Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Concurrent Session 1

Session 1	**Bartle, Ryan** (Lancaster University) *The Right to Roam Defended* The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 was a legislative act passed by the Scottish Parliament which enshrined in law, subject to certain specified exceptions, the Right to Roam (R2R) across land areas within Scotland. It has yet to be extended to the UK as a whole, though I argue in my paper that this situation is regrettable and that R2R should be extended to the UK as a whole. To make my case as persuasive as possible, I do not appeal to any particular moral theory, but to common sense moral premises. First, I argue that the consequences of adopting R2R are more desirable than the status quo; that all things being equal, ensuring land can be enjoyed by all is preferable to its being enjoyed by the privileged few. Second, I argue that the positive freedom to wander, explore, and discover, is more important than the negative freedom to not have one's property right's infringed. Third, I claim that the UK's history of landownership is deeply problematic in such a way that undermines desert based reasons for restricting R2R. A high proportion of the land owned in the UK was inherited, a surprising amount going as far back as the Norman Conquest. I argue that land inherited in such away, especially when it was acquired as a result of violence or exploitation, cannot be said to be "deserved" in any strong sense by those who came to inherit it and that as such, those in question cannot reasonably claim to have desert based rights to restrict it from others. Finally, I aim to show why the various arguments advanced against R2R are ultimately unpersuasive. *Keywords*: Right to Roam; Land Ownership; Access Rights; Common-sense Morality; Environmental ethics;

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 1	**Burkett, Daniel** (University of New South Wales) *Punishment by Agreement - A Contract-Based Argument for the Moral Permissibility of Punishment* Punishment necessarily involves the infliction of harm, and therefore requires us to treat wrongdoers in ways that it would clearly be wrong to treat others. Traditionally, this harm is justified on the basis of either (1) the consequentialist claim that punishment maximises the good for the wider community, or (2) the retributivist claim that wrongdoers simply deserve the harm they receive. However, both theories are subject to well-known (and, I contend, convincing) objections. Specifically, there are a variety of cases in which each theory either punishes the innocent, or fails to punish the guilty. This leads some authors to the controversial conclusion that punishment is never morally justified. I, however, propose an alternative solution: I argue that the moral permissibility of punishment should instead be based on the fact that each wrongdoer has agreed to her punishment. Specifically, I argue that it will be morally permissible to punish an individual P under a particular punishment practice X so long as--at some prior point--P simultaneously (i) had good reason to agree to X, and (ii) gave some kind of agreement to X. I then argue that (i) will be met where an individual can expect to benefit from the implementation of a punishment practice, and--more controversially--that (ii) can be satisfied by the existence of hypothetical agreement. I reflect on the practical implications of this theory by applying it to a number of real-world crimes, and demonstrating how it can go about prescribing specific punishments for particular offences. I conclude by showing that the Contractarian theory is well-equipped to avoid the objections commonly levelled against traditional theories of punishment, and that--for this reason--it provides a promising solution to the problem of punishment. *Keywords*: Punishment; Contractarianism; Agreement; Applied Ethics

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 1	**Cohen-Almagor, Raphael** (University Of Hull) *Nationalité, Sécurité, Laïcité: The French ban on the burqa and the niqab* France has attempted to keep public space secular. Critiques of multiculturalism in France argue that multiculturalism is bad for democracy, is bad for the Republic, is bad for women, and is undermining public order. On October 11, 2010, France became the first European country to ban the full-face Islamic veil, the burqa and the niqab, in public places. Addressing the multicultural critique, this paper probes the debates concerning cultural policies in France in the face of what its government perceives as a challenge to its national raison d'être, including those revolving around the burqa, the niqab and the burkini. Is the burqa and niqab ban socially just? Does it reasonably balance the preservation of societal values and freedom of conscience? What are the true motives behind the ban? Have the discourse changed in the age of COVID-19, when all people are required to wear a mask in the public space? In France, freedom of religion is restricted to the private sphere while secularism is celebrated in the public sphere. The paper makes general arguments about France's changing identity and specific arguments about the burqa and niqab ban. It explains how French history shaped the ideology of secularism and of public civil religion, and how the colonial legacy, immigration, fear of terrorism and security needs have led France to adopt the trilogy of Nationalité, Sécurité, Laïcité while paying homage to the traditional trinity of liberté, égalité, fraternité. It is argued that the burqa and niqab ban is neither just nor reasonable in the eyes of these women and girls, their families and community, and that paternalism that holds that the ban is for the women's own good is a poor, coercive excuse. Claims for paternalistic coercion to protect adult women from their own culture when they do not ask for protection are not sufficiently reasonable to receive vindication. *Keywords*: France, burqa, coercion, égalité, fraternité, laïcité, liberté, nationalité, niqab, religion, sécurité

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 1	**González-Ricoy, Iñigo** (University of Barcelona) *Self-Employment and Independence* One in seven workers in wealthy countries and half of the global workforce are self-employed. Yet contemporary philosophizing about work has neglected self-employment. This neglect is particularly puzzling when it comes to republican and relational views of work, at the core of which is the value of independence. For independence from a boss is precisely what self-employment promises to deliver. Here, I inspect the link between self-employment and independence and ask, in particular, whether the link yields pro tanto reasons to protect and to promote self-employment. I first map the ways independence has been conceived of in recent republican, Kantian, and relational egalitarian thought and distinguish instrumentalist and intrinsic views of the value of independence. On the intrinsic view, dependence on others' will is objectionable as such, and self-employment is valuable for it involves independence from managerial authority. But the view, I argue, is contentious. For if dependence on others is objectionable as such, then relations of dependence in the family, the school, or the state are also, implausibly, objectionable. On the instrumentalist view, what is objectionable is dependence on abusive management, which may be vertical or horizontal. Vertical dependence is dependence on alien authority, which employers wield over staff and self-employment addresses by removing managerial authority altogether. But things get more complicated, I argue, when we factor in horizontal forms of dependence on suppliers and customers and more so when we consider how self-employment may affect employees--in general, who may be liable to more objectionable forms of dependence on their bosses due to competition from self-employed (and in particular gig) workers, and the particular subset of employees that the self-employed may hire, whose dependence on their self-employed bosses, given that small firms are more prone to abuse, may be greater than that of employees working for larger firms. *Keywords*: Self-employment, independence, relational equality

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 1	**Pundik, Amit** (Tel Aviv University) *Offences Specific to Prostitution are Unjustified* The criminalisation of prostitution takes various forms: some offences target sex-workers (e.g. for soliciting), others are aimed at third-parties (e.g. pimps or advertisers), while some jurisdictions follow Sweden in criminalising clients for consumption. In this paper, I argue that existing theories cannot justify offences specific to prostitution. To support this position, I propose my 'continuum' argument, placing on a continuum different scenarios in which some consideration, either monetary or in-kind, was necessary for the sexual relations to take place--from street prostitution to marriage that is solely based on financial interests. The former is a paradigmatic manifestation of prostitution, to which prostitution-specific offences are meant to apply, while criminalisation of the latter seems unjustified. I examine various variables found in prostitution but absent from the other scenarios on the continuum (henceforth 'the other scenarios') and claim that their absence does not impinge on the normative flaw that existing theories attribute to prostitution. Consequently, even if existing theories can justify the criminalisation of prostitution, they cannot justify prostitution-specific offences because the same justification would over-inclusively apply to forms of sexual relations whose criminalisation is commonly regarded as unjustified. My continuum argument contributes to the contentious debate around prostitution in the following way. Existing theories have been repeatedly criticised for their inability to adequately distinguish between selling sexual vs. other types of service, since the normative flaw they identify in prostitution also exists in childcare provision, cleaning, or nursing (e.g. Nussbaum 1998; Brennan and Jaworski 2016; Fabre 2006; Satz 2010). The debate boils down to whether sex (or its selling) has unique features that justify differential legal treatment. By contrast, I argue that, even if it does, existing theories cannot justify prostitution-specific offences because the normative flaw they identify in prostitution also applies to a wide variety of sexual relations. *Keywords*: Prostitution; Criminalisation; Commodification; Consumption

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Concurrent Sessions 2

Session 2	**Cavaliere, Giulia** (Lancaster University) *Involuntary Childlessness, Suffering and Equality of Resources: An Argument for Expanding State-Funded Fertility Treatment Provision* Assessing what counts as infertility has practical implications beyond estimating its prevalence, for access to (state-funded) fertility treatment is usually premised on meeting the criteria that undergird the chosen definition of infertility. In this talk, I argue that the focus of these discussions should move away from 'infertility' (and fertility treatment) and towards 'involuntary childlessness' (and on the medical and non-medical interventions that can be adopted to address it). This expression emphasises that what matters with respect to people's inability to conceive is the lack of the 'end product' (they are childless) and the dispositional attitudes surrounding such state (they are childless involuntarily). Once this conceptualisation is taken onboard, it becomes clear that there exists a mismatch between those who experience involuntary childlessness and those that are currently able to access fertility treatment. My concern in this talk is explaining why such a mismatch deserves attention and what reasons can be advanced to justify addressing it. My case rests on a three-party argument: that involuntary childlessness causes a kind of suffering that we have good reasons to address; that involuntary childlessness is rather widespread and people might have good reasons to insure against it; that involuntary childlessness is characterised by the desire for a certain kind of intimacy, building a certain kind of identity and taking part in a web of social relations. I then move to consider potential objections to my argument: the 'adoption' objection and the 'oppressive social norms' objection. Rather than being defeating objections, however, I explain that they help strengthening my case and that should be factored in broader normative and policy-related discussions on involuntary childlessness. *Keywords*: infertility; luck egalitarianism; suffering; childlessness

