing victimization without ruling out the possibility of agency on the part of the silenced/powerless. To establish my point, I engage with Hornsby and Langton's account of illocutionary silencing, which I believe provides an insight into an account of linguistic agency in the speech act context. Here, the idea of linguistic agency is discussed by centralizing the role of power. Thus, a person can be said to have linguistic agency if they have power in the relevant domain. Similarly, the absence of power may mean the lack of agency. I object to this view by arguing that in light of the kinds of assumptions made about power in the account of illocutionary silencing, the idea of agency is caught up in a powerful/powerless binary, which has negative implications for a theory of linguistic agency in the context of oppression. To establish my claim about the power-powerless binary, I draw on Mary Follett's (1942) ideas of “ontology of relations” and “power with” that appear in Banerjee's (2010) paper. Here, approaching a speech situation through an ontology of relations as opposed to an ontology of entities and bringing them to bear on speech act theory, I propose a way to develop a nuanced account of linguistic agency. Drawing on Banerjee (2010), I show how the feminist pragmatist ontology of relations allows us to see that an accurate account of agency or empowerment can be developed only when it portrays social reality in its many aspects. Thus, the focus should not be so much on speakers and hearers as individual entities tied within a dyadic relation but as nodes within a confluence of multiple relations.

Star, Daniel (Boston University)

The Artistic Rights of Photographers

[***Keywords***: *Rights, Wellbeing, Artists, Photography, Interests*]

Often discussions of the ethics of photography focus on the rights of photojournalists. Here the focus will instead be on the defeasible rights of photographers insofar as they are engaged in artistic endeavors. The interest theory of rights (as distinct from the will theory of rights) is arguably particularly well placed to explain such rights. A useful, albeit imperfect analogy that will be discussed is that of parental rights. We may understand such rights to be somewhat contingent, and grounded in various respects in the wellbeing of parents themselves, the wellbeing of children, and the wellbeing of everyone in society at large. When we turn from considering the role of parents to considering the role of artists, difficulties in narrowly specifying this role that are due to widespread disagreements about what the role of the artist is actually meant to be may be considerably diminished by acknowledging the autonomy-based interests of artists, in particular, with respect to their artistic endeavors. Joseph Raz’s well known idea that autonomy-based interests can and should be acknowledged in our account of wellbeing, and thereby also in our theory of rights, turns out to be particularly illuminating when considering the rights of artists. Thinking about photography as an art form, and select examples in this domain, helps us understand both the practical importance and the limits of artistic rights. In particular, it will be argued that photographers have a defeasible artistic right to take and use photographs of other people in public (not private) spaces, without consent, and that photographers have a defeasible artistic right to depart from representing scenes truthfully (this latter right does not apply in photojournalistic or courtroom contexts, but we should not think that norms that apply to the use of photographs in such contexts apply outside such contexts).

Tesink, Vera (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Neurointerventions in criminal justice: On the scope of the moral right to bodily integrity

[***Keywords***: *Neurointerventions; bodily integrity; criminal justice; mental integrity*]

There is growing interest in the use of neurointerventions to reduce the risk that criminal offenders will reoffend. Commentators have raised several ethical concerns regarding this practice. One prominent

concern is that, when imposed without the offender's valid consent, neurointerventions might infringe offenders' right to bodily integrity. While it is commonly held that we possess a moral right to bodily integrity, it is as-yet unclear to what extent this right would protect against these neurointerventions. In this paper, we examine the extent to which the right to bodily integrity, as it is usually construed, would protect against different forms of neurointerventions. We show that some neurointerventions clearly infringe the right to bodily integrity, while for others it is unclear whether they constitute bodily interferences that may infringe the right. We also consider whether the mental and behavioral effects of neurointerventions are relevant to determine whether they fall within the scope of the right. We conclude that some neurointerventions will fall within the scope of the right partly due to their mental and behavioral effects, and that these effects should be considered when assessing whether a neurointervention infringes the right.

Unruh, Charlotte (University of Oxford)

Letting Machines Do Harm

[***Keywords***: *harm; doing/allowing; deontology; machine ethics; AI Ethics*]

Algorithmic systems increasingly shape our lives and activities, giving rise to a need for identifying ethical principles for creating and interacting with algorithmic systems. Here is a simple principle for creating algorithmic systems: if a human would be morally permitted to act in a certain way, then it is permissible to create a machine that acts in the same way. In this paper, I argue that the simple principle, despite its intuitive appeal, is false. More specifically, I argue that there are cases in which it would be permissible for a human to perform an act, but impermissible to create a machine that performs the same act. My argument starts from the deontological principle that there is a morally relevant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm. I argue that there is also a morally relevant difference between merely allowing harm and letting oneself do harm (that is, failing to stop one's past or future behaviour from leading to harm). Further, I argue that we can let ourselves do harm by creating machines that fail to stop our past behaviour from leading to harm. It follows that it can be permissible for a human agent (who has not initiated a harmful threat) to merely allow harm, but impermissible for another agent (who has initiated a harmful threat) to create a machine that merely allows harm. This result is surprising, because the distinction between doing and allowing harm is often taken to be grounded in the deontologist's special concern with their own agency. If my argument succeeds, it seems that the deontologist should have a special concern with not just their own actions, but also their machine's actions.

