

Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Conference 2010
Abstracts (arranged alphabetically by author surname)

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<p>Sara Belfrage Royal Institute of Technology</p>	<p>Coercion, exploitation and paying for research participation</p> <p>In research where people are involved, for instance in psychology or biomedicine, it is generally agreed that efforts should be made as to avoid research subjects being coerced into participation and also to avoid those participating being exploited. Coercion is bad because it compromises voluntariness, exploitation because it compromises justice. The issue of paying, or compensating, participants for their involvement raises concerns regarding both coercion and exploitation, and these two ‘wrongs’ are often discussed together. In this paper I clarify the meaning of, as well as the relation between, coercion and exploitation in this context. I also show that in order to avoid both, there are only two options available. The first, which applies to all kinds of research, is to offer no payment at all to participants. The second, which is only applicable to research of one kind (the kind resembling ordinary jobs), is to offer a decent amount equivalent to a ‘fair wage’. Hence, there is no support for the current praxis to offer participants small amounts of money, often called not ‘payment’ but ‘compensation’. The argument presented in this paper is of practical relevance if we believe that people are in fact motivated to participate in research by the money offered, and I do think that we have reason to believe that this is the case.</p>
<p>David Rhys Birks University of Manchester</p>	<p>The Value of Decision-Making Capability</p> <p>Consider the following commonly held view: If a person is of sound mind, and is making a self-regarding voluntary choice, we should always respect his decision to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether we believe that there is a reason to refuse treatment or not. It is only when a person lacks decision-making capability that it can be justified to disregard his voluntary choice and administer treatment. In this paper I will argue against this common view and instead propose that we should not always respect a person’s self-regarding voluntary choice, even if they have decision-making capability.</p> <p>My argument proceeds as follows. First, I claim that decision-making capability does not generate a reason not to administer treatment, even if a person chooses not to have treatment. This is because I accept an account of reasons which holds that our desires are only endorsements of reasons, and do not generate reasons. As a result, if there is a reason to provide medical treatment to a person, and there is no independent defeating reason not to administer the treatment, then his refusal to have treatment cannot itself provide a reason not to administer medical treatment to him. This is not to deny that sometimes there can be significant instrumental reasons to respect an individual’s choice not to receive medical treatment. For example, the disvalue of intervention sometimes can be far greater than its alleged benefit. Nonetheless, there are instances in which these instrumental reasons will be defeated by the reason to administer treatment, such as situations where absence of treatment leads to extreme suffering or death. In these cases, contrary to the common view, it is permissible to administer medical treatment</p>

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	regardless of the person's decision-making capability.
Tom Campbell Charles Sturt University	<p>Explanation and Prescription in Applied Legal Philosophy</p> <p>Applied legal philosophy is usually understood to be organised around morally evaluative questions concerning legal issues of some complexity and requiring knowledge of significant social and political detail, such as policy oriented studies of criminal responsibility. This is in contrast to morally neutral conceptual analysis of fundamental legal concepts, the paradigm being Hart's Concept of Law. The emergence of the applied philosophy movement can be seen as a reaction to the post World War II philosophical orthodoxy which excluded first order moral questions from philosophy. However there is currently a lively debate about whether the analytical legal philosophy requires to be located within a broader study that is either explanatory (Leiter and MacCormick, in different ways) or normative (Waldron, sometimes), or some mixture of the two (Schauer). There is a particular dispute as to whether moral considerations may properly bear on the analysis of the concept of law on account of its morally significant implications (Coleman, Marmor, Perry, Murphy etc). If so, then these apparently purely abstract issues can be regarded as applied legal philosophy, with the methodological implications this brings with it. The paper explores these issues in relation to 'normative legal positivism' (Waldron, Campbell, Goldsworthy) both as a morally prescriptive theory concerned with what form law ought to be given, and as a way of re-interpreting apparently morally neutral conceptual analysis in modern jurisprudence. Emphasis will be on methodologically distinguishing normative legal positivism from the work of post-positivists such as MacCormick and Raz. This is in part a turf war not just a matter of division of academic labour.</p>
Steve Clarke University of Oxford	<p>Are (Applied) Philosophers' Intuitions Reliable?</p> <p>Appeals to intuitions are made in a variety of areas of philosophy, including applied philosophy. For example, Thomson famously developed an argument about the morality of abortion, appealing to our intuitions about the morality of a case that she held to be analogous to abortion, involving a famous musician hooked up to another person's body as a form of temporary life support. Many appeals to intuitions are appeals to intuitions as a source of evidence. The credibility of intuitions as evidence has recently come under attack by members of the experimental philosophy movement, who have produced evidence that ordinary intuitions about philosophical issues vary significantly in response to cultural background, educational level, variations in affective states and the order of presentation of thought experiments. All of these are factors that appear philosophically irrelevant, so it seems hard to square these findings with the claim that ordinary intuitions provide a reliable basis for philosophical claims. Here I examine one influential line of response to the challenge to ordinary intuitions about philosophical issues presented by experimental philosophers. This is the response that Alexander and Weinberg refer to as 'intuition elitism'. It involves denying that ordinary intuitions are relevant to philosophy and arguing that the considered intuitions of professional philosophers are the evidential source that philosophers implicitly</p>

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	<p>appeal to (and should appeal to) when deploying intuitions as an evidential source. I consider this line of argument from three angles. First, I ask whether it plausibly accounts for our practices when we appeal to intuitions in philosophy. Second, I ask whether it genuinely relieves those who employ it from the onus of responding to experimental philosophers' findings. Third, I consider empirical research on the intuitions of other professionals to see if lessons can be learned about the reliability of the intuitions of professional philosophers.</p>
<p>Ramon Das Victoria University of Wellington</p>	<p>On the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory</p> <p>This paper develops an understanding of the ideal/non-ideal distinction according to which, fundamentally, it concerns the extent to which a normative theory includes as a provisional starting point relevant empirical assumptions about the social world and/or human nature. Whether a theory is ideal or non-ideal is thus a matter of degree. Put somewhat differently, the primary determinant of whether a normative political theory is ideal or non-ideal is the extent to which it fleshes out in a relevant manner the referent of 'here' in the practical question: 'How do we get there from here'? The word 'relevant' indicates that this empirical (descriptive/explanatory) project can be expected to vary according to context and normative purpose. A non-ideal theory about health-care reform in the United States will naturally focus on different empirical assumptions from a non-ideal theory about ending global poverty. Deciding which empirical assumptions are relevant to the case at hand is largely a matter of judgment, and it may not be possible to make very general recommendations about which assumptions should be included and which left out. The paper is structured as follows. First, an account is provided of the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory. Second, this account is illustrated by discussing a recent non-ideal theoretic approach to preventive war. Third, the account is compared and contrasted with other recent work in the literature. Finally, it is briefly indicated how the present understanding of non-ideal theory is particularly well-suited to addressing current debates in global justice. Throughout, the discussion is guided by the idea that the ideal/non-ideal distinction is most fruitfully understood along lines that divide work that is practically useful as a guide to action and institutional design, from work that is not as useful in this respect.</p>
<p>Alison Denham Tulane University and Oxford University</p>	<p>Responding to Distress: mindreading deficits in psychopathic subjects</p> <p>In the past decade, few experimental studies have provoked greater interest among moral theorists than James Blair's remarkable investigations of psychopathy and autism. Blair was among the first to ask what we might learn from a comparative examination of the morally salient characteristics of subjects affected by these two disorders. His studies addressed, inter alia, the question of what role, if any, 'mindreading (theory of mind) deficits play in the genesis of the morally deviant conduct associated with psychopathy. The question was an inspired one, and moral philosophers have been quick ' perhaps at times too quick ' to interpret his findings as offering empirical vindication for their favoured views of moral agency and judgment. In the first part of this paper I will set out how two theorists, Shaun Nichols and Jeanette</p>