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 2	**Forsberg, Lisa** (University of Oxford) *What makes bodily integrity worth having?* The body enjoys a prominent place in moral and political thinking, public policy, and the law. It is often claimed or assumed that human beings possess a right to bodily integrity, such that others cannot permissibly interfere with it unless certain conditions are met. The idea seems to be that a right to bodily integrity specifically, and not some broader right to autonomy or bodily and mental integrity, is worth having or respecting for its own sake, and that the possession of such a right is largely uncontroversial. Given its prominence, we might expect it to be clear what the right to bodily integrity consists in and why bodily integrity is distinctly worth having or respecting. However, accounts of the precise nature and the value of bodily integrity remain surprisingly elusive. While the right to bodily integrity is often appealed to or asserted, its precise content and justification are rarely specified. Descriptively, it is unclear what is involved in bodily integrity and how broad it is in scope. Normatively, it is unclear why it is important and worth protecting by a right. This paper focuses on the latter, normative, question. The paper aims to clarify what makes bodily integrity or a right to it worth having or respecting. It considers several accounts of the right to, or importance of, bodily integrity, including capabilities, autonomy, trespass, self-ownership, and respect accounts. It argues that each of these accounts fails to justify the prominence of bodily integrity in our practices and discourse. It is questionable whether the accounts succeed in explaining why we ought to have a right to bodily integrity, rather than, for example, some broader right to, say, autonomy or bodily and mental integrity. More importantly, they do not explain the obviousness of the right to or value of bodily integrity. *Keywords*: bodily integrity; physical integrity; mental integrity; rights; autonomy; self-ownership; trespass; capabilities; respect

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 2	**Renzo, Massimo** (King's College London) *Practical Agency and Self-Understanding* I argue that appropriately responding to the reasons for action that apply to us involves not only acting as we have reason to, but also being motivated to do so by the right reasons. We fail to exercise our practical agency as we should not only when we fail to do what we have reason to do, but also when we do what we have reason to do for the wrong reasons. Either way, we suffer a form of alienation from our agency, because what we do fails to be informed by an adequate understanding of how we should respond to the situation at hand. This is a failure on two levels: First, we fail to understand certain features of the world. Normative facts are features of the world that call for certain responses. When we are moved by the wrong reasons, we are confused about some of these facts. Second, we fail to understand ourselves. Grasping and being adequately moved by the reasons that apply to us is a way of knowing ourselves and our place in the world. When we are unaware of those reasons, or confused about them, we fail to understand how we are connected to the world around us. One could challenge this view by claiming that we can be moved to act by the right reasons, even if we lack an understanding of those reasons. If so, we might accept that mere conformity with our reasons for action constitutes a defective exercise of our practical agency, and yet reject my account. In reply, I argue that whereas having a grasp of our reasons for action does not involves being able to articulate them or explain them, it does require something more than the mere disposition to do the right thing for the right reasons. *Keywords*: Practical Agency, Alienation, Motivation, Self-Understanding, Virtue.

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 2	**John, Stephen** (University of Cambridge) *How certain is "certain enough"? How deontic norms shape epistemic practice* Proponents of Evidence Based Policy often claim that we should not enact some policy unless we have evidence of effectiveness and safety derived from Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs). For example, recently, EBM proponents have worried about facemask mandates or policies for vaccination spacing on grounds that we lacj RCT-derived evidence for their effectiveness. They base this claim on the further claim that RCTs are better than other forms of evidence. Philosophers of science have disputed these claims about the epistemic superiority of RCTs, but these epistemological disputes leave open a simple question: why assume that we should not act unless we have the best evidence? This claim is not, itself, dictated by epistemic norms. Nor is it obviously a sensible strategy for maximising expected utility. It can often be rational to act on a claim which is far from certain, for example, if the expected costs of a false positive are low, but the expected costs of a false negative are high. This paper suggests a way of understanding why we might value certainty in policy contexts: as a way of institutionalising the norm of non-maleficence. The paper consists of two main sections. The first section, drawing on work in philosophy of science and normative ethics, sets out a general argument for thinking that decisions about when to accept factual claims - decisions about how certain is "certain enough" - might legitimately be shaped by non-epistemic considerations. This claim is familiar enough, but this paper adds a spin: that the relevant non-epistemic considerations might go beyond consequentialist concerns to reflect distinctively deontic issues. The second part of the paper then argues that we can understand actual policy debates over Evidence Based Policy as reflecting a version of the dynamic above. There are ongoing debates between proponents of EBP and an older epidemiological tradition, which stresses evidential pluralism in policy contexts. One way of undertanding these debates is in solely epistemological terms; as reflecting disagreements over norms for causal inference. I suggest an alternative interpretation: that EBP arises from the context of clinical medicine, with a strong focus on norms of non-maleficence, whereas older public health traditions are more firmly embedded in utilitarian traditions. In effect, apparently technical debates about the evidence are, I suggest, unfamiliar iterations of very familiar debates in normative ethics. In conclusion, I note some implications of my claims both for how we do applied ethics and how we do policy.

	Keywords: Applied epistemology; medical ethics; evidence based medicine; research ethics

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 2	**Seglow, Jonathan** (Royal Holloway, University of London) *Against the Secret Ballot* The secret ballot is often seen as a centrepiece of democratic elections, helping guarantee they are free, fair and that votes reflect citizens' genuine preferences. However, J. S. Mill and a few contemporary writers have argued that open voting could augment public deliberation. Against it, are considerations of corruption, civic shame (at inability to defend one's voting choice) and democratic distortion (voting in socially acceptable ways). Bypassing the aspirations of public deliberation, I argue that voters' knowledge of each other's electoral preferences is an integral part of the democratic ideal. Building on the assumption that coercive power of democratic states is authorised by the people and exercised in their name, I claim is that a necessary condition of the justifiability of coercive power is that it's addressed to those subject to it: the coerced can then in principle address their coercers back. With open voting, voters know in principle how each of them proposed to shape the law to which all are subject: they enjoy mutual minimal answerability. While avoiding corruption, civic shame and democratic distortions favour retaining the secret ballot for the time being, I conclude that the objectionable features of actually existing democracies do not detract from the cogency of open voting as a constituent of the democratic ideal. *Keywords*: democracy; secret ballot; open voting; coercion

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Concurrent Sessions 3

Session 3	**Chappell, Zsuzsanna** (Independent scholar) *Interacting with Ourselves: Four Aspects of the Self We Can Act On* Many of our actions are self-directed: agents carry these actions out reflexively, aimed at themselves. Many of these are mundane: dressing oneself, feeding oneself. However, there are also a number of such self-directed actions which are clearly positively or negatively valenced in our society: one can self-harm, self-medicate, self-soothe, self-regulate, carry out self-care and read self-help books. Actions of the latter kind frequently fall under the domain of applied philosophy, and some of them may even involve others (eg assisted suicide). These valenced actions are grounded in attitudes one holds towards oneself. Self-blame might lead to self-punishment, self-esteem might lead to self-reward. It is only recently that philosophers have once again become interested in de se attitudes, that is attitudes an agent hold towards themselves (cite date). Thus, it is possible not only to blame or forgive others, but also to blame of forgive oneself. The main question, which I wish to address is the following: what exactly is this self which one is carrying out these actions towards. I consider four possible answers: the embodied aspect of the self, the inter-personal aspect of the self, the mental aspect of the self and the deep self. All of these aspects of the self are in continuous mutual interaction with each other. Unlike layers of an onion, which have to be peeled back in order, different aspects of the self act towards each other at different times. Taking these different aspects of the self seriously and identifying how they interact allows us to make better sense of behaviours such as addiction, self-harm or eating disorders. They also help us in working out details of what is happening and what is going wrong in cases of structural injustice. *Keywords*: self, action, embodiment