Westeren, Felix (London School of Economics and Political Science)

Irreplaceable value and climate change adaptation

[***Keywords***: *irreplaceable value; philosophy of public policy; value theory; climate change*]

This paper focuses on things with irreplaceable value and their relation to climate change adaptation. Intuitively, in a crisis like that caused by climate change, where a range of valuable things are likely to be lost, it makes sense to preserve that which has irreplaceable value. I propose that this intuition offers one way of prioritising some valuable things over others without resorting to value monist approaches, and while respecting strong intuitions about the importance of irreplaceable value. Adapting to climate change often requires us to replace valuable things with other things replicating their function or valuable properties. This suggests a tension between the preservation of existing things, including those with irreplaceable value, and adaptation. I argue that fewer things have irreplaceable value than is generally thought, and that this means some existing biases against adaptation are unjustified. In particular, not all species and unique landscapes have irreplaceable value, as their value-conferring properties can often be found in replacements too. Culturally significant objects and practices, on the other hand, tend to have important irreplaceable value that should be protected in the formulation of adaptation policy. These objects and practices are irreplaceably valuable because of their history – they are a necessary part of a valuable relation that has emerged over time between them and a valuing community. Given that this value has emerged

over a long period of engagement between the valued object and a group of valuers, no other possible object can have the same valuable property, that of the object's history, the moment it comes into existence. This makes the protection of widely valued, irreplaceable ways of life and other practices particularly important in climate policy.

Williams, Garrath (Lancaster University)

Corporate shareholding as the capture of state power

[***Keywords***: *Business corporations; shareholding; public/private; state capture*]

Political theorists have become increasingly aware the hybrid, public-private nature of the business corporation. Against the familiar idea that corporations are "free market" actors, it is now widely understood that incorporation depends on a grant of state authority. Only this allows a new legal entity, with its own assets and liabilities, to come into existence. At the same time, states do not specifically charter corporations: corporate law regimes allow the free creation of business corporations, and place very few constraints on their purposes.

Most corporate bodies have no owner – universities or charities, for example. We usually assume that the business corporation is different: collectively, shareholders own it. Two facts lend plausibility to this view. One person may own all the shares in a corporation; in many respects, this enables them to treat it as their property. In addition, many corporations have "wholly owned subsidiaries." These are essentially fiefdoms of the parent company, insofar as share ownership involves governance rights.

In this paper, I argue that shareholding in these hybrid public-private bodies captures state power for sectional gain. I set out three lines of critique before stressing their international ramifications. First, shareholding institutionalises irresponsibility. Shareholders have (some) governance rights, but bear no legal responsibility for corporate actions. Second, despite frequent use of the word "investor," shareholders rarely benefit the corporation, and often use their legal powers to extract value. Third, these mechanisms increase inequality: "to those that hath shall be given."

These points open up into a global problem. Shareholding and subsidiaries cross borders. Although each corporation depends on authorisation from a specific state, the worldwide adoption of corporate shareholding enables business corporations to reach into poorer regions of the world, while keeping them to the wealthy shareholders who form a tiny minority of the world's population.

Wilson, Emilia (University of St Andrews)

Mis-interpretive Resources

[***Keywords***: *Hermeneutic Injustice; Feminist Philosophy; Ameliorative Analysis; Understanding; Social Epistemology*]

Our interpretive resources enable us to make sense of, and communicate about, the world. Hermeneutic injustice occurs when agents lack adequate interpretive resources to render their experiences intelligible to themselves and others, due to exclusion from the joint determination of these resources. Scholarship on hermeneutic injustice, however, has primarily had a 'negative' focus, both with respect to (i) the adequacy of our interpretive resources (focussing on 'gaps' where resources should be) and (ii) the resulting epistemic harms (focussing on the epistemic goods individuals are unable to obtain). In this paper, I take up the project of exploring the positive dimension of both issues: I examine how our interpretive resources may produce substantive misunderstandings, which go beyond mere lack of understanding. I show that these resources may produce insidious harms which have gone overlooked in analyses of hermeneutic injustice to date.

I begin by sketching an account of misunderstanding, more than merely failing to understand, as 'grasping' an inapt interpretive structure. Next, I consider the role of our interpretive resources in 'scaffolding' interpretive structures and propose that 'mis-interpretive resources' are those which scaffold misunderstanding. I highlight that misunderstanding is pernicious due to its subjective

resemblance to understanding. Moreover, I show that mis-interpretive resources can have a kind of contaminating effect I term 'epistemic corrosion', in which other (valuable) epistemic resources are rendered damaging due to how they are interpreted. Finally, I illustrate the insights the account developed her offers for analysing hermeneutic injustice, by analysing the paradigmatic example of 'sexual harassment'.

By developing an account of how flawed interpretive resources may sustain misunderstanding, this paper expands our understanding of hermeneutic injustice. This analysis offers a richer understanding of the nature and amelioration of hermeneutic injustice, which captures more complex and insidious epistemic harms.