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	<p>Kennett, have interpreted Blair’s findings. Their resulting accounts of the nature of psychopathic disorder are not only different but incompatible. Nonetheless, Nichols and Kennett rely on a common and central interpretive thesis: both take Blair’s comparative results to show that a subject’s competence in moral judgment is in general independent of his proficiency as a mindreader. This interpretive thesis is the focus of my discussion in Part II. I there re-consider two empirical claims that serve as premises supporting it. The first premiss is that Blair’s autistic subjects suffer mindreading deficits in ways that sustain the needed contrast with the mindreading skills of psychopaths, namely in their ability to respond discriminately to states of distress in others. The second premiss is that Blair’s psychopathic population (or more precisely, Factor 1 psychopathic individuals generally) are not subject to morally salient mindreading and TOM-related cognitive deficits. I argue that these premises are not supported by the data, and therefore provide additional warrant for either Nichols’s or Kennett’s conclusions. In Part III I sketch an alternative hypothesis: psychopaths are selective ‘mindreading egocentrics’, subtly impaired in their ability to detect and internally represent phenomenologically characterised states of distress (especially pain, fear and sadness) in others and even in their own past and present selves.</p>
<p>James DiGiovanna John Jay College</p>	<p>Applications in Epistemology: Knowledge, Understanding and Pedagogy</p> <p>If teaching is about imparting knowledge, then epistemology should provide a definition, and thus a goal, for what it is that we are to deliver to students. But if we simply impart justified, true beliefs (following the standard definition of ‘knowledge’), we may have given our students nothing more than trivia. That is, they may have a set of facts, but not the skills needed to use them, nor an understanding of what those facts mean and how they connect. As a result, I argue here that the JTB (justified, true belief) model is wanting not because of the problems posed by Gettier cases, but because it doesn’t answer to a basic intuition about knowledge. That is, it fails to include understanding, here understood as the capacity to make connections between atomic knowledge pieces, to produce novel claims by virtue of knowing some prior claims, and to enact the knowledge in various forms, depending on the field of knowing. In this paper I give examples to show that understanding is already tacitly understood to be an aspect of knowledge, and then go on to discuss how that can guide our pedagogy. This will include expanding the conception of knowledge so that it admits of degrees, even in regard to individual propositions. That is, I know a claim or proposition better insofar as I understand it more, and I understand it more insofar as I can connect it to more other claims, answer questions about it, introduce novel claims that draw from it, and use it in various applications. This paper will draw from both epistemological research by philosophers such as Wayne Riggs, Jonathan Kvanvig and Linda Zagzebski, as well as work in the psychology and philosophy of pedagogy, especially research and developments coming from Lev Vygotsky’s notion of the ‘zone of proximal development.’</p>
<p>Souzy Dracopoulou Middlesex</p>	<p>How useful is philosophy in clinical and public policy making settings?</p>

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University	<p>We think of philosophy as being essentially critical of any established beliefs. The moral philosopher is expected to engage in questioning and debate about accepted moral positions and to shy away from any easy answers. This Socratic understanding of philosophy conflicts sharply with the expectations facing applied philosophers today. In the clinical setting, for example, the bioethicist is called upon to advise on issues that require immediate resolution. A critical stance here, in which debate is encouraged and answers are non imminent, is simply not an option. It is in many respects similar in the context of public policy making, where bioethicists are consulted. Ongoing debate, moreover critical of any community values and cultural practices, will appear out of place here also. In this paper I put forward a critical review of certain broad approaches to addressing the above conflict and offer some suggestions based on the results of this review. One general approach is that the critical nature of philosophy should under no circumstances be compromised in the context of its application, whether this is the clinical setting or the public policy making environment. I look at a range of views, from the one that applied philosophy is not a legitimate discipline whatsoever, to the view that the competent use of philosophy's critical tools can make an essential contribution in certain applied areas. The critical, analytical skills that philosophers provide go hand in hand with a number of moral theories, that have traditionally been thought to lent themselves well to the needs of the bioethicists. Examples of public policy shaped by one or other of these ethical theories abound. However the problems with this second approach are many, not least with respect to the justification of one theory over another as well as their assumed universal status.</p>
Kevin Elliott University of South Carolina	<p>Geoengineering and the Precautionary Principle</p> <p>As it becomes increasingly doubtful that the international community will take adequate steps to mitigate climate change, interest has grown in the possibility of geoengineering earth's climate to prevent catastrophic levels of warming. Nevertheless, geoengineering schemes have the potential to create grave, unintended consequences. This paper explores the extent to which the precautionary principle (PP), which was developed as a framework for responding to uncertainty, can provide guidance for responding to geoengineering's potential benefits and hazards. It argues for three conclusions. First, there are so many different versions of the PP and so many strategies for geoengineering that there cannot be any simple relationship between the two. Nevertheless, second, it is possible to identify a range of lessons suggested by many versions of the PP. These include: (a) the importance of taking actions to avoid being saddled with the choice between disastrous climate change or dangerous geoengineering schemes; (b) the value of research on the feasibility and potential hazards associated with specific geoengineering approaches; and (c) the possibility of performing research in ways that increase the likelihood of identifying potential hazards. Third, examination of the geoengineering case provides an opportunity to reflect on a range of important situations--self-defeating scenarios--that raise problems for the PP. These scenarios occur when a threat (e.g., climate change) is so serious that it cannot be tolerated under a particular formulation of the PP, but the only effective measures available for avoiding the threat (e.g., geoengineering)</p>

