Journal of Applied Philosophy - Early View Articles

Bodily Violence, Agency, and Animals

Published online on Jan 16, 2018

Abstract

Ethical theories in the Kantian tradition tend to centre heavily on rational agency, so it may appear challenging for such theories to account for the wrongness of bodily violence, especially the wrongness of bodily violence to animals who lack rationality. This article develops a Kantian explanation for the pro tanto wrongness of killing or injuring animals who have agency and lack rationality, based on a Kantian explanation for the pro tanto wrongness of killing or injuring people. Even though morality is grounded in the will of rational agents or the value of rational agency, one does not have to be a rational agent to be morally considerable.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

10.1111/japp.12300 About DOI

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