Panel Session Abstracts

AI-informed Penal Sentencing: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology

The central aim of this panel is to provide an ethical and epistemological analysis of an evolving trend in judicial practices – namely, the use of algorithmically generated predictions for deciding how and how much convicted defendants should be punished. These cases cover both sentences issued immediately after the verdict stage (e.g., prison, community work, probation, fines) and parole decisions whereby prison sentences get modified at a later stage. We broadly refer to these practices as AI-informed penal sentencing, and take such practices to involve decisional uses of algorithmically structured tools for predicting convicted defendants' behavior and/or judges' statistically typical sentencing decisions in particular criminal cases.

Unlike most philosophical analyses of AI-informed penal sentencing practices, the papers in this panel do not concentrate on the highly non-ideal, yet largely contingent defects that currently render AI-informed sentencing practices objectionable – such as, most commonly, the opacity prompted by intellectual property rights, the various forms of bias flowing from racist, sexist or xenophobic attitudes that permeate the data-sets on which the tools are trained or the unintelligibility of the machine-learning techniques underlying some of these tools. Instead, we offer a set of ethical and epistemological analyses of the features that seem inherent to idealized algorithmic designs and of the problems that would persist in suitably idealized settings where these tools would be implemented. Consequently, we do not ask "what renders actual AI-informed penal sentencing morally and/or epistemically (un)warranted under current non-ideal conditions?", but "what renders AI-informed penal sentencing morally and/or epistemically (un)warranted under ideal conditions?"

(listed alphabetically)

Chiao, Vincent (University of Richmond)

Sentencing the Exception

The basic moral complaint against being sentenced by an algorithm is not that that it is biased, opaque or unintelligible, but rather that it is not sentencing you but is, instead, sentencing a composite constructed out of other individuals like you in various respects. This complaint is more basic than complaints about bias, opacity, or intelligibility because it flows out of the nature of a predictive algorithm rather than contingent qualities having to do with the type of algorithm used, the data it is trained on, how protective a jurisdiction is of intellectual property and so forth. At the

same time, however, it is an open question whether this complaint is susceptible of clear analysis. The key distinction is between treating a person as an individual as opposed to a representative of a broader reference class. In this paper, I shall consider a variety of ways of analyzing that concept in the context of punishment. Drawing on Enoch and Spectre's (2020) discussion of "statistical resentment," I suggest that there may not be a single dominant interpretation of what it is for a punishment to be individualized to a person but rather a mix of different, and partially conflicting, concepts. What it means to complain that a court has not treated you as an individual differs depending on whether what is at issue is a person's life history, culpability, rehabilitative potential, deterrence, or risk of recidivism. In addition, the complaint is subject to procedural interpretations as well, having to do with being given a fair opportunity to present one's perspective during the legal process. Breaking the basic complaint down into these constituent conceptions of what it is to be treated as an individual can contribute, I argue, to clarifying the normative stakes in debates about the case for sentencing by algorithm.

Poama, Andrei (Leiden University)

AI-assisted Penal Sentencing: The Epistemic Free-Riding Objection

Several authors (Laquer & Copus 2017; Leibovitch 2017; Chiao 2018) argue that machine-learning algorithms can and ought to be used by judges at the sentencing stage to predict the statistically typical (average or modal) sentencing decision taken by other (actual or counterfactual) judges in relevantly similar cases, and adjust their individual sentences to cohere with these latter ones. Unlike currently deployed AI-informed tools, the proposal here is to use algorithms to predict judicial, not offender behavior. Furthermore, unlike existing static actuarial tables or sentencing guidelines and grids, such algorithms proceed dynamically – viz., by updating sentence predictions based on the decisions taken by individual judges. The contention is that these algorithmic tools can secure more consistency among sentencing decisions while preserving judges' substantive commitment to reasonably defensible penal principles. The argument of this paper is twofold. First, it argues that the decision-making situation that such proposals would instantiate can be described as one that prima facie satisfies the conditions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) – viz., one where the average competence of decision-makers is better than random, where decision-makers share the same goal, and where their judgments are independent. Because of this, the proposal seems epistemically desirable. Second, I draw on List & Pettit (2004) and Dunn (2018) to further argue that, insofar as they believe that sentencing algorithms create situations that satisfy CJT, judges are individually justified to adjust their sentencing decisions with statistically typical ones. Insofar as this happens, and because sentencing is a temporally deployed process, judges' beliefs that CJT is satisfied would also rationally motivate them to epistemically free-ride on other judges' decisions, and thereby eventually prompt a situation that violates the independent judgment condition posited by CJT. Thus, envisaged diachronically, the proposed algorithms are an epistemic liability.

Ryberg, Jesper (Roskilde University)

Sentencing and Artificial Intelligence: When is it Morally Acceptable to Replace Humans with Algorithms?

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is currently permeating many parts of social life and public administration including several stages of the criminal justice system. This paper concerns the use of AI at sentencing. More precisely, the purpose is to consider when it will be justified to replace humans with algorithms in relation to sentencing decisions. Two different types of application of AI are considered: The use of algorithms to assess the risk that offenders will recidivate (e.g., whether an accused should be regarded as a "high risk" or "low risk" offender) and the use of algorithms to determine the appropriate sentences of criminal offenders (e.g. whether an offender should have 6 or 8 months in prison). While much of the current discussion of such applications has focused on challenges such as the lack of algorithmic transparency or the risk of biased decision-making, the purpose here is consider the question as to when algorithms should be held to perform sufficiently

well to replace humans with regard to risk assessments and the determination of sentences. First, it is argued that the development of a plausible assessment criterion for when an algorithm is outperforming humans is a much more complicated ethical task than has hitherto been recognized. Second, several of the practical implications of the lack of plausible assessment criteria are considered.