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 3	**Jefferson, Anneli** (Cardiff University) *Blaming for effect - Some worries for consequentialist accounts of responsibility* According to consequentialist accounts of moral responsibility, moral blame, punishment, praise and reward are justified by their effects. Direct consequentialism holds that the effects of specific blaming instances on the agent being blamed are what matters, indirect accounts appeal to effects on the whole community, including the agent being blamed, over time. A common criticism of consequentialist accounts is that they allow blame without desert, if the consequences are positive. In this paper, I assess whether consequentialist justifications of our responsibility practices can meet this objection. I show that because moral responsibility is by definition reactive, even accounts that focus on the effects of our practices have to take the evaluation of past behaviour as a starting point. If they do not, they are not responsibility practices, but some other kind of practice. However, direct consequentialism still has the counterintuitive consequence that blame is unjustified if a wrong-doer is so hardened that they will not benefit from being blamed. Indirect consequentialism avoids this consequence, because it takes into account effects on all of society. However, if overall effects on society justify our practices, the worry arises that we might be justified in blaming the innocent or non-responsible if that benefits the majority. I argue that for conceptual reasons, scapegoating the innocent for the sake of others is not a genuine instance of blame, but instead a form of pretend blame. Whether this kind of activity is morally justified depends on the relationship between a consequentialist theory of moral responsibility and a consequentialist theory in normative ethics. If being a consequentialist about moral responsibility commits one to being a consequentialist generally, and scapegoating has positive consequences, it will be morally justified. *Keywords*: moral responsibility, consequentialism, harm

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 3	**Jenkins, David** (University of Otago) *Gentrification as Domination* Normative political theorists – with some notable exceptions – have not yet given much attention to gentrification. Uppermost in current accounts of gentrification is a focus on the ways in which people, already embedded into particular placed-based social, cultural and economic routines are displaced by the influx of wealthier, middle-class people into formerly working class neighbourhoods. However, rather than describe its wrong in terms of displacement, I instead consider the normative implications of a more profound transformative agenda that underpins gentrification. Descriptions of gentrification that begin with the influx of displacing middle-class people enters the story too late. I argue gentrification expresses a large-scale shift of emphasis in capitalist production that can only be instantiated through relationships structured around domination. The harms of displacement are only one part of a much broader set of wrongs, with deeper and more insidious implications. In section 1, I give a description of gentrification that corrects for tendencies to focus on the influx of higher-income households, which misses the fact that gentrification is also a process of production. An important aspect of such production is both the relationships between investors, developers and higher income households which underpin them, and the legislative apparatus that has enabled participants in these relationships to make profitable use of urban land. In section 2, I argue that a result of the legislative apparatus which structures the relationships between landlords, investors, developers and higher income households is the creation of a relationship of domination between these participants and those who exist outside of that relationship. I then use this idea of gentrification-as-domination to describe why it better captures what we should find troubling about gentrification. In section 3, I argue that focusing on domination as the more fundamental wrong underpinning gentrification moves us beyond contingent considerations of distributions in costs and benefits. *Keywords*: housing; gentrification; domination; displacement

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 3	**Thomas, Deryn** (University of St. Andrews) and **Angie O'Sullivan** (University of Edinburgh) *What is the point of 'work', anyway? A function-first account of the concept of work* This paper proposes and defends a function-first analysis of the concept 'work'. Drawing on the method of conceptual analysis developed by Edward Craig (1990) and more recently developed by Michael Hannon (2019), we argue that what matters in understanding the concept of work and identifying instances of work are the functions that the concept work plays in everyday life. Traditional accounts of work have primarily focused on identifying the characteristic features, or necessary and sufficient conditions, of the concept. While these accounts will often differ in regard to which features are considered most essential, they fail to explain why the concept exists in the first place. Given that concepts emerge for a purpose, conceptual analysis, in so far as it attempts to examine and reveal the nature of certain concepts, should answer this question. The paper proceeds as follows: section 1 briefly explains function-first methodology; section 2. gives our function-first account of work. We argue that work is a goal-oriented, purposeful, or production-oriented activity done in exchange for compensation. The final section showcases the advantages of function-first method as applied to the concept work by illustrating how it resolves the problem of distinguishing between work and play, a problem that traditional analyses cannot resolve. *Keywords*: Work; Function-First; Conceptual Analysis; Play

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 3	**Wilson, Emilia L.** (University of St Andrews) *The Harms of Permissibly Ignored Sexual Refusal tropes* Depictions of ignored sexual refusal as part of seduction are so common as to be a clichÃ©, found throughout all genres and media. Feminist philosophers of language have argued that interpreting these depictions requires one to make certain presuppositions, entrenching rape myths and preventing the viewer from recognising sincere sexual refusal (Langton & West 1999). However, this account is limited to cases in which we can attribute very specific presuppositions to the depiction and faces difficulty explaining precisely how these assumptions transfer to real world contexts. In this presentation I draw on the philosophy of metaphor, as another example of open-ended non-literal communication, to develop an original account of how interpreting these narratives can shape audiences' attitudes towards rape and sexual refusal. I take a scene from the James Bond movie Goldfinger (1964) a paradigmatic example to work with. I draw on recent work on the ethics of metaphors to argue that interpreting such a narrative can make inferences which justify ignoring sexual refusal more available to the audience. I claim that depictions like Goldfinger portray ignoring sexual refusal as permissible and, as such, require the audience to infer some explanation as to why. I use Fraser's (2018) account of an 'inferential network' to argue that making these inferences in order to interpret this narrative can make them (i) more cognitively accessible to the audience and (ii) more socially licensed. I show that mainstream depictions may be particularly harmful due to their influence over social license -- a harm which has been previously overlooked. I thus develop an original account of how these depictions can cause harm which captures the rich and open-ended nature of this form of communication while highlighting a specific mechanism by which these depictions can distort attitudes to rape. *Keywords*: feminist philosophy; philosophy of language; pornography; metaphor; rape

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Concurrent Sessions 4

Session 4	**Burri, Susanne** (LSE (London School of Economics) and University of Konstanz) *A Subjective Impermissibility Account of Liability to Defensive Harm* This paper argues that a person becomes liable to defensive harm just in case she acts impermissibly in light of her beliefs or her evidence, and her actions do, in fact, impermissibly threaten a moral good that is protected by her victim's rights. I defend this conception of liability by arguing, first, that liability to defensive harm is a matter not of distributive justice in the allocation of unavoidable harm, but a matter of rights enforcement. When an agent threatens to violate her victim's rights, the victim may do certain things to keep the rights violation from occurring, and a threatener's liability is simply the flip-side of what a potential victim may do to stave off a rights violation. I then argue that from an enforcement perspective, the Subjective Impermissibility Account outperforms influential existing accounts, including culpability accounts as well as the Moral Responsibility and the Moral Status Account. I defend my proposed account of liability against two pertinent objections: first, that it has unduly restrictive implications in particular cases, and second, that it fails to provide helpful guidance to potential victims who are trying to establish whether they may permissibly defend themselves. *Keywords*: Liability to Defensive Harm; Rights; Self-Defence

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 4	**Edlich, Alexander** (LMU Munich) *Tightlacing. Abusive Normative Address* We introduce a kind of psychological abuse so far untheorized. It consists in manipulating victims via abuse of normative address into adopting a mistaken self-conception seemingly justifying unreasonable demands. We call this phenomenon Tightlacing, invoking the image of wearing a corset so tightly bound it distorts the shape of the torso to detrimental effect. Tightlacing functions by addressing the victim such that implicitly an assumption about who or what they are is communicated. This happens when a demand is directed at the victim such that they are portrayed as a natural addressee of this demand while actually the demand is reasonable only on a substantial and mistaken assumption about what the addressee can do or be. We motivate this using an example of a child demanded to control their emotions whenever expressing them may make others uncomfortable. While the demand comes in the guise of reasonableness -- after all, what expressing one's emotions does to others can be a relevant consideration -- it is reasonable only on the assumption that the child is or can be in full control of their emotions. Only then can the failure to control one's emotions be viewed as something the child may be reproached for. Since this assumption is implicitly smuggled into the conversation, however, and thus made difficult to notice and contest, the child is manipulated to accepting it and developing a self-conception that puts them under pressure to adapt to unreasonable demands. Other examples include the silencing of victims by asking them to move on and the moralistic demand to be a moral saint. We conclude by drawing an analogy to Gaslighting. Where Gaslighting manipulates victims to viewing themselves as epistemically incompetent, Tightlacing manipulates victims to viewing themselves such that some behaviour is not allowed to them. Gaslighting suppresses testimony, whereas Tightlacing suppresses behaviour. *Keywords*: Normative Address; Abuse; Manipulation; Gaslighting

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 4	**Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper** (University of Aarhus) *Forgiving the Mote in your Sister's Eye: On Standingless Forgiveness* When partners are confronted with evidence of their infidelity they sometimes start to blame those they have deceived for having been unjustifiably neglectful in ways that partly explain their affairs. Imagine you are the deceived party in one of these cases. And imagine that, without having addressed the issue of their own infidelity, your partner magnanimously states that they forgive you, suggesting that this is a suitable point at which to end the conversation. Probably, you would dismiss the forgiveness as an offer your partner has no standing to make. In this talk, I want to make sense of what is going on when people dismiss forgiveness despite conceding that they have wronged the other party in the way for which they are being offered forgiveness. Essentially, forgiving simply is ceasing to blame in the right way. Hence, if one lacks standing to blame, one also lacks standing to forgive. Or so I shall argue. In the recent literature on standing to blame, many philosophers argue that: a) a blamer can lack standing to blame for an act even if that act is blameworthy; b) standingless, hypocritical blame is pro tanto morally wrongful; and c) factors other than hypocrisy can undermine one's standing to blame. I shall defend analogous claims about forgiving: a*) a forgiver can lack standing to forgive someone else for an act even if that act is forgivable; b*) standingless, hypocritical forgiveness is pro tanto morally wrongful; c*) factors other than hypocrisy can undermine someone's standing to forgive. I also try to defend the more cautious Conditional Claim that, for each of a--c), if that claim is true, then so is the corresponding claim about forgiveness, i.e., a*--c*). *Keywords*: Blame; forgiveness; standing.