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	<p>are themselves so dangerous that they must be banned under that formulation of the PP. If we were to face self-defeating scenarios in the geoengineering case, it would be important to draw on other ethical principles, such as the act/omission distinction and the responsibility to obtain appropriate forms of consent before engaging in potentially harmful activities.</p>
<p>Jakob Elster University of Oslo</p>	<p>How outlandish can imaginary cases be?</p> <p>It is common in moral philosophy to test the validity of moral principles by proposing counter-examples in the form of cases where the application of the principle does not give the conclusion we intuitively find valid. These cases are often imaginary and sometimes rather ‘outlandish’, involving teleportation, people with spare sets of eyes hanging from their body, etc. This case-based method for testing principles has received much critical scrutiny recently, in part as the result of a general scepticism towards the use of moral intuitions. But even if we accept the general method of using intuitions about cases, we need to ask how this method should be applied. I will discuss whether we can test moral principles with the help of cases taken from distant possible worlds, or if only cases taken from worlds relatively close to the actual world are relevant when testing principles which are meant to be used in the actual world. A challenge for the latter solution - which I wish to defend - is to find a principled way of delimiting the possible worlds from which counter-examples can legitimately be drawn. I will discuss two possible ways of doing this: 1) We should only consider cases from the actual world or worlds which represent possible futures of the actual world, so that e.g. cases involving teleportation are only relevant if the future invention of teleportation is a real possibility; 2) We should only consider cases which could have arisen in the actual world (and its predecessors in time), because it is in this world that we have developed the moral competence we use when intuitively assessing various cases. I will argue in favour of the second approach, as providing the most plausible basis for the use both of principles and of intuitions in moral thinking.</p>
<p>Katie, Gallagher Princeton University</p>	<p>Risk, Harm, and Justice</p> <p>I argue in this paper that the pervasive, and often un- or under-regulated existence of risk in daily life, poses an ongoing and largely unattended to, but stark, problem for the just state. When young, healthy individuals have no access to simple preventive care procedures because they have no health insurance, when certain counties face exorbitant pollution levels because they lie downstream or downwind from major industrial areas, and when all of us consume toxins known to producers but left for expediency in the food that we eat every day, we can say that something is going very wrong. I argue in the paper that the wrong stems from the fact that risks, even in their pure form, constitute harms, and that this fact generates distributive obligations on the part of riskers towards their prospective riskers. The paper is in three parts. In the first part I critique standard arguments from legal philosophy that hold that risk, by its nature, cannot constitute harm. In the second part I offer a novel conceptualization of risk and an argument as to why it does constitute harm. I call this conceptualization the Possible Worlds Conception of risk. I define the</p>

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	<p>imposition of a pure risk as an action which makes accessible to the actual world some alternate possible world in which an injury occurs. I then develop a theory of value which shows how the measure of certain sorts of value in the actual world can rise or fall in light of the degree of instantiation of that value in a range of alternate possible worlds. I show how welfare is one of these values, and use this to show how risks are harms. In the third part I discuss the distributive constraints upon risk imposition that follow.</p>
<p>Hans-Johann Glock University of Zurich</p>	<p>Doing Good by Splitting Hairs? Analytic Philosophy and Applied Ethics</p> <p>Historically speaking, what we now know as applied ethics is a child of analytic philosophy. It arose as the result of two factors that came together in the 1960s: the re-emergence of normative ethics on the one hand, urgent social and political challenges on the other. But is there a significant substantive link? Does applied ethics manifest certain doctrinal, methodological or stylistic commitments of analytic philosophy? What virtues or vices has applied ethics inherited from the analytic movement? And how might it contain the latter without losing the former? My paper will criticize certain aspects of applied ethics as an analytic industry. But it will also defend applied ethics as the most promising contemporary attempt to wrestle inescapable moral problems out of the clutches of religious dogmas and political ideologies. Specific cases discussed will include euthanasia and animal welfare.</p>
<p>Moira Howes Trent University</p>	<p>Intellectual Virtue and Objectivity in Public Discourse about Science</p> <p>If scholarly concepts of objectivity are to influence positively public discourse about science, I argue that the relationship between concepts of objective knowledge and intellectual virtue require clarification. There is a general failure in philosophy of science to explicate how intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellectual courage and intellectual perseverance relate to concepts of objectivity. This is unfortunate, because one good way to improve the quality of public discourse in cases where objectivity is questioned is to raise awareness of the existence of intellectual character and promote its cultivation. The exercise of intellectual virtue is especially important in highly contentious public debates, such as those concerning climate change, corporate influences on scientific practice, and conflicts between religion and science. My argument has two parts. First, I claim that philosophers of science tend to treat intellectual virtues as 'personal' and as such, largely ignore them. Such virtues are 'not public standards of critical discourse but qualities required to participate constructively in such discourse.' (Helen Longino 1997, 30) I argue instead that intellectual virtues are public standards of critical discourse and show this by considering the development and evaluation of intellectual virtues in epistemic communities. Second, I argue that debates about the possibility of objective knowledge' particularly those involving advocates of so-called 'value-free' knowledge' are often really about intellectual virtue and who has and does not have it. This mistake thus obscures the importance of intellectual virtue to scholarly and public debates about science and may have created unnecessary confusion about objectivity in those debates. I contend that clarifying these issues will help improve public</p>