Zimmerman, Annette (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

Proceeding with Less Caution

In previous work (Zimmermann & Lee-Stronach, "Proceed with Caution," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52, no. 1 (2022), 6-25), I argue that we have a moral and epistemic duty to avoid doxastic negligence when it comes to our human response to algorithmic outputs in high-stakes, complex decision settings. In other words, we often have strong reasons to proceed with caution in such settings. Proceeding with caution can require, for instance, (i) recognizing–and leaving room for–uncertainty by suspending belief about algorithmic outputs; (ii) initiating and continuing processes of inquiry, even in maximally complete information settings, e.g. checking and reconsidering algorithmic decision rules, input data etc.; and (iii) gathering and explicitly considering additional information with the goal of achieving maximally informative input data, including sensitive attributes. However, sometimes our moral and epistemic duties pull in the opposing direction: too much caution can undermine important normative goals–the same goals which motivate proceeding with caution in the first place. This paper explores what this implies for how and why we ought to–and ought not to–engage in further inquiry with respect to a given algorithmic output, and examines these implications within the criminal sentencing domain.

Philosophy of Risk and Prediction: Ethical, Social, Legal Issues

This panel brings together moral, political and legal philosophers working on risk and risk assessment. The aim is to explore various moral, political, social, and legal issues concerning prediction of risk. Some risks are relatively predictable, such as the risk of losing money on a particular poker hand. Other types of risk cannot be predicted to such a precise degree. This raises a host of interesting questions.

For instance, suppose that we ask what the probability is that a specific offender will reoffend within the next five years, One difficulty is how we can rationally assess such risks. And what would it imply for the rationality of our decision-making, if we cannot meaningfully predict how likely the risks involved in a given situation are? Furthermore, should our risk assessments only be based on (statistical) data and other 'rational' considerations, or should, for instance, emotions like hope and fear also play a role in deciding which risks to take seriously?

Aside from such epistemic difficulties, the notion of risk also poses a number of difficult moral and legal quandaries. For example, can we detain the aforementioned offender to prevent future crimes, if we deem the risk of reoffending too high? Another difficulty involves identifying factors or features that render imposing risk on others morally wrong. Suppose that someone drives a car whilst under the influence of alcohol, but no harm results, are they then still morally reproachable for risking harm to others? If yes, then what grounds our moral judgment? Furthermore, under which circumstances can risk imposers be held morally and legally liable?

During this panel, six speakers will present their recent work regarding these pressing epistemic, moral, and legal questions.

Maheshwari, Kritika (TU Delft)

Fear & risk: a case of affective injustice

People's emotional responses to risk, such as fear, are often met with suspicion in public policy. For instance, the dominant view has been that emotions like fear regarding or in response to risks threaten rationality and thus, people's perception of risk has no place in objective methods of risk analysis or decision-making around risks in general. In this paper, I challenge the normative import of the dominant view on grounds that under certain circumstances, emotional responses to risk (such as fear), when dismissed as irrational, can become sites for affective injustice, namely a form of injustice one suffers in one's capacity as an affective being. By appealing to a number of real-life cases, I show that (a) there are distinct varieties of affective injustices at play when people's fear-based responses are rejected as irrational; (b) existing accounts of affective injustice fail to capture all of them; and lastly, (c) the normative significance of affective injustice sometimes gives us a strong reason to account for people's fear seriously in our criterion for moral acceptability of certain risk impositions, or so I'll argue. In doing so, this paper aims to achieve two things. One, it brings together growing discussions within the ethics of risk and affective justice and motivates an under-explored question that arises at the intersection of these topics. And two, it contributes to existing work in ethics of risk perception that challenges the dominant view for other reasons, for instance, the fact that emotions such as fear can act as an important source of people's ethical sensitivity towards risk such as justice, fairness, and autonomy.

de Vries, Max (University of Groningen)

Three approaches to determine the dangerousness of offenders

The prevention of future crime has become an increasingly dominant function of the criminal law of many liberal democracies. This "preventive turn" manifests itself – among other things – in an increasing reliance on preventive measures, such as preventive detention of offenders. The imposition and extension of preventive measures often requires that the offender is determined to be "dangerous," i.e., that the offender poses a sufficiently high risk of reoffending. A key question in this regard, which has been the subject of study of several legal philosophers, is how the dangerousness of offenders can and should be determined. In this presentation, I will argue that three diverging approaches to the determination of dangerousness can be recognized in the legal philosophical literature. The first approach is to assess risk factors that are statistically relevant for the prediction of the offender's recidivism risk. The second approach is to evaluate the offender's character to assess whether any "dangerous" character traits are present. The third is a mixed approach, which involves both an actuarial assessment of risk factors as well as a character evaluation. I will conclude by comparing the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, which raises questions for further research.