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 4	**Maheshwari, Kritika** (University of Groningen) *Extinction Risks, Doomsday Machines, and Scanlon's Contractualism* Many people share the intuition that causing or allowing human extinction would be morally wrong. But what exactly makes it wrong, if and when it is? Call this the Extinction Question. According to a popular response, call it the Consequentialist Answer, it is a wrong-making feature of human extinction that it would cause people with lives worth living never to be born (Parfit 2017, Beckstead 2013, Bostrom 2013, Beard & Kaczmarek 2019, Greaves & MacAskill 2019). Many find the Consequentialist Answer intuitively compelling. Others, however, disagree. According to a recent non-consequentialist response, call it the Contractualist Answer, the fact that merely possible people have no real standpoints as they will never exist (by definition), and the fact that they cannot have an interest in 'coming into existence' are reasons to exclude them from our explanation of what is wrong with causing or allowing extinction (Finneron-Burns 2017). On the one hand, contractualists argue, contra consequentialists, that merely possible people make no difference to our obligations to prevent extinction from occurring. On the other hand, some critics with consequentialist leanings have recently responded by arguing that there is in fact no inherent feature of the contractualist theory that prevents it from giving weight to the interests of merely possible people (Beard & Kaczmarek 2019). They challenge the contractualists to provide further justification for their position in light of two objections. First, we might wrong potential people by failing to provide them the benefit of existence. And second, we might wrong potential people by failing to bringing them into existence with a life that is foreseeably good for them. However, I argue that Contractualism cannot countenance such instances of wronging on their framework. Accordingly, existing attempts to reconcile the contractualist's and the consequentialist's judgement of what makes choosing causing or allowing extinction wrong by identifying a common wrong-maker does not succeed. *Keywords*: extinction, risk, Scanlon, contractualism, Parfit

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 4	**Rowland, Rich** (University of Leeds) *Integrity and Rights to Gender-Affirming Healthcare* Gender-Affirming Healthcare (GAH) interventions include the prescription of hormones (testosterone or oestrogen) and surgery such as top-surgery (mastectomy) and facial feminisation surgery. Many hold that trans and non-binary people have rights to GAH. But there is an issue about the grounds of this right. Some, such as Bracanovic (2017) and Go (2018), argue that rights to GAH can only be grounded in one of two ways. First, rights to GAH may be grounded in the right to be cured of, or to mitigate, an illness that one has. Gender dysphoria is an illness (on this view) and rights to GAH could be grounded in rights to have this illness mitigated or cured. Second, rights to GAH could be grounded in rights to well-being or to have the harm one is experiencing mitigated: trans and non-binary people have very high rates of suicide and severe depression and GAH mitigates this depression. However, the first ground pathologizes trans and non-binary identities in a way that there is an emerging consensus that we should not and the second ground problematically implies that many trans and non-binary people do not have rights to GAH for many trans and non-binary people are not depressed. In this paper I propose that rights to GAH can be grounded in rights to live and act with integrity. The most popular account of rights to religious accommodation ground these rights in rights to live and act with integrity. I argue that if this is right, and some people have a pro tanto claim right to religious accommodation on grounds of integrity, similarly some people have pro tanto claim rights to GAH purely on the basis of their right to live and act with integrity. *Keywords*: Gender Identity; Integrity; Authenticity; Religious Accommodation; Rights to Healthcare; Trans

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Concurrent Session 5

Session 5	**Gubler, Simone** (University of Nevada, Reno) *The Case Against Victim Impact Statements* A victim impact statement is a statement delivered during the sentencing component of a trial by a victim of civil or criminal wrongdoing. It permits the victim to detail the subjective impact of the wrong (including the experience of emotional hardship, loss, and psychological suffering). As a relatively new practice (at least in the context of the common law), the victim impact statement has significant philosophical and juridical interest. Victim impact statements functionally broaden the scope of the court's concern with harms visited upon the victim, beyond those harms expressly prohibited by law. They also accord victims greater expressive power in court -- victims are not subject to cross-examination on victim impact statements, nor are they held to the standards of proof and evidence that apply in establishing matters of fact during trial. The inclusion of the victim impact statement in the trial process provokes questions about procedural justice, the subjective character of harm, the reliability of untested testimony, and the scope of harms with which the law should be concerned. In this paper, I identify a dilemma for justice posed by the admission of victim impact statements by courts and argue against permitting the practice in the sentencing component of civil and criminal trials. *Keywords*: Philosophy of law; victims; justice

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 5	**Hinze, Jakob** (University of St Andrews) *Democracy, Epistocracy, and the Voting Age* Should voting rights be conditional upon competence? Proponents of epistocracy think so, but most political theorists dismiss this view. At the same time, the practice of disenfranchising citizens below a certain age is widely endorsed. This paper raises a challenge for proponents of the voting age. Drawing on a revised version of Estlund's (2008) influential response to the question of 'why not epistocracy?', I argue that electoral inequality is justifiable only if all qualified points of view can accept that it promotes the epistemic reliability of democratic procedures. This condition rules out epistocracy, but it is an open question -- one that the critics of epistocracy have not sufficiently engaged with -- whether it also vindicates the standard form of democracy that disenfranchises everyone below the voting age. In light of the argument against epistocracy, proponents of the voting age need to offer a renewed justification of age-based disenfranchisements: they need to show that there is an age group whose electoral exclusion enhances, beyond reasonable doubt, the epistemic reliability of the electorate, and they need to specify for what age this is the case. I do not argue that they cannot succeed at this task. Still, at the very least, my analysis implies a reversal of dialectical roles in the debate about the voting age: while it is commonly assumed that voting age is justified unless its opponents offer conclusive reasons to abolish it, my argument suggests that the voting age must be abolished unless its defenders give a comprehensive justification for it. The most significant upshot of thinking through the epistocratic challenge to democracy, I conclude, is not that epistocratic reallocations of voting power are a bad idea, but rather that a deeply entrenched feature of current voting schemes must be reconsidered. *Keywords*: Epistemic democracy; epistocracy; the voting age; political authority; political equality

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 5	**Kanygina, Yuliya** (University of Gothenburg) *Moral Impartiality, Self-Other Asymmetry and the Presumption of Duties to Oneself* There is a conflict between the ideal of moral impartiality, the core idea being that everyone matters equally for moral justification, and the thesis of the commonsense morality according to which it is morally permissible for the moral agent to treat herself in ways in which morality forbids her to treat others. It is possible that this conflict is only apparent. When moral impartiality is upheld at the level of the application of moral norms, it requires the agent to be guided solely by the distinctions identified as relevant by the norm in question. The self-other asymmetry, some argue, is a fundamental feature of morality, and so the distinction between oneself and others that it supposedly reveals would be relevant for and accommodated by all of our moral norms. The asymmetry supposedly tells us, that morality does not assign positive value to the well-being or happiness of the moral agent, of the sort it assigns to well-being or happiness of others. I argue that that the self-other asymmetry is not a fundamental feature of morality. Rather, our asymmetric intuitions concerning self- and other-regarding actions are best explained by the implicit presupposition that when the agent engages in self-sacrificing behavior, she consents to it. I claim that the extant arguments against the consent-based explanation of the asymmetry presuppose, rather than establish the asymmetry. Since the argument against the asymmetry implies a revisionary view, one should not expect the switch of intuitions regarding actions, whether with or without consent. A better way to show that our intuitions track the normative significance of consent is to consider cases where the will of the moral agent is either legitimately superimposed (in the context the surrogate decision-making) or its significance invalidated (in any of the way in which we take consent to be invalidated). I consider such cases and argue that they provide support to the consent-based explanation of the asymmetry, thereby denying it the status of a fundamental feature of morality. I end by arguing that from the first-person standpoint, the consideration of the agent's own will is typically settled by the consideration of her well-being. Therefore, gratuitous self-harm which is incompatible with an overall well-being of a person is not only irrational or foolish but possibly wrong. *Keywords*: moral impartiality; self-other asymmetry; consent; duties to oneself

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 5	**Lang, Gerald** (University of Leeds) *Deontology, Inviolability, and Defence* The 'paradox of deontology' challenges deontology by asking why it does not sanction the minimization of rights violations overall. An influential deontological reply, associated with Frances Kamm, is to insist that each individual's inviolability is boosted if it is impermissible to sacrifice them for the sake of the many. But this line of argument needs to do more to defend inviolability against rival measures of moral standing, and it also needs to have something to say about the enforceability of our rights. These two problems are tackled by sketching out a defence-based theory of inviolability, which injects defensive theory into deontology. *Keywords*: Paradox of deontology, inviolability, defence, enforceability, costs of rescue