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	discourse about science. Longino, H. 1997. Feminist Epistemology as Local Epistemology. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 71: 19-35.
Patricia Illingworth Harvard University	<p>Charity without Borders</p> <p>As recently as January 2009 the highest court in the European Union (EU) made it possible for members of the EU to donate money to charitable organizations in any country within the EU and to deduct that donation on their national taxes. Thus it overrode what has come to be called water's edge policies, tax policies that limit the reach of the charitable tax deductions. It is too early to know what the impact of this decision will be on giving to other countries, but we should not be surprised to see international giving increase within the EU. In this paper, using the United States as an example, I look at how charitable tax law can be used to increase global giving. I argue that the water's edge policy, according to which organizations that qualify as a charitable deduction for a taxpayer must be organized or created in the United States, should be repealed. I argue that in view of the role that giving plays in creating and cementing relationships among people, and the need to create those relationships globally, global people, will require cosmopolitan giving policies, such as that of the EU. The paper also argues that water's edge policies have detrimental consequences for both giving and global social capital: not only do water's edge policies have expressive content that is inconsistent with cosmopolitan conceptions of the good, they also undermine prospects to develop much needed global social capital and to increase global giving. In contrast, micro financing, is a relatively successful mechanism for diminishing global poverty, and has the potential to contribute to global social capital. When people in rich countries lend money to people (solidarity groups) in poor countries, they signal their trust in these groups, create trust between the lender and borrower, rich country and poor country. Part of the reason for the success of micro financing may have to do with the trust and social capital that are created.</p>
Stephen John University of Cambridge	<p>Is "genetic discrimination" based on bad science, unfair, both, or neither?</p> <p>In recent years, worries have been expressed about the possibility of 'genetic discrimination' in healthcare, insurance and occupational settings. The aim of this paper is to understand on what grounds 'genetic discrimination' might be deemed wrongful. In Section 1, I distinguish two different objections which have been made against practices of 'genetic discrimination': that they are based on bad science; and that they are unfair. I further distinguish three ways in which practices of discrimination might be judged unfair (they distinguish between people on the basis of properties which are irrelevant in some context; they distinguish between people on the basis of properties which are relevant, but over which those individuals have no control; they cause disproportionately unequal outcomes). In Section 2, I argue that the 'epistemic' and the 'unfairness' objection are not, as they might at first appear, separate. Rather, building on recent work in the philosophy of science, I argue that, in policy-making contexts, the appropriateness of a scientific distinction must partly be assessed relative to whether or not it maps onto categories which are</p>

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	<p>generally recognised to be relevant to political and social debate. In Section 3, I show how this claim complicates the question of when and why ‘genetic discrimination’ might be unfair, because we must consider not only whether existing categories are problematic or acceptable, but whether new categories would be problematic or acceptable. In conclusion, I note how the differences between the case of genetic discrimination and more familiar cases such as racial or sexual discrimination might require us to rethink the concept of discrimination more generally, and, in particular, the relationship between discrimination and morally unacceptable attitudes.</p>
<p>Katarzyna Kobos Univ.of Lodz/UC Berkeley</p>	<p>The significance of imaginary cases for applied reasoning</p> <p>In my presentation I will defend the conviction that fictitious cases, predominantly thought experiments, bear with respect to explicit factive verbal descriptions a relation analogical to the one that holds between abstract diagrams and direct pictorial representations (Searle o pictorial representation). I will substantiate my claim by virtue of analyzing the verbal versus non-verbal character of thought experiments, their affinity with models and diagrammatic tools of reasoning that all involve idealization Diagrammatic reasonings (Chandrasekran, Kulpa) enjoy a measure of autonomy (Sloman) from linguistic(to be more specific: sentential) information. Much as they are not derivative upon any formula, their semantic content is embedded in a theory and is not self-supported. Likewise imaginary cases depend upon veridical accounts but prove better at modeling the phenomenon in question by hybridizing selective aspects of case-studies (Nersessian). Note that what in regard to diagrams is dubbed abstract in their schematicity and serves to visualize something not available to the senses, comes to be known as imaginary if delivered by verbal means. Empirical cases are themselves subject to evaluation and fall under general rules. Only imaginary cases, as free from common judgmental classifications and not directly bearing on actual situations, may guide the process of rule-formation. They share with general rules the feature of distorting the representation of any particular instance of reality for the sake of optimal demonstration of its characteristics, namely ‘idealization (Nowak, Weisberg). As general rules such as ‘Do not kill’ or ‘Parallel lines never intersect (in Euclidean geometry)’ require further restrictions to make them viable in practice for neither is robust in reality there being cases without a solution with no casualties or there not being a vantage point from which to observe that parallel lines fail to intersect, so do imaginary scenarios.</p>
<p>Bogdana Koljevic The New School</p>	<p>The Challenges of Contemporary Political Philosophy as Applied Philosophy</p> <p>In this paper the author addresses the issue of contemporary political philosophy as applied philosophy. The author argues that the specificity of political philosophy , in difference both to other areas of philosophy and political practice , is its double challenge and responsibility, for it simultaneously answers to the strictest demands of reason and theory, on the one hand, and to its own potentiality and results in local and global political practices. Moreover, the author claims that contemporary challenges exemplified in questions of the role and meaning of international law, state</p>

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	<p>sovereignty, political identity, democracy and publicity, and the idea of international community, are par excellence issues of contemporary political philosophy. This is to say that the responses to such extraordinary challenges are a matter for a (new) theory and a matter of the possibility of its implementation. The author argues that the leading trace of such an undertaking is to be articulated in between the idea of application of general abstract principles and contextualism in politics, and that a radical defense of exclusivity of either method faces multiple obstacles in both theory and practice - remaining either empty of the sense of practice and creation in politics or reducing political action to political technique and blind occurrence of contingent events, and therefore implicitly presenting a path to anarchy. Similarly, the idea underlined is that forms of arguments and the entire methodology of such political-philosophical investigations is to follow up the empirical concrete cases and examples and to attempt to articulate the conceptual link between empirical events. In conclusion, the author emphasizes the decisive questions for political philosophy today and potentialities of how answers given can and do significantly impact political practices.</p>
<p>Gerald Lang University of Leeds</p>	<p>Solving the Non-Identity Problem</p> <p>The well-known Non-Identity Problem arises from the combination of three claims:(a) Certain acts appear to harm the interests of future individuals, thus wronging them.(b) Those same individuals wouldn't have existed but for the performance of the acts in question; in other words, those acts are identity-affecting.(c) Those same individuals have lives which are worth living overall.If (b) and (c) are true, our grounds for holding (a) seem to be undermined.Let us suppose that Nigella deliberately fails to avoid conception for two months in the knowledge that any offspring conceived in that period will be significantly handicapped. She gives birth to Nigel. Has Nigel been wronged by Nigella? If so, then he should be able to advance a complaint against Nigella. But at this point, he seems exposed to the 'Symmetry Claim': if he is entitled to complain about the harmful effects of Nigella's procreative activity (namely, his possession of a handicap), then he should also acknowledge the beneficial effects of that same activity (namely, his being alive with a life worth living).My solution to the Non-Identity Problem is to dispute the Symmetry Claim. I shall argue that Nigel is entitled to advance a complaint against Nigella on the following grounds: (i) Nigella has behaved carelessly, or callously; and (ii) Nigella can take no moral credit for the beneficial effects of her procreative activity, since she took no steps to see to it that the particular zygote emerging from that activity was Nigel.I will conclude on a more ecumenical note: though Nigella lacks a moral defence against Nigel's complaint, Nigel should, in view of the fact that he is alive and has a life worth living, consider whether he has compelling grounds overall for advancing the complaint which he is nonetheless entitled to advance.</p>
<p>Rob Lawlor University of Leeds</p>	<p>Organ transplants: while we worry about sales, are we exploiting donors?</p> <p>In a previous paper, I have argued that organ sales needn't be exploitative. In</p>