Jellema, Hylke (University of Groningen)

Pursuit and prediction in criminal investigations

In many legal systems, there is too little time to pursue every case and every lead within a case. Investigators must therefore predict what cases and leads, if pursued, are likely to yield the best results. This involves at least two risks: (i) that not pursuing a case or lead will result in a guilty person going free or an innocent person being convicted, and (ii) that a lead or case is pursued, but does not lead anywhere, thereby wasting scarce resources. The decision what to pursue is therefore crucial for a just criminal law system. This talk explores a specific problem relating to worry: which crime scenarios should be pursued within a given case. Investigators often struggle with this decision. However, it is unclear whether and how they can reason rationally about this. I propose a framework for thinking about which scenarios to pursue. To develop this framework, I

draw on work on pursuitworthiness from the philosophy of science. In particular, I distinguish several reasons for (not) pursuing a given scenario and examine how to balance these using an example from a real case. I end my talk by exploring how this framework can be developed further. One notable avenue of research that I consider is the prospect of connecting it to recent work on the automated prediction of court decisions.

Endörfer, Richard (University of Gothenburg)

Compensation and Risk-Sensitive Contractualist Theory

Most socially productive practices we engage in every day, such as taking the car to work, cooking food on gas stoves, and flying to conferences via airplane, impose risks onto others. Non-consequentialists often have trouble explaining why their theories permit us to engage in such everyday practices which impose risk of severe harm onto very few in order to secure benefits for a large majority. A solution to this problem that has often been discussed in the literature on non-consequentialist risk ethics is compensation. The basic idea is simple: If a person cannot consent to being exposed to a risk, we can compensate her such that she weakly prefers being exposed to the risk and receiving compensation to not being exposed to the risk at all. Contractualism is one of the most promising non-consequentialist approaches to risk ethics. Despite this, the literature on contractualist risk ethics mentions compensation at best in passing. In this talk, I argue that this neglect has far-reaching consequences for the discussion on Ex Ante versus Ex Post contractualism. In particular, I argue that Ex Ante contractualists must invoke compensation to explain why specific social practices are justifiable to each. However, because Ex Ante contractualists discount the complaints associated with risk impositions by their probability, victims are not entitled to compensation that would make them whole in case they suffer material, severe harm due to being exposed to everyday risks. I argue that this is an unattractive implication of Ex Ante contractualism, which Ex Post contractualists can easily avoid.

Justice for and between children

Over the last twenty years, moral and political philosophers have paid close attention to the question of what duties of justice the state, educational institutions, parents, among others, have towards children and what kind of duties equality between children poses on those agents. This panel contributes to the literature on justice for and between children by addressing some issues that have so far received relatively little attention.

Colin Macleod examines a potential tension between parents' duty to promote their children's wellbeing and their duty to foster their children's sense of justice. For example, privileged children might benefit from taking advantage of an unjust basic structure. The aim of Macleod's paper is to explore how this tension can be resolved.

Christine Straehle's paper focuses on the obligations that the international community has towards children refugees. Straehle argues that children have a fundamental interest in being carefree, which requires having a high level of trust in being protected from harm. Accordingly, children refugees have a right to be provided with institutional structures that allow them to have and keep trust.

Tim Meijers' paper analyses a pressing issue in procreative ethics: if you know that your child will be significantly disadvantaged, would it be wrong for you to procreate? Contra what is sometimes held in the literature, Meijers argues that the fact that disadvantaged people are already victims of injustice makes it permissible for them to engage in procreation.

Finally, Giacomo Floris and Riccardo Spotorno's paper examines the neglected question of the basis of filial equality. Why exactly should parents treat their children as each other's equals? Drawing on

the recent literature on the basis of moral equality, Floris and Spotorno argue that the basis of filial equality lies in a duty of parental love.

Macleod, Colin (University of Victoria)

Nurturing Justice

Justice for children is partly about nurturing children by identifying and attending appropriately to key their key interests. Parents, for instance, have duties to care for their children. They must promote their children's wellbeing in various ways and insulate them from harms. Justice for children is also partly nurturing within children an effective commitment to justice. Children, it seems, should learn to care about justice such that they can identify and respond to the demands of justice. This paper explores a possible tension between these facets of nurturing justice: against the background existing injustices, some ways of promoting the wellbeing of children may conflict with instilling in children an effective sense of justice. For instance, it may be advantageous for children from affluent families to be raised in ways that primes them to take advantage of unjust social structures and to be motivated to resist change towards justice. The paper will consider whether these different facets nurturing justice can be harmonized.

Straehle, Christine (University of Ottawa and University of Hamburg)

Children and Refuge – a vulnerability-based analysis

Most accounts of the plight of refuges single out the particular hardship that flight and the search for asylum inflicts on children. In this view, the international community has special obligations towards children because of their vulnerability. Yet what precisely constitutes the vulnerability of children refugees is underdeveloped in these discussions. This is the question that I take up in this paper.

In the first instance, I argue that children are, like all other refugees, owed the protection of their basic needs, such as food, and shelter and the provision of bodily security. Moreover, though, I suggest that children *qua children* have a basic interest in being carefree that distinguishes them from adults. I examine what it means to be carefree, and support those who argue that carefreeness is a disposition. I argue that carefreeness as a disposition requires having a high level of trust in being protected from harm. Children are vulnerable in the particular sense that they are less able to protect themselves against a loss of trust.
In the second part of the paper, and based on the conceptual first part, I discuss a range of harms that children suffer qua children in the context of flight and refugee. I end with the claim that we owe children refugees institutional structures that allow the to have and keep trust.