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 5	**Mancilla, Alejandra** (University of Oslo) *Effective disoccupation* In international law, the doctrine of effective occupation was developed by imperial and colonial powers to justify their sovereignty over newly annexed territories, and was measured by two criteria: animus occupandi, that is, the right will or intention to be sovereign over the territory; and corpus occupandi, that is, the actual exercise of sovereignty to mark presence in the territory. What counted as â€œactual', however, was narrowly understood as having a legal and institutional system similar enough to the European, thus allowing for the dispossession and loss of control of the native inhabitants over the lands that the European colonized. The morally outrageous implications of this narrow concept of sovereignty for the subjected peoples were denounced with increasing force especially since the second half of the twentieth century, giving way to a process of global decolonization that raised the number of states from over 50 in the 1950s to 195 today, and counting. However, the morally outrageous implications of this narrow concept of sovereignty for the nonhuman, natural world remain intact. Today, both the ex-colonial powers and the newly independent states enjoy Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, which has allowed not only the use, but the overuse and abuse of the nonhuman, natural world. The consequences are staring us in our face, the most obvious being climate change and the biodiversity crisis. In this article, I propose a transition from effective occupation to effective disoccupation when it comes to the nonhuman, natural world--not only on the grounds that we must, but also on the grounds that we should. To enact effective disoccupation, states must show animus disoccupandi, that is, the right will or intention to give up Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and to replace it with Permanent Trusteeship. To this must be added the corpus disoccupandi, to wit, the concrete, actual exercise of trusteeship over the territory. In international law, the doctrine of effective occupation was developed by imperial and colonial powers to justify their sovereignty over newly annexed territories, and was measured by two criteria: animus occupandi, the right will or intention to be sovereign over the territory; and corpus occupandi, the actual exercise of sovereignty to mark presence in the territory. What counted as â€œactual', however, was narrowly understood as having a legal and institutional system similar enough to the European, thus allowing for the dispossession and loss of control of the native inhabitants over the colonized lands.

The morally outrageous implications of this narrow concept of sovereignty for the subjected peoples were denounced with increasing force since the second half of the twentieth century, giving way to a process of global decolonization that raised the number of states from over 50 in the 1950s to 195 today. However, the morally outrageous implications of this narrow concept of sovereignty for the nonhuman, natural world remain intact. Today, both the ex-colonial powers and the newly independent states enjoy Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, which has allowed not only the use, but the overuse and abuse of the nonhuman, natural world. The consequences are staring us in our face, the most obvious being climate change and the biodiversity crisis.

Here, I propose a transition from effective occupation to effective disoccupation when it comes to the nonhuman, natural world. To enact effective disoccupation, states must show animus disoccupandi, that is, the right will or intention to give up Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and to replace it with Permanent Trusteeship. To this must be added the corpus occupandi, to wit, the actual exercise of trusteeship over the territory, where the default is not exploitation, but preservation.

We must engage in this transition, I claim, if we have self-interested reasons in keeping the earth inhabitable for us. But we also should: the more we learn about our place on earth among others, the more obvious it is that an ethics and, by extension, a political philosophy that does not take those others into account (not just on instrumental grounds) is inadequate and wanting.

Keywords: political philosophy; territorial rights; sovereignty; natural resources

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Concurrent Sessions 6

Session 6	**Ivankovic, Viktor** (Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb) **and Moles, Andres** *(*Central European University) *The Inevitability Argument for Nudging and the Evidence-Based View* The inevitability argument (IA), the claim that behaviorally and non-reflectively influencing individuals is permissible because influence to decision-making cannot be avoided, is arguably the "most important argument for nudging" (Grill 2014, 142). However, this argument is often rejected because while context dependency certainly is unavoidable, intentional tampering with choice arrangements is not. Since only intended influences can be manipulative, it makes a great moral difference whether influences on choice are designed or a product of untampered environments. We claim that an alternate version of the IA cannot be so easily dismissed. If the choice architect is able to predict both the outcomes of intended influences and the untampered choice environment, then there will be little, if any, moral difference between changing the environment and keeping it as it is; the two categories will become 'close moral cousins'. Such circumstances produce a new version of inevitability – the architect will have to pick one of two 'morally close' options. Furthermore, choice architects can become responsible for foreseeable secondary effects of behavioral choice arrangements. These are two core aspects of what we call the evidence-based view. We also tackle several ways in which the argument for moral closeness between designed and untampered choice environments could be challenged. First, opponents might suggest that to conceive behavioral expertise in this way is too 'science-fictional'. Second, even if sci-fi expertise is attainable, opponents might suggest that different normative conclusions should be reached, such as suspending behavioral research or keeping behavioral experts away from positions of power. Finally, the strongest objection posed to our view is that while acts and omissions are close in any single choice-making context, it might make a difference whether all choice environments are unified in their influential direction; this is something we would expect of designed, and not of untampered choice environments. *Keywords*: nudge; inevitability; moral closeness; evidence; foreseeability

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 6	**Rinner, Stefan** (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy) *Accommodation and Attitudinal Change in Psychotherapy* People go into therapy and counseling for different reasons. The most common reasons are feelings, beliefs, desires, behaviors, and relationships that are perceived as problematic. Usually, it is a combination of these. For example, problematic behaviors often go hand in hand with relationships and feelings that are perceived as problematic. Somewhat simplified, we could say that what sets the different schools of psychotherapy on the market apart is which of these reasons are considered to be causally responsible for the others. Whereas behavior therapy starts with the behavior of the client, systemic therapy starts with his/her relationships. Psychodynamic therapies, on the other hand, get to the bottom of the client's mental attitudes and feelings. However, common to all of these procedures is that the therapy usually takes place verbally in the form of a conversation between client and therapist. Hence, following a much quoted definition by Strotzka, we can say that, in a large part, psychotherapy tries to change behaviors, mental attitudes, and feelings that are perceived as problematic by the client verbally, via a conversation between the client and the therapist. A similar phenomenon has been discussed by philosophers of language in connection with hate speeches. For example, philosophers, such as Rae Langton and Caroline West, have pointed out that hate speeches often change the feelings and attitudes of the audience and, thereby, lead to increasing violence and discrimination against the members of the group targeted for hate. Following this, philosophers of language have tried to answer the question, how, exactly, hate speech brings these attitudinal changes about. Different explanations have been offered in the literature. This leads to the question whether also the attitudinal changes in psychotherapy could, at least in part, be explained within the context of philosophy of language. In this talk, I will mainly concentrate on Langton and West's explanation of the attitudinal changes that come with hate speeches, starting from David Lewis' theory of conversations in ``Scorekeeping in a Language Game''. I will argue that Langton and West's explanation is highly relevant also in connection with attitudinal changes in psychotherapy. This will be illustrated using different examples from the therapeutic practice, which, in turn, will lead to a better understanding of Langton and West's account of attitudinal change via speech. *Keywords*: Presuppositions, Accommodation, Hate Speech, Psychotherapy, Systemic Questions

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 6	**Specker Sullivan, Laura** (Fordham University) *Varieties of Distrust: A Normative Taxonomy for Medicine* Trust is a well-developed concept. Distrust is less well-developed, despite its growing importance in the global pandemic due to its role in frustrating public health efforts, among other effects. Distrust has become a common theme in the United States in 2020, describing in broad terms African American attitudes towards clinical research, well-off white mothers' attitudes towards vaccines, and rural white men's attitudes towards public health interventions. Yet there are different types and sources of distrust, and this has implications for how the distrust ought to be addressed, and by whom. I distinguish three types of distrust: distrust due to injustice, distrust due to ignorance, and distrust due to misunderstanding. I suggest that each of these types of distrust is a unique moral psychological phenomenon (although they share some distinguishing features) and that a different normative approach is appropriate to each. While the source of the distrust in the cases of ignorance and misunderstanding are an epistemic flaw in the truster, in the case of racial injustice distrust is justified and must be redressed by the trustee. This taxonomy not only allows medical professionals to identify different forms of distrust, but it also allows them to determine the appropriate moral response. *Keywords*: Trust; Distrust; Race; Injustice; Medicine