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	<p>this paper, I argue that, if we accept a couple of background assumptions, it follows that allowing the donation of organs is exploitative. Working from the foundation of Wertheimer's account of exploitation, I defend the common sense view that it is possible to take unfair advantage of an individual's generosity or kindness, or their sense of duty. I then consider this in relation to both stranger donation and family/friend donation, and also consider paired donation. The two assumptions I rely on are 1) that organ sales are permissible and 2) that the duty to help the ill is a duty that can be shared more or less fairly and ought to be shared by all who are able to (even if only in the form of paying taxes, which then contribute to funding the NHS). If there is a fair price for a kidney, we should take seriously the possibility that we exploit the donor if we do not pay them the fair price for their kidney, which, of course, includes, not paying them at all. Of course, I do not argue that anyone who gives something for free is exploited. The common sense view that I defend claims that it is possible to exploit the kindness of others, not that all gift-givers are exploited. I argue that we (society/the NHS/the tax payer), but not necessarily the recipient, exploit the donor if we take advantage of his sense of duty or his desire to save a loved one in order to procure an organ for nothing. I argue that this exploitation is clearest in the case of paired donation, but argue that the exploitation can be seen in other cases too.</p>
<p>Judith Lichtenberg Georgetown University</p>	<p>Oughts and Cans: Demandingness and the Limits of Ethical Theory</p> <p>Many philosophers argue that reasonably well-off people have very demanding moral obligations to assist those living in dire poverty. I explore the relevance of demandingness to determining moral obligation, challenging the view that "morality demands what it demands" and that if we can't live up to its demands that's our problem, not morality's. I argue that not only for practical reasons but also for moral-theoretical ones, the language of duty, obligation, and requirement may not be well-suited to express the nature of our responsibilities in these matters. But it is nevertheless morally imperative to reduce global poverty and inequality. I defend an approach that looks to institutions to alter the environment within which people make choices and that employs our understanding of human psychology to encourage changes in behavior.</p>
<p>Catherine Lu McGill University</p>	<p>The idea of settling accounts after political catastrophe</p> <p>What is involved in the idea of settling accounts in the aftermath of political catastrophes, including genocide, interstate and civil war, and oppression? This project focuses on three distinct forms of settling accounts -- through retribution, reparation, and remembrance. All three forms face the challenge that in contexts of political conflict that have culminated in catastrophe, the authority to judge and settle moral accounts is highly controversial. Contestations about authority exist in domestic as well as international contexts, as well as between local, national and international agents and institutions focused on the task of moral accounting. These contestations are most apparent in the retributive realm, where the question of authority to settle moral accounts is tied to the question of authority to punish. My</p>

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	<p>argument, however, is that judgements about individual responsibility and punishment do not exhaust the task of accounting for political catastrophe. Recognizing a more pluralistic notion of accounting for political catastrophes, including other forms of public narrative and self-reflection, opens room for a pluralistic view of the agents who can engage in the task of accounting for political catastrophes. One implication of a pluralistic view of moral accountants and accountings is that contestations about authority to settle accounts are mitigated by an acknowledgement that any accounting for political catastrophe – including judicial judgements – are incomplete, subject to contestation and revision, and will likely remain unsettled. The quest to settle moral accounts once and for all may in fact turn out to be excessively authoritarian and ahistorical, undemocratic or inequitable, and morally as well as politically counterproductive.</p>
<p>Neil Manson Lancaster University</p>	<p>The Ethics of Spin</p> <p>Spin is now a common part of public life: especially in politics and the media. Spin can take subtle forms, managing the way that audiences come to form intended beliefs or attitudes towards, say, a policy or proposal. Spin seems to occupy a peculiar moral space: on the one hand it shares something with morally acceptable forms of self-presentation and management of ‘face’; on the other it has much in common with deception, and yet does not seem to attract the same opprobrium as deception. This paper aims to clarify what spin is, to distinguish different kinds of spin, and to then identify what is morally wrong with (at least some kinds of) spin. In particular, it is argued that insofar as spin essentially involves a higher-level concealment of intentions, most instances of spin are worthy of more moral opprobrium than may be commonly assumed.</p>
<p>Kate Moran Brandeis University</p>	<p>The Family as Friend and Foe of Moral Development</p> <p>From a Kantian perspective, the family is both crucial to the development of moral agency and a source of moral danger. This stems from the fact that at least two capacities seem to be required for moral agency. First, an agent must appreciate the humanity of others. Second, she must be able to think from the standpoint of others. In short, the family is extremely useful (perhaps even necessary) with respect to the first of these goals, but potentially harmful with respect to the second. If we understand ‘humanity’ as the capacity to set and pursue ends, it is crucial that developing agents have a close and sustained relationship with people whose end setting they can observe first-hand. This association allows developing agents to understand others’ choices not as isolated and disembodied ‘events’, but rather as part of a narrative connected to another person’s conception of the good. Through this sustained association, developing agents are also able to observe how the actions of family members affect the ends of others over the long term. So it is not just the fact of others’ humanity that the family allows us to understand, but also the concurrent fact of others’ (and our own) moral efficacy and agency. However, the closeness that allows agents to internalize the fact of others’ humanity also has an isolating effect and can hinder our ability to think</p>

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	<p>from the standpoint of others. Kant observes that habits of thinking tend to get passed down within families, and the isolating effects of the family lie at the heart of contemporary arguments for public education (e.g. Brighouse and Gutmann). Of course, there are potential remedies to this problem, and in the final part of the paper, I discuss the obligations that parents might have with respect to avoiding these dangers.</p>
<p>Jennifer Mulnix UMASS Dartmouth</p>	<p>Can the Empirical Psychologist Teach the Philosopher Anything about Happiness?</p> <p>What is happiness, and how is it best achieved? This paper explores the interplay between philosophy and empirical psychology on the subject of happiness. Certainly, questions over what is the nature of happiness, or what happiness is, differ from questions concerning what is likely to cause happiness. But how do the notions of happiness presupposed in studies by empirical psychologists relate to certain normative philosophical conceptions of happiness? This paper presents several competing philosophical conceptions of happiness as well as what they imply about the actual pursuit of a happy life. Finally, this paper concludes by reflecting on the question of whether the mere contemplation of the nature of happiness by itself can cause one to be happier (regardless of what view of happiness one ultimately adopts). To address this question, I discuss some preliminary empirical research conducted on college students enrolled in a 'Philosophy of Happiness' course.</p>
<p>Colleen Murphy Texas A&M University</p>	<p>Confronting Wrongdoing: The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice</p> <p>Scholars have coined the term 'transitional justice' to refer to the appropriate way to address a legacy of wrongdoing in contexts where societies are emerging from long periods of civil conflict and repressive or autocratic rule, and attempting to transition to democracy. Transitional justice now constitutes an interdisciplinary academic field, and numerous think tanks, such as the International Center for Transitional Justice, take as their mission the promotion of transitional justice. Interestingly, there remain a series of philosophical questions about transitional justice that have received little attention in the literature. The most basic questions are (1) whether transitional justice is in fact a distinctive kind of justice, and (2) what its distinctive demands are. This paper addresses some of the preliminary issues that a defense of transitional justice as a distinctive kind of just must consider. In particular, I first analyze why principles of justice might be context dependent and how context influences principles of justice. I then discuss empirical descriptions of transitional contexts with the aim of identifying the features that the demands of justice in such contexts distinctive.</p>
<p>Shaun Nichols University of Arizona</p>	<p>Brute Retributivism</p> <p>Recent empirical work confirms what many have long believed – ordinary people endorse and act on the basis of norms of retributive justice. Norms of retributive justice are, however, notoriously difficult to justify. This leads many philosophers to reject the legitimacy of those norms. Other philosophers</p>