Meijers, Tim (Leiden University)

Creating disadvantaged children

Suppose you and your partner find yourselves in an unfortunate situation of the following kind. You and your partner live in poverty. Due to mere bad luck, you find yourself at the losing end of an unjust social arrangement. You are not, in any way, responsible for your condition. You and your partner are considering to procreate. You really want to have children, and you think having a child and raising it would enrich your lives.

Yet, you know that any child that you will have will almost certainly live in poverty, like you. Postponing procreation for a few years will not make a difference: you will still be in a similar situation. You are asking yourself the following question: would it be morally permissible for me and my partner to create a child? Or, would it be impermissible due to the fact that the child will probably lead a disadvantaged

life – disadvantages which flow from the fact that you are badly off, like malnutrition, precariousness, stress, lack of education, lack of opportunities for meaningful work, and so on.

This paper takes a closer look at this question. It is not a trivial question: millions of people find themselves in a situation relevantly of this kind. Much literature on procreative ethics, in effect, denies people in such a situation can rightfully procreate. Although the upshot is not an enforceable duty *not* to procreate, many ethicists do claim that it would be wrong for to procreate anyway. This reply is, perhaps, somewhat baffling. People in such a situation already suffer because I am at the losing end of an unjust social arrangement, and claiming that it would be wrong to engage in procreation, an activity many people consider to be central to a meaningful life, seems to add insult to injury.

Floris, Giacomo (University of Hamburg), and **Spotorno, Riccardo** (University of Pavia):

Parental Love and Filial Equality

It is widely accepted that parents have a fundamental moral obligation to consider and treat their children as each other's equals in some basic sense. But why exactly is this so? The question of the basis of filial equality – that is, the question of what, if anything, grounds the equality of status among children in the eyes of their parents – has so far been largely neglected in the literature on the philosophy of childhood and the ethics of parenthood. This paper aims to fill this gap by developing a theory of the justification of filial equality: specifically, it argues that parents ought to consider and treat their children by virtue of loving them. Parental love is the basis of filial equality.

Climate Justice and the Carbon Footprint of Procreation (co-organised with Isabella Trifan)

While not new, concerns about population pressure have resurfaced in the context of the ongoing climate crisis; academic and public debates now frequently canvas the idea that the choice of having a child has negative environmental externalities which must be measured and which bear on the moral permissibility of procreation.

An interesting development in this area is the convergence between claims made by environmental scientists who measure the "carbon impact of an additional child" (Murtaugh & Shlax 2009; Wynes & Nicholas 2017; NÃ¶rdstrom et al 2020), on the one hand, and, on the other, normative claims defended by some ethicists and political philosophers (Young 2001; McIver 2015; Conly 2016; Earl, Hickey & Rieder 2017; Banhuyssen & Brandstedt 2017; Robeyns 2021; Burkett 2021; for critical discussion, see Pinkert & Sticker 2021).

Two key such claims are, firstly, the Footprint Thesis, on which the carbon impact of the choice to have an additional child includes the emissions of the child and of that child's descendants, discounted by degree of relatedness; in the US, this is calculated to be 5.7 times the procreator's lifetime emissions (Murtaugh & Shlax 2009); and, secondly, the Moral Equivalence Thesis, that procreation, like conspicuous consumption, is impermissible, since they have the same carbon impact and there are no relevant respects in which these differ that justify treating them asymmetrically (Young 2001; McIver 2015).

This panel subjects these two claims to scrutiny. The papers assume that the affluent have demanding duties of climate justice and that the right to procreative choice is constrained, yet they identify weaknesses of the Footprint Thesis and Moral Equivalence Thesis. The panel thus will improve our understanding of the moral assumptions behind the measurement of the carbon impact of procreation and provide a nuanced view of the moral status of procreation and consumption.

Cripps, Elizabeth (University of Edinburgh)

Should we have kids in the climate emergency?

This paper asks whether affluent persons have an individual climate justice duty to limit biological family size. This practically salient dilemma also forces careful attention to two further issues. One is the question of just how demanding individual climate justice duties are. The other is the danger of so-called 'ivory tower' reasoning. On some topics, it becomes morally and methodologically imperative to integrate philosophical discussion with detailed sociological and psychological research.

The focus is on individual choice rather than population policy and is deliberately on agents whose children will have higher-than-average carbon footprints and who have procreative freedom of choice. The paper also assumes that individual climate justice duties include (but are not limited to) cutting one's own carbon footprint.

The discussion goes as follows. Should such couples and individuals have no biological children, because of the carbon implications? Not necessarily, because this requires either extremely demanding individual emissions-cutting duties or the empirically implausible assumption that it is never a fundamental interest loss not to become a biological parent. Should anyone consider carbon footprint at all, in deciding how many kids to have? Yes, because individual emissions-cutting duties are more than trivially demanding, and there is no reason to assume that it is always significantly costly to have fewer children than one would ideally want.