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 6	**Toop, Alison** (University of Leeds) *A Uniqueness Challenge for Multiple Accounts of Love* Intuitively we take romantic love to be a distinct form of love. We distinguish it from the love that we have for our friends when we say things like 'love you, but not in that way'. It seems reasonable to expect our accounts of love to at least accommodate this intuition, if not explain it. I focus on four (broadly categorised) accounts of inter-personal (non-familial) love: accounts that take love to be union with the beloved (Union Accounts); accounts that view love as robust concern for the beloved (Robust Concern Accounts); accounts that view love as a form of valuation, either as an appraisal or bestowal of value (Valuation Accounts); and accounts that take love to be either a single emotion, or a complex emotional interdependence with the beloved (Emotion Accounts). The uniqueness challenge for these accounts is as follows: can they demonstrate that there is a unique form of romantic love? I argue that these accounts, taken in isolation, cannot demonstrate that there is a unique form of romantic love. They either fail to identify a distinctive type of romantic love; or they can only identify a distinctive type of romantic love by appealing to some further aspect of the relationship that the love is found within. There are two general ways in which an account can show that there is a distinct from of romantic love. The first is to show that the constitutive feature of love (union, robust concern, valuation or emotion) is exclusively a part of romantic love (and not a feature of other types of love). The second is to show that the nature of the constitutive feature is distinct in some way in romantic love. I will show that neither of these ways is open to any of the four accounts considered. *Keywords*: Love; relationships

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 6	**Unruh, Charlotte** (Technical University Munich) *Choosing Where to Give* Many people believe that the duty to rescue people that we encounter in emergencies is stronger than the duty to donate to charity. Many people also believe that in choosing where to donate, we should donate to the most effective charities. In this paper, I argue that there is a tension between these beliefs. The tension arises because different justifications for the duty to rescue prescribe partiality in where to donate. The upshot is that the justification of the strength of duties to rescue people in immediate peril and effectiveness constraints on charitable giving are more closely related than it might seem. *Keywords*: Duty to rescue, Effective giving, Equivalence Thesis

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Concurrent Sessions 7

Session 7	**Jost, Lara** (St Andrews and Stirling) *Endometriosis and Source Based Epistemic Injustice* Endometriosis is a common gynaecological disorder where the lining of the womb grows outside of it, causing inflammation, pain and subfertility. In the UK, patients suffering from endometriosis have to wait an average of 7.5 years between the first time they report symptoms and the time they get a diagnosis (Endometriosis UK). Other countries do not fare much better, as patients around the world have to wait an average of 5.5 years in individual or private-insure funded healthcare or an average of 8.3 years with government-funded healthcare. Despite increased discussions about epistemic injustice in the domain of healthcare, one phenomenon around endometriosis cannot be explained by the currently available framework: the discrepancy in diagnostic time between patients consulting for pelvic pain and those consulting for infertility. Indeed, patients who consult primarily for infertility wait on average 3.4 years less than patients who consult for pelvic pain. Why is there such an important discrepancy in the diagnostic time between these patients who have the same illness? To answer this question, I first provide an expansion to the concept of epistemic injustice, called source based epistemic injustice, which highlights the unfairness towards knowers who use epistemic methods based on currently unapproved sources of knowledge, like pain and other types of affective experience. I then use this new framework to highlight why patients consulting for pelvic pain suffer from an additional form of epistemic injustice, thus explaining the diagnostic delay. Ultimately, I explain how clinical methods relying on 'mechanical objectivity' put endometriosis patients with pelvic pain in an irreconcilable epistemic tension that can only be resolved by reforming our epistemological theories and incorporating affective experience within our approved sources of knowledge. *Keywords*: Medical Ethics; Social Epistemology; Applied Epistemology; Healthcare

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 7	**Schwarz, Lucia** (University of Arizona) *Ethical Veganism? Oh My Goodness!* The debate on ethical veganism has hitherto concerned itself almost exclusively with the question of whether veganism is morally obligatory. By contrast, I argue that it is morally good to be vegan. Focusing on goodness, rather than obligatoriness, has at least three advantages: first, for many people, it may feel more natural to think about going vegan in terms of goodness rather than obligation; second, the claim that veganism is good is less likely to alienate potential allies than the claim that it is obligatory; third, focusing on goodness, rather than obligatoriness, affords one dialectical advantages when addressing objections to ethical veganism. In exploring the potential goodness of veganism, I focus my attention on a certain aspect of the traditional debate, namely, the trade-off between the costs that accrue to the animals we use for food and the costs that accrue to consumers in virtue of abstaining from meat. I hold that, when we take into account only the harm being done to the animals and the costs accruing to consumers, for many people, it is a good thing to be vegan. My main argument is that eating vegan constitutes a morally good sacrifice for the sake of another. *Keywords*: Veganism; Animal Ethics; Applied Ethics

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 7	**van 't Klooster, Jens** (KU Leuven/University of Amsterdam) *The Normative Blindspots of Basel III* How can political philosophers contribute to resolving complex and contested issues involved in banking regulation and other areas of economic policy? A significant difficulty in dealing with such topics is that any normative judgment on the outcomes of economic policy depends closely on contested factual questions. How much to regulate banks depends on one's view of the benefits of regulation and its costs, neither of which political philosophers are particularly well-placed to judge. Political realists have rightly challenged overly moralising approaches to political disagreement, but so far not developed similarly applied methods of normative investigation. As I argue, normative theorists can avoid the pitfalls of an overly moralistic approach by studying the normative blind spots of regulatory processes. Normative blind spots are features of political deliberation and decision-making that lead to inadequate consideration of the interest of those affected the political process. I apply this methodology to identify three blind spots of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's approach to setting bank capital requirements. First, developing economies that implement the BCBS's Accords are often not members of the Committee, which leads their interests to be systematically absent from deliberation on new standards. Second, the focus of the BCBS on an adequate pricing of risk leads to a neglect of issues of a fair distribution of credit. Third, the BCBS reliance on credit rating agencies and risk-modelling preclude effectively incorporating the environmental impact of bank lending into the regulatory standards. In studying these features of the Basel process as normative blind spots, I do not seek to show that they result in unfair outcomes per se, but rather that they constitute an intrinsically objectionable form of procedural neglect. *Keywords*: Distributive Justice; Finance; Regulation; Non-ideal theory; Realism

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 7	**Wakefield, James** (School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University) *Wholehearted Agency and Practical Disorientation* Some philosophers maintain that we have agency to the extent that we regulate the effectiveness of our desires. This process plays out within the confines of our actual volitional sets. Practical reasoning accordingly involves us distinguishing between ends that we just happen to want and those that *really* matter to us, thereby forming wholehearted commitments despite the presence of conflicting desires in our consciousness. Certain configurations of the will, such as indifference and ambivalence, prevent us from attaining a state of wholeheartedness. Drawing on the work of Harry Frankfurt, Cheshire Calhoun and Sarah Buss, in this paper I evaluate the threat to agency posed by the commonplace but little-discussed phenomenon of 'practical disorientation', characterised by the absence from our consciousness of any clear conception of what really matters. I argue that practical disorientation is structurally distinct from indifference and ambivalence, but poses a similar threat to our practical capacities as agents. The fact that we can self-consciously experience disorienting episodes and yet recover suggests that being an agent is not just a matter of negotiating the pushes and pulls of our various volitional impulses. It is also a negotiation between different ways of conceiving of ourselves, our relationships with the world, and the kinds of life we can regard as satisfactory. *Keywords*: agency; disorientation; indecision; wholeheartedness

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Session 7	**Wells, Katy** (University of Warwick) *Living with your ex: housing and freedom of (dis)association* "My ex and I were already living in a house share when we signed a rental contract with mutual friends. Two months before we were due to move in to the new house, I broke up with him…. Eventually we separated, but as we'd already signed the contract for a year and the deposits were paid, we had no choice but to continue living together." (Natasha, writing in Stylist Magazine). Housing is an important domain in which we pursue relationships, in particular, our close or intimate relationships. In inviting others into our homes, in having them stay over, in moving in with a friend or partner, we exercise one significant dimension of our freedom of association: our freedom to intimately associate with others. Our housing, however, can also place limits on our freedom of association. As illustrated by the quote above, the inability to exit a particular housing situation can mean the inability to fully exit the relationship. In spite of the significance of housing, political philosophy has been slow to begin to address questions of housing justice, questions about what a just set of housing policies might look like. In addition, whilst there is important work considering barriers to exit from intimate relationships, particularly from feminists, such work has not always placed housing at the centre of the discussion. The present paper seeks to remedy this situation by addressing the following question: how should a just housing policy take account of the importance of our freedom to disassociate from others? The paper argues that a satisfactory housing policy, from the perspective of protecting our freedom to disassociate from others, would look markedly different to present-day housing policy in places like the UK. Among other things, protecting our freedom to disassociate from others requires radical changes to rental markets. *Keywords*: Housing; freedom of association; co-habitation; exit; relationships

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Panel Session Abstracts

Panel Session	***The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness*** What does it mean that a public institution is trustworthy? The contemporary philosophical debate in institutional theory offers two main resources to delineate the contours of institutional trustworthiness. One resource, widely accepted across the social sciences, comes from the competence view of public institutions. Public institutions are defined by their capacity actually to fulfil the function and achieve the purpose for which they were created. In this view, institutional trustworthiness can be investigated by adopting an 'exogenous perspective', which analyses the external reactions to institutional functioning and its failure (e.g., citizens' trust in representative institutions). Another resource comes from looking at public institutions through a deontological lens, which focuses on the normative commitments that model and guide the actions of institutional members. In this view, we access an 'endogenous perspective' on institutional trustworthiness, which focuses on the internal reactions of officeholders to institutional functioning and its failure (e.g., officeholders' disobedience). This panel aims to discuss institutional trustworthiness from a philosophical perspective; analyze its conceptual and normative grounds; compare and contrast various normative views of institutional trustworthiness. Papers will engage, inter alia, with such themes as: - the conceptual links between institutional (dys)functions and institutional trustworthiness; - the normative relation between internal answerability practices (e.g. transparency requirements, whistleblowing) and the trustworthiness of the dynamics of officeholders' interaction; - the difference between responsive and reliable institutions and trustworthy institutions; - the relation between institutional trustworthiness and other significant properties of public institutions, such as integrity or transparency. ***Papers:*** **Ceva, Emanuela** (University of Geneva), **Bocchiola, Michele** (University of Geneva), and **Giunta, Martino Marta** (University of Geneva) *Institutional Trustworthiness. An endogenous perspective.*

This paper introduces a novel view of institutional trustworthiness as an endogenous normative property of operational public institutions.