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	<p>attempt to justify retributivism by adverting to some objective moral footing (e.g., Kant, Moore). In this paper, I will assume that morality is not objective and proceed to argue that retributive norms form part of a set of norms that do not need justification. Of course, this does not mean that retributivism should stand, all things considered. To determine whether we should ultimately preserve our retributive norms will depend on a number of other factors, including both the expected utilities and our other core values.</p>
<p>Ingmar Persson Gothenberg University</p>	<p>Could Liberal Democracy Cope with Climate Change?</p> <p>Human psychology has been designed by evolution to enable humans to live in small-scale societies with technological means of affecting only the immediate environment. For instance, humans are most concerned about a few individuals they personally know and the imminent future, and they feel more responsible for what they cause by themselves rather than together with others. These features make human beings rather ill-suited to come to terms with environmental problems such as climate change which arise because they live in huge societies with millions of citizens and a sophisticated technology which allows them to exercise influence all over the world and far into the future. The political system of liberal democracy seems badly equipped to rectify this situation, since elected politicians will be reluctant to risk the support of the majority by making short-term welfare cutbacks to attain long-term goals. Nonetheless, it should not be thought that human beings are biologically determined to exploit natural resources to exhaustion because more than any other animal humans also are capable of adapting their behaviour in light of their experience.</p>
<p>Thomas Pogge Yale University</p>	<p>The Health Impact Fund: a suitable aim for political reform efforts</p> <p>Some 18 million people die annually from poverty-related causes. Many more are suffering grievously from diseases that could be treated or are severely affected by avoidable death and disease in their families. It is possible substantially to reduce these burdens by supplementing the rules that govern pharmaceutical innovation. These rules, established by the World Trade Organization's TRIPS Agreement, cause advanced medicines to be priced beyond the reach of the poor and steer medical research away from diseases concentrated among them. We should complement these rules with the Health Impact Fund. Financed by many governments, the HIF would offer any new pharmaceutical product the opportunity to participate, during its first ten years, in the HIF's annual reward pools, receiving a share equal to its share of the assessed global health impact of all HIF-registered products. Choosing this option, the innovator would have to guarantee to make this product available, wherever it is needed, at the lowest feasible cost of production and distribution. Fully consistent with TRIPS, the HIF achieves three key advances. It directs some pharmaceutical innovation toward the most serious diseases, including those concentrated among the poor. It makes all HIF-registered medicines cheaply available to all. And it incentivizes innovators to promote the optimal use of their HIF-registered medicines. Magnifying one another's</p>

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	<p>effects, these advances would engender large health gains. And the HIF would also be an exemplar of a morally structured source of global public goods which is politically realistic, scalable, replicable in other domains, and empowering of the global poor.</p>
<p>Orsolya Reich Central European University</p>	<p>The Citizenship Insurance</p> <p>My aim in this paper is to provide a plausible luck egalitarian approach to global justice. This approach is based on a modified version of the thought experiment originally offered by Dworkin in his celebrated <i>What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources</i> (1981). In the first part of the paper, I argue that global justice requires to redress global brute luck inequalities to the extent a hypothetical global citizenship insurance scheme would redress them. In the real world this could happen through progressive national tax systems amended by an international redistributive agency. I also argue that besides direct resource transfers, rectification for the bad brute luck in citizenship could happen by admitting immigrants from badly-off countries too. Some, however, might say that this latter means of rectifying bad brute luck is problematic for luck egalitarians. Luck egalitarians cannot offer morally acceptable policies with regard to immigrant rights. For immigration is a matter of choice, thus citizens of the host countries will not have any obligation by (luck egalitarian) justice to enhance the situation of the newcomers. The second part of the article shows that this worry is unjustified. In my closing remarks I show that although the view on global justice I offer in this paper is very Dworkinian on the face of it, it can be appealing for a wide range of luck egalitarians.</p>
<p>Melinda Roberts The College of New Jersey</p>	<p>Does the Moral Status of Merely Possible People Imply that Early Abortion Is Wrong?</p> <p>Do merely possible people, people who, within a given scenario, never exist, matter morally? Do any losses they incur count against acts that impose those losses and in favor of acts that avoid those losses? Our inclination might be to say that the merely possible don't matter morally, and neither do their losses. Certainly, this position grounds a simple solution to important puzzles in population ethics. However, for reasons I (briefly) review, it is not tenable. Many theorists, accordingly, feel bound to say that the merely possible do, after all, matter morally, and that their losses, like ours, have moral significance. In this paper, I propose an alternative position, one that departs from positions described by Broome, Singer, McMahan, Harman, Hare and others. On my proposal, each person, existing, future and merely possible, matters morally but variably. Thus: Variabilism. A loss incurred at a possible future, or world, <i>w</i> by a person <i>p</i> has moral significance, for purposes of evaluating the act that imposes that loss and the alternative acts that avoid that loss, if and only if <i>p</i> does or will exist at <i>w</i>. Accordingly, the merely possible do matter morally, but any losses they incur when left out of existence altogether have no bearing on the permissibility of the acts that impose (or avoid) those losses. This middle ground on the merely possible suggests a middle ground on abortion. Where an early abortion, by definition, keeps a</p>