Should everyone 'stop at' some fixed maximum number of biological kids? Not unless that number is one, and we are prepared to accept both very demanding individual emissions-cutting duties and problematic sociological assumptions about the cost to individuals of 'stopping at one'. Do further individual duties follow from the uncomfortable fact that having a child is one of the highest-carbon-footprint decisions individuals make? Yes. Three are outlined: to raise good climate citizens, become activists, and cut the family carbon footprint.

Grill, Kalle (Umeå University)

Are We Morally Responsible for Our Descendants' Harmful Consumption?

Two important moral differences between our own non-essential consumption and that of our children and later descendants concern the presence of other moral agents in the causal chain from our lifestyle choices to their environmental impact.

First, the environmental harm of our descendants' non-essential consumption is conditional on their voluntary choice to engage in such consumption. Future consumption choices will likely be at least as voluntary and probably more informed than present procreative choices, both because the former cause harm more directly and because our understanding of the harms of consumption will likely continue to increase over time. Causing harm via the free and voluntary action of someone else, who is at least as informed about the ensuing harm, is arguably much less morally problematic than causing harm directly, without intermediaries. As Bernard Williams put it, "each of us is specially responsible for what he does, rather than for what other people do."

Second, our descendants' consumption will harm the environment only if it is environmentally harmful. Environmental harm is not an integral aspect of consumption. It is rather an unfortunate side effect that occurs because of the particulars of the life-cycle of products and services under our current system of production, distribution and waste management. People with influence over these processes have real opportunity and a moral obligation to change them so that future consumption will be environmentally harmless, or at least much less harmful. Causing harm via the

free, voluntary and immoral action of other people, who have had amble opportunity to avoid or mitigate the harm, is even less morally problematic, relative to causing harm directly.

These two differences undermine claims to the effect that the likely future harms of procreation are morally on a par with the harms of our own consumption.

Olsaretti, Serena (ICREA-Universitat Pompeu Fabra) and **Trifan Isabella** (University of Essex)

My Child, Whose Emissions?

The Moral Equivalence Thesis states that procreation and conspicuous overconsumption are morally on a par, and that both are impermissible (Young 2001, MacIver 2015). This argument presupposes some version of The Footprint Thesis (as coined by Pinkert & Sticker 2020). The Footprint Thesis states that the carbon footprint of procreative choice includes some or all of the emissions of any resulting child and possibly some or all of their descendants' carbon emissions, such that these emissions count as the procreator's carbon footprint.

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we subject to close scrutiny the Footprint Thesis and show that, although it is in part an empirical claim, it is also importantly informed, in ways we explain, by moral assumptions. There are different versions of the Footprint Thesis, depending on different moral assumptions. Bringing these assumptions to view is necessary, as, absent a justification of them, our favouring any one version of the thesis over competing ones remains arbitrary at best and unjustifiable at worst.

Second, we argue that we can consistently endorse, and should endorse, not one but two versions of the Footprint Thesis, depending on what particular moral task we are embarked on. We focus on two such moral tasks. The first concerns situations in which an individual who can freely choose whether to have a child is embarked on deciding whether to do so, in highly non-ideal conditions which are impossible to change in the relevant time-frame. We argue that the version of the Footprint Thesis that is defensible in this context is inappropriate, by contrast, where the task we are embarked on is that of formulating institutions-guiding principles concerning what the ideally just distribution of the environmental costs of demographic renewal are, between parents and non-parents and between different generations.

Pinkert, Felix (University of Vienna), and **Sticker, Martin** (University of Bristol)

Is Procreation Special?

The Moral Equivalence Thesis treats (some) procreation and conspicuous consumption as morally on a par. According to the Thesis' critics, procreation is ethically different from other life projects and certainly from consumption. The environmental costs of procreation should thus be weighed differently from costs of consumption or other personal pursuits, so that some procreation can be permissible even if it is associated with very high carbon emissions.

We argue that procreation is not inherently special, but that, contingently, procreation does have two features that distinguish it from many other projects.

Firstly, contrary to many other projects that might make a life worth living, procreative projects cannot be readily adapted in a manner that would make them low-emission, as long as one's society remains on a high per-capita emissions path. Co-parenting with multiple parents would either fail to sufficiently reduce the per-parent carbon footprint of having a child (if a small number of people co-parent), or fail to recognisably realise central procreative projects such as having a particularly close parent-child relationship (if a large number of people co-parent). Similar problems hold for adoption.

Secondly, contrary to most other projects, the emissions resulting from procreation are stretched out over a very long period of time, reaching many generations into the future. This introduces a great deal of uncertainty into any calculation of the true costs of procreation. It also makes it possible to drastically reduce its impact by means of societal changes that affect future carbon emissions.

Paying attention to these neglected peculiarities of procreation allows us to present a middle ground between positions that maintain that procreation is morally no different from consumption and positions that maintain that procreation should be treated entirely separately from consumption, e.g. by allocating a dedicated carbon budget to it.

Population Aging and Distributive Justice

Most of the world's economically developed, high-income societies, as well as some middle-income societies, are subject to population aging. This occurs when the median age increases, typically due to a combination of increased longevity and a falling birth rate.