A public institution is a system of interrelated rule-governed roles (the offices) occupied by human persons (the officeholders). Power mandates are attributed to the institutional roles in keeping with the normative ideas that justify the establishment of a public institution and regulate its working. Institutional action is thus constituted by the officeholders' interrelated uses of their powers of office.

We explain how predicating the operability of institutional action means to attribute certain constitutive properties to a public institution that qualify the officeholders' interrelated uses of their powers of office. Institutional operability should be understood as a 'metaproperty' of institutional action. We elucidate this understanding by contrast with conceiving institutional operability as either a supervenient or a range property of institutional action. This clarification is essential for understanding the relationship between institutional operability and its constituent properties. One such property, we argue, is 'office accountability'. We have office accountability when officeholders can justify to each other the rationale of the uses of their powers of office as coherent with the terms of those powers' mandate. Because this justificatory exercise is primarily internal to a public institution, office accountability enhances the relations of interdependence between the officeholders' actions. This enhancement is key to generating a special kind of institutional trustworthiness, endogenous to institutional action, as the officeholders' mutual trust that their interrelated action sustains institutional operability.

This novel endogenous perspective on institutional trustworthiness integrates current 'exogenous' approaches centered on the external reactions to institutional action (e.g., citizens' (dis)trust in representative institutions). This integration is essential as it points to the heart of what makes a public institution operational by calling officeholders to their responsibility to work together to sustain institutional action from the inside.

Gold, Natalie (Oxford University)

Can institutions be trustworthy and honest?

Honesty is a key component of trustworthiness. It has recently been argued that, for individuals, in order for honest behavior to be considered virtuous, it must stem from a constrained set of motivations. However, thinking about the honesty of institutions challenges that picture. We often need institutions to reveal information truthfully and not to cheat us, as a part of being trustworthy. What is the moral and epistemic standing and responsibilities of institutions? Is it appropriate to consider institutions as being honest in the sense of exhibiting morally praiseworthy? In particular, what should we think of the organization when individuals follow procedures but are not motivated by any desire or commitment to be trustworthy: what is the relationship between the honesty of an institution and the motivations of the individuals within it? I answer these questions by considering them in the context of empirical research on honesty of institutions and of real-life case studies of honest and dishonest behavior in financial institutions. I look at the different ways in which an institution can be (dis)-honest, including the prevailing culture and norms in the institution and in the industry, individual bad actors, and poor incentive structures for employees. I establish the possibility of a mismatch between employee and institutional honesty (and its limits) and use this to inform my analysis.

Vallier, Kevin (Bowling Green, OH)

Political Trust

	Political trust, trust in government, has been in decline in the United States for decades. This trust collapse is arguably connected to American political polarization, perhaps as both cause and effect, and so should be of interest to political philosophers. Towards this end, this essay develops an account of political trust that is both analytically intuitive and that fits the empirical literature on political trust. I argue that a public exhibits political trust to the extent that its members generally believe that government officials are necessary or helpful for achieving public political goals and that most or all government officials are generally willing and able to do their part to achieve those goals, knowingly or unknowingly, by following institutional norms, where moral reasons are sufficient to motivate compliance with those norms. This account classifies political trust as a subset of social trust (trust in society), which is in turn a subset of interpersonal trust. I also explain how researchers measure political trust and what they identify as the causes and consequences of political trust.

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration

Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Panel Session	***The Rights of the Family in the Context of Immigration*** Moral and political philosophers have devoted a significant amount of attention to the rights that parents have in receiving tax-funded support when meeting the costs of child-rearing. They have also closely examined the social rights of immigrants – including whether immigrant have a right to bring family members with them when they immigrate to the host state. However, limited scrutiny has been given to how answers to these two questions affect each other. Yet, as this panel will show, our best accounts of the rights of the family and of immigration need to be more fully integrated. One reason for this is that a significant contribution the family makes to society – namely, that of raising new members – can to some extent be substituted for by immigration. The possibility of immigration thus calls into question the case for pro-family policies. Another reason is that immigrants are themselves members of families, and their rights to family life may thus affect the nature of their rights as immigrants. It may mean that they must have a right to bring family members with them when they immigrate. If this is the case, the extent to which immigration is a more "cost-efficient" alternative to "local" procreation as a source of new members for a society becomes unclear, for in admitting immigrants, a society may be required to admit their children, too, and thus to cover the costs that those immigrants face, as parents, in rearing their children. This panel will explore these, and other interactions, between accounts of the rights of the family, and of immigration, and thus contribute towards redressing a significant deficit in applied moral philosophy. ***Papers*** **Bou-Habib, Paul** (University of Essex) and **Olsaretti, Serena** (ICREA and University Pompeu Fabra) *Children or Migrants as Public Goods?* Who should pay for child-rearing? There is no question that taxpayers must support the basic needs of children whenever families are unable to do so. But should families meet a greater share of the costs of child-rearing than they currently do, assuming they are able to do so? The most influential answer this question invokes the public goods argument. It maintains that child-rearing costs must be shared between taxpayers and the family in a way that reflects the fact that child-rearing generates human capital from which all citizens benefit. Although the public goods argument has been subjected to scrutiny, it has not been examined against the assumption that states are able to receive human capital from skilled immigration. The availability of skilled immigration reduces the extent to which citizens need to rely on the family as a

source of human capital. This paper thus asks: does the possibility of replacement migration undermine the public goods argument?

The paper's main claim is that the public goods argument is not undermined by the possibility of replacement migration. We begin by clarifying the kinds of family policies we focus on in the paper. We next explain exactly how replacement migration poses a challenge for the public goods argument in favour of family polies. The remainder of the paper then analyses whether this challenge is decisive. We distinguish between three different versions of the public goods argument. We argue that only the pro-natalist version of the argument is threatened by the availability of replacement migration. Two other versions of the public goods argument – which we call, the pro-investment and the fairness versions – are not vulnerable to the challenge posed by replacement migration. The article thus shows that the public goods argument for family policies is robust despite the availability of replacement migration.

Ferracioli, Luara (The University of Sidney)

Temporary Migration and Children's Rights

Which rights in temporary migration are non-negotiable, and which rights can be put aside so as to create an incentive for the pursuit of temporary migration schemes by affluent liberal states? According to Gillian Brock, temporary immigrants should have access to an array of core civil rights, but not a right to bring their children with them. For Brock, the fact that many parents in liberal societies choose careers that include long-term family separation without social sanction shows that such separation is morally permissible. In this essay, I argue that Brock is wrong in accepting the separation of parents and children as a cost of ensuring that temporary migration arrangements are sufficiently feasible. In particular, I argue that the right of children not to be separated from each parent creates stringent obligations on migrants, their employers, as well as host societies.

In part I, I discuss and criticise Brock's argument against a right to family life. I argue that Brock's appeal to the socially acceptable choice that some parents make to be away from their children does not establish that such choices are morally permissible. In Part II, I discuss what the right to family life means for the design of temporary migration schemes. In particular, I argue that the interests of children create stringent obligations on host societies not to implement schemes that foreseeably lead to the separation of parents and their children. In Part III, I discuss the gender dimension of temporary migration and argue against live-in caregiver arrangements in host societies due to the costs for mothers in the global south. I conclude that justice in temporary migration requires the ability of parents to migrate with their children, promote their children's interests, and access work that is conducive to family life.

Meijers, Tim (Leiden University)

Migrants by Plane and Migrants by Stork: Can we Refuse One but not the Other?

States combine the routine refusal of citizenship to migrants with polices that grant new-borns born to citizens (or residents) full membership of the society in question without questions asked. What, if anything, can justify this differential treatment of the two types of newcomers? Is there a morally relevant difference between migrants and children born to citizens (or residents)? The paper assumes a statist position, allowing for considerable partiality towards compatriots. Even with this starting point, differential treatment is hard to defend. Although some justification for differential treatment exists, the case for it is weak and limited. Those who embrace statist theories face a dilemma: give up differential treatment or let go of partiality towards compatriots.