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	<p>possible person from ever existing to begin with, Variabilism supports the view that the early abortion is ordinarily permissible, whether it is chosen for a good reason, a poor reason or no reason at all. In contrast, the late abortion, the abortion that ends the life of an existing and otherwise continuing thinking thing, is subject to a distinct analysis.</p>
<p>Yashar Saghai Georgetown University</p>	<p>In search of a welfare criterion for public health nudges</p> <p>Currently in the US and the UK there is a growing interest in certain non-coercive interventions to promote welfare. These “nudges” designate a variety of interventions that steer people in a welfare-promoting direction, without overly burdening choice, by harnessing or circumventing cognitive biases that usually inhibit rational decision-making. However, the main theory supporting nudges, Thaler and Sunstein’s libertarian paternalism, has not provided them with adequate justification. In this paper, I will pursue this line of reasoning in three directions and make my case more concrete by focusing on public health nudges. First, I will show that libertarian paternalists defend an informed desire account of welfare, in which welfare is constituted by what individuals would choose were a variety of limitations on their reasoning abilities lifted. For such a theory to succeed, libertarian paternalists would have to display an idealization method reliably pointing to the good or rational decision. Since they cannot adequately take up this challenge, Thaler and Sunstein are tempted to rely on an arbitrary chosen objective welfare criterion because they intuitively perceive some outcomes as beneficial and others as harmful. Next, I will claim that neo-Aristotelian theories of welfare are in a better position to face this challenge, since they explicitly argue for an objective account of welfare. I will examine the two most important theories of this type specifically elaborated in the domain of public health: Madison Powers and Ruth Faden’s six-dimensions of well-being, which form the basis of their theory of social justice (2008) and Jennifer Prah Ruger’s health capabilities approach (2010). I will show that these two theories endorse a minimal objective criterion of welfare, and that they can offer a more compelling justification for public health nudges than Thaler and Sunstein’s informed desire account. Finally, I will examine the factors that determine the threshold of benefits necessary for justifying the use of public health nudges.</p>
<p>Per Sandin Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences</p>	<p>Women and Children First</p> <p>This paper investigates whether the slogan ‘women and children first’ can be normatively justified when interpreted as a rule of thumb to be applied in emergencies by third-party rescuers, such as professional firefighters. I argue that considerations of utility, responsibility, fair innings, intuitive appeal, and vulnerability all speak in favour of giving priority to children. It is more difficult to argue that women should be given priority. After discussing and dismissing two arguments ‘potential evolutionary advantage and that women’s priority ‘piggybacks’ on the priority of children - I argue that considerations of fairness seem to speak in favour of giving priority to women, but that they are not sufficient to justify the slogan.</p>

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<p>Daniel Schwartz Hebrew University of Jerusalem</p>	<p>The Admissibility of Plan Descriptions and the Impure Tactical Bomber</p> <p>Suppose that an agent triggers various causal chains contributing differentially to her desired aim. It is often assumed that if there is a licit causal chain that sufficiently contributes to the goal, the agent may admissibly exclude from the description of her plan other causal chains which would be wrong for her to rely upon exclusively, mainly or partly. Nevertheless, to exclude from practical calculation the contribution made by ‘bad causal chains’ seems both irrational and morally wrong (for reasons explained in the paper it violates harm minimization). Here I provide some arguments that cast doubt on the claim that to include the contribution of bad causal chains in rational calculation and to adjust the plan accordingly converts the components of that causal chain in intended means and makes one morally responsible for them. I use for illustration the case of the ‘the Impure Tactical Bomber’, a bomber who takes in account the beneficial demoralizing effects of the civilian deaths caused by the destruction of a munitions’ factory. She does so by readjusting her bombing plan so that the total effect of her actions determines the amount of bombing that should be done.</p>
<p>Michael Tiboris University of California, San Diego</p>	<p>Risk, Wholeheartedness, and Criminal Attempt</p> <p>Legal systems across the world recognize a distinction between attempted and "successful" criminal acts. This distinction is often reflected in the degree of punishment these acts receive. Attempts are generally punished less than successes. But why should this be? Suppose Smith, in the middle of a bank robbery he’s been planning, tries to shoot the teller through what he believes to be a plate glass window. Unbeknownst to him, however, the glass has been replaced with bullet-proof glass. It’s true that, had the glass not been bullet-proof, the result would have been worse. But why should this make the attempt less punishable than if he had in fact killed the teller? From the perspective of Smith’s intent, planning, and action, there is no difference between the outcomes. The different result is traceable to features beyond Smith’s knowledge and control. In this essay, I consider how we might make a principled distinction between attempts and successes for the purpose of imposing criminal punishment. I focus on retributivist theories of punishment, since these seem to face the greatest challenges distinguishing between attempts and successes. This is especially so with ‘completed’ attempts, like Smith’s case, where the attempter’s action is ‘completed’ from their perspective (e.g. the bullet has left the gun). Building on David Lewis’s idea that desert-based views of justified punishment should distinguish attempts and successes based on their ‘wholeheartedness,’ I challenge Lewis’s particular formulation of wholeheartedness as a measure of risk to the victim. Then, I suggest an alternative account of wholeheartedness, which I think is better than Lewis’s, but may nevertheless not be enough to justify the distinction between criminal attempt and success.</p>
<p>Ryan Tonkens</p>	<p>The Virtues and Vices of Rigging the Natural Lottery</p>

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<p>York University</p>	<p>The purpose of this paper is to articulate a novel approach to the issue of human prenatal genetic alteration (PGA). This account is motivated by the need to overcome a serious problem that confronts the PGA debate as it is currently oriented. The problem is that we have no way to test our speculations about the consequences of PGA without begging the question about the moral permissibility of genetically altering unborn humans (i.e. embryos, fetuses). The only way to empirically support our predictions about the actual consequences of PGA is to resort to ethically worrisome (and radical) experimental genetic research. Without a robust understanding of the effects of PGA (on the resulting child, on society, on human nature), there is no way to generate a sound assessment of the risks and benefits of genetically altering humans. The upshot of this is that, despite any plausibility that certain views on PGA may have (e.g. Harris 2007), we cannot reach a sound normative evaluation of PGA as the debate is currently oriented. The suggested solution to this problem is to focus primarily on the character of good parents, rather than the consequences of PGA. A virtue-based approach to the ethics of PGA bypasses the problem outlined herein, where other rights-based and consequentialist views cannot. Here it is asked whether parents who possess the character traits necessary for promoting the overall flourishing of their children would condone PGA for those children. The virtue of parental wisdom is introduced, and used as a basis for evaluating PGA. It is argued that, given the present state of our understanding of the actual risks and benefits of PGA, good parents have good reason not to condone PGA for their children (in very many cases), especially as part of the first wave of genetically altered humans.</p>
<p>Stéphanie Van Droogenbroeck Free University of Brussels</p> <p>and</p> <p>Laszlo Kosolovsky Ghent University</p>	<p>Applied Philosophy extended to Experimental Philosophy: A Case Study in Medical Diagnostics</p> <p>We will show that experimental philosophy (e.g. Knobe & Nichols 2008) can be a helpful tool for applied philosophy. Physicians are often seen as experts in a medical diagnostic process. The status of an expert is closely linked with authority arguments. Medical researchers are interested in how authority works in medicine. This is a key question to have better understanding of an informed decision by patients. We will focus on the use of medical knowledge by the treating physicians. Philosophers have argued that scientific knowledge (Hardwig 1991), moral knowledge (Jones 1999), or almost all knowledge (Webb 1993) depends for its acquisition on trust in the testimony of others. Trust enhances cooperation; because it removes the incentive to check up on other people, it makes cooperation with trust less complicated than cooperation without it (Luhmann1979). The argument for the need to trust what others say is that no person has the intellect, experience, and time necessary to learn, independently, every fact about the world (Simon 1955 & 1972). This and the continuing specialization of medical knowledge, calls in the need to base ones arguments on authority. Doing this reduces our notion of trust to a weaker form, which we would like to call blind trust. It is clear that this has major implications for the way we think about medical decision making. It would be useful to know if and how often physicians are being persuaded by authority arguments. This experimental research will open up the eyes of physicians that authority plays a determining role in their decision-making. When we have</p>