Population aging causes a worsening of the 'dependency ratio'' – the fraction of the population of working age (whose labour and consumption acts as the primary tax base) and the population of non-working age, including the retired (who tend to consume a disproportionate share of tax-funded services). Because of this, population aging places a strain on some longstanding practices and areas of public policy where distributive justice is salient. Many of these relate to longstanding approaches to the design of the tax system, and the parallel practice of distributing goods and services across the lifespan of citizens. More specifically, population aging creates pressure to reform various elements of housing policy, the regulation of labour markets, pensions/retirement funding, and healthcare.

This panel proposal explores some of the central questions about justice and population aging. The overarching aim is to examine the sort of reforms that might be made necessary by population aging, with a view to identifying the more theoretical principles that might bear on precisely which reforms are the most likely to be justified.

While each of these questions are practically significant, the panel's work will contribute to ongoing theoretical work around inequality, time, and justice between co-existing generations, much of which has yet to engage in a sustained way with population aging, despite more sustained attention on inequality between age groups and birth cohorts.

Bieber, Friedemann (University of Zurich)

Aging Societies and the Flexibilization of Work

Full-time employment on a fixed schedule has traditionally been treated as the norm in wealthy countries. But over the past decades, more flexible work arrangements have spread. Some, like regular part-time employment, are mostly welcomed. But many, like zero-hour contracts and platform-based on-demand labour, are judged critically – by the public as by political philosophers. A key objection is that by withholding protections and stability of regular employment without offering compensation, these arrangements are drivers of precarity and unjust.
This paper aims to offer a more nuanced assessment of the flexibilization of work in aging societies. Notably, while the recent philosophical debate has moved beyond the paradigm of regular employment, it has upheld that of a specific worker: the dependent earner who relies on their job for a living. But not everyone fits this description: some people are supplemental earners with independent sources of income. This is true especially of the growing group of well-to-do pensioners.

For these pensioners, flexible work arrangements are drivers of freedom rather than of precarity. Given their economic independence, they can take on risk and always have the option of walking away. And even where unable, or unwilling, to commit to full-time jobs or regular schedules, they may value the opportunity to work occasionally – for the sake of social interactions, to put their capacities to use, or to save for indulgences.

How, then, should aging societies regulate their labour markets? On the one hand, they have strong incentives to recruit the workforce of the elderly; on the other, flexibilization carries costs for dependent workers. The paper explores how societies can tailor flexible work opportunities to pensioners (and other supplemental earners) and proposes two mechanisms by which those who benefit could compensate those burdened. This way, it highlights the potential of what one may call 'targeted flexibilization'.

Halliday, Daniel (University of Melbourne)

Does Justice Require Raising the Retirement Age?

The retirement age is the age at which persons become eligible for certain benefits, such as pensions and other subsidized services. It is not an age at which citizens are required to cease their labour market participation, though remaining in full time work may disqualify eligibility for at least some of the benefits. In most developed societies there is currently economic pressure on governments to increase the retirement age, so that the balance between benefit recipients and taxpayers can be made more feasible. But there is substantial political pressure to resist increasing the retirement age, in part due to a sense that to do so would be to break a promise.

The case for increasing the retirement age draws on moral considerations about justice between age groups, particularly the apparent injustice of having a large body of the population benefit from a resource transfer funded by younger members of the population, when those who benefit could feasibly continue to work for a few more years. The strength of this objection may depend on the extent to which persons of pre-retirement age already suffer worse economic conditions compared to those who would benefit most from keeping the retirement age where it is. The case against increasing the retirement age may draw on a cluster of considerations independent of age group justice. Currently, many people retire at an age early enough to perform various forms of valuable unpaid labour, such as care labour for grandchildren and forms of social volunteering, like charity work. If people were to retire at an older age, they may be too old to perform such work by the time they retired. In addition, there is the intuitive sense that to increase the retirement age would be to break a promise: Less strongly phrased, the issue here is one of violating legitimate expectations set by years of policy, around which individuals may have planned their lives. This paper seeks to understand and weigh these considerations against each other.

Valente, Manuel (UC Louvain)

What do the Children of Aging Societies Owe Parents?

Debates on intergenerational justice often focus on what contemporaries owe future people or what parents owe their children. Much less is said about what children owe their parents' generation. This is a particularly urgent question in ageing societies: The fewer young people per older adult there are, the higher the per capita sacrifices that can be asked from the former to support the latter. Would such extra demands be fair? This article compares three views of such obligations: ascending reciprocity, intergenerational (maximin) equality and double reciprocity. The first, ascending reciprocity, says that parents must receive from children at least as much as they transfer to their own parents. While this view justifies a stable system of intergenerational transfers, it is too insensitive to generational inequality. In ageing societies, it may justify overburdening children and do so independently of how well off they are as a birth cohort. The second view from intergenerational (maximin) equality is, instead, highly sensitive to how well-off different generations are. Yet, population ageing renders our parents' generation better off than they would

otherwise be. It will then be hard for maximin egalitarians to ground special assistance duties in something that is a source of advantage. Thus, unlike ascending reciprocity, intergenerational equality offers an egalitarian yet unstable system of intergenerational transfers under ageing. I defend a conception of double reciprocity - the view that children owe their parents' generation depending on how much, on the whole, they received from them. I show that such a view offers an adequate response to population ageing, namely one that is neither insensitive to intergenerational inequality nor unstable. More generally, this indicates that the perceived tension between reciprocity and distributive inequality has a solution in the intergenerational realm.