	The paper explores various arguments for differential treatment and their limitations. Perhaps some of the reasons we have for thinking states have a right to exclude migrants do not apply to newborns? Some theorists defend the right to exclude migrants for sustainability and population size-reasons. I argue that there is no reason to think expanding the population through migration is less sustainable. Second, one may think the relevant difference between migrants and new-borns is their differential impact on the (political) culture of the society. Yet, both types of newcomers will have a transformative impact. Third, perhaps the newcomers themselves differ. Migrants are usually not babies. Perhaps we have particular obligations to babies, as vulnerable beings. Although such obligations exist, they do not necessary include or imply a right to citizenship. Moreover, many migrants are vulnerable too. The best argument for differential treatment is the interest parents have in shared citizenship with their children. But this argument, too, has several limitations. And it has implications that those who embrace the statist position find hard to accept – for example that unwanted children are not entitled to citizenship.

Society for Applied Philosophy

Annual Conference 2021, 2 – 4 July (Zoom)

Concurrent Session Abstracts (arranged by session, alphabetically by author surname)

Concurrent Session 1 | Concurrent Session 2 | Concurrent Session 3 | Concurrent Session 4 | Concurrent Session 5 | Concurrent Session 6 | Concurrent Session 7

Panel Session Abstracts (follow at the end)

All panel abstracts

The Philosophical Dimension of Institutional Trustworthiness

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Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence

Panel Session	***Philosophy of Sport: The Ethics of Excellence*** What is the point of sport? The papers in this panel develop the view that sport is, most fundamentally, an excellence-based activity. The value of sport resides principally in its providing an avenue by which admirable human skills and capacities can be cultivated, tested, and manifested. Recent controversies in elite and professional sport involving leading athletes such as Lance Armstrong, Oscar Pistorius, and Caster Semenya have underscored the ethical dimension of sport. In these debates concerning the use of performance enhancing drugs ('doping'), the use of carbon fibre prosthetic limbs, and binary sex segregation in sport, excellence-based reasons are in the foreground of normative analysis. Excellence has played a central role not only in public debate but also in philosophical debate about sport. Interpretivists about sport such as John Russell and Robert L. Simon, inspired by Ronald Dworkin's legal philosophy, appeal to excellence as the grounding value in their normative theories of sport. However, sporting excellence has commanded more support than scrutiny in the philosophy of sport literature. This panel will fill this lacuna by exploring complementary aspects of sporting excellence. The panel will address the following questions concerning the nature and application of 'excellence' in sport: 1. What constitutes sporting excellence? [Pike] 2. Is sporting excellence in a given sport relative to different sporting cultures? [Eylon] 3. How can sporting excellence be undermined or promoted by rule designers and adjudicators? [Devine] 4. What is the relationship between excellence and other (potentially competing) values such as 'inclusion' and 'fairness'? [Howe] In addressing this cluster of questions, the panel will provide the beginnings of a systematic philosophical analysis of the nature, contours, and moral significance of excellence in sport, and it will bring these theoretical insights to bear on the leading ethical problems in sport of enhancement and sex segregation. ***Papers***: **Devine, John William** (Swansea University) *Taking Excellence Seriously: Ethics and Enhancement in Sport*

What forms of enhancement should be permitted in sport? Arguments concerning the justifiability of enhancement in sport have revolved around three principal considerations: 1. harm, 2. fairness, and 3. excellence. Excellence-based arguments remain the least developed. Despite the concept being invoked regularly in the literature and the display of athletic excellence being one of the primary justifications for competing in or caring about sport, the philosophy of sport lacks a theory of sporting excellence.

The enhancement debate has been unduly narrow not only in the neglect of excellence (an important candidate justificatory criterion) but also in revolving around one mode of enhancement – performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) – in isolation from the myriad other forms of enhancement that sport governing bodies must adjudicate.

This paper addresses both shortcomings by examining how excellence-based arguments should inform the enhancement debate not limited to PEDs. I argue that the fundamental rationale for sporting competition is the display of sporting excellence. 'Excellence' is understood not comparatively but as exemplary of valuable human capabilities. There are four ways in which an enhancement may undermine sport as an excellence-based activity. Enhancement may undermine a sport's:
1. Cluster of Excellences: The enhancement may alter the set of excellences that are tested within the sport (e.g. speed, strength, strategic nous);
2. Quantum of Excellence: The enhancement may reduce the amount of excellence displayed in a sport;
3. Clarity of Excellences: The enhancement may obscure the degree to which those excellences are observable in the sport;
4. Balance of Excellences: The enhancement may disrupt the appropriate relation (structure of relative importance) between excellences within the sport.

These concerns contribute to a single interpretivist principle called the 'Excellence Principle'. I argue that the Excellence Principle is a desideratum for any adequate normative theory of enhancement in sport.

Eylon, Yuval (Open University, Israel)

Values, Relativism And Excellence

I argue that what counts as an excellence in sports (quickness, ball-control, etc.) is relative to a conception of the sport - a culture of playing the sport, which in turn manifests an ethical outlook.

Relativism about sports excellences seems either trivially true, or false. It is trivially true in the sense that different sports require different skills. However, for each given competitive sport, it seems that excellence is internally defined - the quickest sprint is the excellent sprint, and similarly in the more complex cases of sports that involve a multitude of skills such as football (however we determine what being 'better overall' means). Relativism seems unwarranted.

Since winning is the constitutive aim of competitive games, it seems to follow that playing well is playing to win. But if so, how can other values (playing fairly, playing spectacularly, taking risks, playing entertainingly) be anything but distractions? The response is that the end of the game is not merely winning, but winning well - or more accurately a particular type of win: a fair win, a spectacular win, an at-all-costs win, winning simpliciter (which is just one type of win amongst others), etc. This claim is defended by showing that it accounts for several phenomena.

Finally, the end of the game (a type of win) is internally related to the excellences of a game: the type of win pursued defines what counts as playing well and as good performance. Therefore, inasmuch as there are different and incompatible ideals of wins, this allows for a relativism of sporting excellence: excellences in sports are relative to conception of playing well in a similar way in which virtues of excellences are taken to be relative to conceptions of the good life, and thus to different ethical outlooks of games and of the good life.

Howe, Leslie A. (University of Saskatchewan, Canada)

The Importance of Fairness to Excellence

Insofar as sport is understood as fundamentally involving a contest of some sort between human individuals on the basis of developed bodily movement (involving skill, strength, and/or endurance), that contest entails two primary and ineradicable values: excellence and fairness.

Whether the mechanisms of sport are understood as designed to produce (or develop) excellence in the form of singular individuals (champions) or to advance individual excellence broadly through a wider community, two things are needed: wide inclusion of possible competitors and fair conditions of competition. Inclusion matters because if competition is arbitrarily limited the better potential competitor may be overlooked or valuable challenges never presented and excellence not achieved. Fair competition, however, requires a competition-enabling exclusion. The term “excellence” itself implies difference and difference between human bodies in sport is not only an outcome but an operating condition, one that necessitates a standard of fairness in order to achieve excellence. This is both a conceptual and a practical requirement: because the development of excellence is promoted through challenge, competitors should be appropriately matched (as through competition classes/categories). To always win or lose due to gross mismatch produces no certainty in assessment and little excellence, but produces only hollow champions.

As a human good, sport should be open for all to participate in if they so wish, and more participation benefits sport through a wider development of excellence. Doing so, however, requires recognising incompatibilities and adoption of practical measures to ensure the principle of fairness is met in opportunity and in competition. Participation in sport is a good, not a right, and its benefit is illusory if access and practice are not governed by fairness: if these are not fair, there is neither excellence nor sport.

Pike, Jon (Open University, UK)

Excellence in Sport and a Skilful Grip on Affordances.

I will argue that excellence in sport is constituted by the ability to do, and success in doing, very difficult potential actions (or affordances).

Excellence consists in doing something well. In sport, the things that participants want to do well, and spectators want to be done well, are various affordances. It seems that this is a matter that requires additional criteria of wellness, over mere success. But I will argue that these cases reduce to cases where, if the affordances are difficult enough to identify, and difficult enough to complete successfully, excellence is simply a matter of doing them simpliciter (that is, to succeed in doing them). Sport, even non-competitive sport, tends to funnel its participants towards difficult affordances. We find

	ourselves situated in a biophysical environment, act in that environment and succeed or fail. The affordances in question consist in the direct relationship between the agent and their biophysical environment, and excellence in sports resides in doing some of the most difficult biophysical tasks that there are to be done. The Fosbury flop, the front crawl, and Simone Biles' triple double somersault are new ways of moving bodies. As such, they are examples of excellence. When we find new, very difficult ways to move, we are discovering something about the possibilities that exist in the world, rather than creating something ab initio. I will argue, then, that excellence in sport has much more to do with pre-institutional affordances than it has to do with rules. Like sports themselves, sporting excellence is rooted in our biophysical environment rather than in conventions, or 'constitutive' rules.