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	<p>acknowledged this we can altogether search for ways to make the relationship more one of justified credence than of blind trust, so renewing the positive effect of trust on cooperation. Thus, experimental philosophy can help applied philosophy.</p>
<p>Mark Vopat Youngstown State University</p>	<p>Innate Talent and the Distribution of Educational Resources</p> <p>It has been a settled view in the philosophic literature that there are such things as innate talents or abilities that are distributed arbitrarily by nature. This acceptance of talent as innate has been generally accepted as an axiom for philosophic discussions about justice. Disparate thinkers such as Rawls and Nozick have each used this assumption, albeit in different ways, to ground their own views on distributive justice. While the role of natural talents and abilities has implications for various theories of distributive justice, it also has serious implications for real-world distributions. One area where natural talents and abilities underpin our decisions regarding the allocation of scarce resources is in the area of public education. Beginning in the 1970s, many school U.S. school districts reallocated their already scarce resources from local schools to specially created magnet schools. Many of these magnet schools have some sort of entrance exam, portfolio, or audition requirement that students must pass in order to gain admission. These selective magnet schools are predicated on the idea that there are certain students that have natural talents and abilities that justify their inclusion in these programs. Such programs are seen as simple meritocracies that look beyond race, gender, ethnicity or socio-economic status, and focus and encourage the innate talent of certain individuals. It is the assumption that such innate talents exist that I take issue with in this paper. The assumption that selective magnet schools are simply rewarding talent ignores the overwhelming amount of research that shows that talent is not innate, but is a combination of opportunity, encouragement, and deliberate practice. Based on this research, I argue that selective and competitive magnet schools are fundamentally unfair to students generally and constitute an unjust use of public resources.</p>
<p>Krushil Watene University of Saint Andrews</p>	<p>Defining Indigeneity, and Capturing the Importance of Indigenous claims</p> <p>At least two issues bear on whether the recently adopted Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is able to instigate and inform real world change. The first is the general challenge of adequately defining or characterizing indigeneity. That is, the challenge of offering an adequate characterization given the diversity amongst indigenous peoples, and the similarities between indigenous peoples and (non-indigenous) ethnic minorities. Given the importance that such a definition has for the states and peoples to which the declaration directly applies, there is good reason to consider (or so this paper contends) the content of our characterizations and the strategies used in reaching them. Thus, in the first section this paper surveys some of the ways in which indigeneity has been (and continues to be) defined, before offering a solution that is 1) open to significant differences, and 2) that helps to provide much needed clarification in light of practical issues. The second and related issue, concerns the nature of indigenous peoples' claims and the question of</p>

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	<p>when (if ever) indigenous claims take priority over non-indigenous claims. In section two we examine the benefits of the characterization of indigeneity offered in section one, and we apply the characterization to current cases. Our conclusion is that current definitions of indigeneity are problematic, and that a pluralistic approach is not only possible but far more useful for understanding indigenous claims.</p>
<p>Justin Weinberg University of South Carolina</p>	<p>When Is Moral Hazard Hazardous?</p> <p>Moral hazard, in its general form, is a phenomenon in which morally good agency directed at some party incentivizes morally bad agency by that party. An example of morally good agency is making cars safer for drivers. An example of morally bad agency is driving recklessly. When making cars safer for drivers incentivizes recklessness by drivers, as some studies suggest, we have moral hazard.</p> <p>Sometimes forms of good agency are objected to because they create moral hazard. Call this the <i>moral hazard objection</i>, or MHO. For example, a policy of unconditional free rescue of stranded hikers (good agency) is sometimes objected to because it will encourage people to go on adventures they are not qualified for, endangering themselves while knowing that others will bear the costs of their lack of preparation (bad agency). Some forms of geo-engineering aimed at ameliorating global warming (good agency) have been objected to on the basis that they will encourage each of us continue to treat the environment poorly (bad agency).</p> <p>While the term “moral hazard” originated in discussions of insurance, examples of it—and objections to it—are widespread in various personal, social, and global contexts. Despite this, the concept has received surprisingly little treatment by philosophers. In this paper, I have three aims. First, I will defend a conception of moral hazard. Second, I will look into which normative commitments are compatible with advancing the MHO, and argue that it is unclear how deontologists of a rather standard stripe could coherently advance the MHO. Third, I will attempt to clarify the conditions under which the MHO is applicable, and how strong an objection it is.</p>
<p>Reginald Williams Bakersfield College</p>	<p>Innocence, Aggression, and Self-Defense</p> <p>Jeff McMahan and Michael Otsuka argue that it is wrong to kill Innocent Aggressors (I-As) and Innocent Threats (I-Ts) in self-defense because they no more intend, or are morally responsible for, their behavior than are Bystanders (Bs), whom it is wrong to kill. Judith Jarvis Thomson and Jonathan Quong argue that killing I-As and I-Ts in self-defense is permissible, even though it is impermissible to kill Bs. I argue that it is permissible to kill I-As but neither I-Ts nor Bs. My claim is that only I-As exhibit aggression, and that it is permissible to kill one to terminate lethal aggression, regardless of whether one intends or is morally responsible for exhibiting it. My argument turns on a new account of ‘aggression’ that focuses on hostility, rather than intention or moral responsibility, as is common in the literature on self-defense.</p>